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ABSTRACT

Author: Mendonca, Flavio, A. C. Ph.D.
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: December 2017
Title: Exploiting Science: Enhancing the Safety Training of Pilots to Reduce the Risk of Bird
Strikes.
Major Professor: Thomas Q. Carney.
Analysis of bird strikes to aviation in the U.S. from 1990 to 2015 indicate that the successful
mitigation efforts at airports, which must be sustained, have reduced incidents with damage and a
negative effect-on-flight since 2000. However, such efforts have done little to reduce strikes
outside the airport jurisdiction, such as occurred with US Airways Flight 1549 in 2009. There are
basically three strategies to mitigate the risk of bird strikes: standards set by aviation authorities,
technology, and actions by crewmembers. Pilots play an important role as stakeholders in the
prevention of bird strikes, especially outside the airport environment. Thus, safety efforts require
enhanced risk management and aeronautical decision-making training for flight crews. The
purpose of this study was to determine if a safety training protocol could effectively enhance
CFR Part 141 general aviation pilots’ knowledge and skills to reduce the risk of bird strikes to
aviation. Participants were recruited from the Purdue University professional flight program and
from Purdue Aviation. The researcher of this study used a pretest posttest experimental design.
Additionally, qualitative data were collected through open-ended questions in the pretest,
posttest, and a follow-up survey questionnaire. The participants’ pretest and posttest scores were
analyzed using parametric and nonparametric tests. Results indicated a significant increase in the
posttest scores of the experimental group. An investigation of qualitative data showed that the
topic “safety management of bird hazards by pilots” is barely covered during the ground and
flight training of pilots. Furthermore, qualitative data suggest a misperception of the safety
culture tenets and a poor familiarity with the safety risk management process regarding bird
hazards. Finally, the researcher presented recommendations for practice and future research.
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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

Successful wildlife hazard management programs at U.S. airports, which must be
sustained, have done little to reduce bird strikes outside the airport environment (Blackwell et al.,
2012; Dolbeer, Weller, Anderson, & Begier, 2016). Integration of new technologies with safety
management systems concepts, the application of new strategies and methodologies at airports,
and national guidelines, can further improve the safety of the aviation industry (Blackwell et al.,
2012; Dolbeer, 2009, 2013; Dolbeer, Wright, Weller, Anderson, & Begier, 2015). Moreover,
these efforts require enhanced risk management and aeronautical decision-making (ADM)
training for flight crews, air carrier operations personnel, and air traffic control (ATC) personnel
(Dolbeer et al., 2016; Eschenfelder & DeFusco, 2010).
Pilots play an important role as stakeholders in the prevention of bird strikes (Dolbeer;
2006a; Dolbeer, 2006b; Eschenfelder, 2005; ICAO, 2012; Mackinnon, 2004; Mendonca, 2008a;
2011, 2016; Nicholson & Reed, 2011), especially outside the airport environment (Dolbeer,
2006a; Dolbeer et al., 2016). Crewmembers can mitigate the risk of aircraft accidents due to
birds through adequate flight planning and the use of appropriate aircraft operating techniques,
among other strategies. Additionally, by reporting the presence of birds to ATC and wildlifemanagement personnel, aviators can also help protect other aircraft operators (MacKinnon,
2004).
General aviation (GA) airports are frequently resource-constrained and operate with
minimum staff (Cleary & Dickey, 2010). The majority of the GA airports have indicated certain
activities that can attract wildlife are vital for their financial viability. Several GA airports lack
safety strategies and programs to manage wildlife strikes. Many GA pilots do not fly frequently;
thus, they are less experienced, and may not be current on how to prevent or handle a bird strike.
In the U.S., GA aircraft account for almost 75% of the national fleet. Following Dolbeer et al.
(2016), GA pilots have reported wildlife strikes at both certificated and GA airports. From 1990
through 2015, 63 percent of the aircraft destroyed or damaged beyond repair involved small GA
airplanes (Dolbeer et al., 2016). In the same period, there was a steady increase in the strike rate
to GA aircraft, from 0.43 in 1990 to 2.05 strikes per 100,000 movements in 2015 (Dolbeer et al.,
2016). In addition, the number of damaging strikes to GA aircraft outside airport boundaries has
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increased since 2000. The great majority of fatalities and serious injuries due to bird strikes
involved GA pilots. Unfortunately, the figures may not correspond to the real number of strikes.
A number of authors have cited the impact of the underreporting of wildlife strikes on aviation
safety (Anderson et al., 2015; Avrenly & Dempsey, 2014; Conover, 1999; Dolbeer et al., 2015;
Dolbeer et al., 2016; Lima, Blackwell, DeVault, & Juricic, 2015; Mendonca; 2008a, 2008b;
Schwarz, Belant, Martin, DeVault, & Wang, 2014). According to Rillstone and Dineen (2013),
approximately 39% of wildlife strikes to both commercial and general aviation aircraft are
reported to the FAA. However, it is estimated that only 5% of the strikes to GA aircraft are
reported to the FAA (Schwarz et al., 2014)
Despite previous research studies addressing the safety management of wildlife, little to
no work has been done to mitigate the risk of accidents due to wildlife involving the GA
community. The purpose of this study is to determine if a safety training protocol could
effectively enhance Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 141 GA pilots’ knowledge and
skills to reduce the risk of bird strikes to aviation.

1.1

Scope of the Study

In the U.S., all flight training is conducted under the oversight of the FAA following the
regulations laid out in 14 CFR Parts 61, 141, or 142 (FAA, 2016a). Application to operate under
CFR Part 141 is voluntary. However, certificated flight schools operating under CFR Part 141
must meet stringent standards for personnel, aircraft, maintenance, and facilities. Additionally,
Part 141 approved flight schools must teach an approved curriculum, which includes a training
course outline (TCO). The courses approved by the FAA must provide ground training on
aeronautical knowledge areas, including the safe and efficient operation of aircraft (Electronic
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter H, Part 141, 2017). These strictures
help to ensure a high-level of aviation safety and efficiency (FAA, 2016a; Mendonca & Carney,
2017).
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) stated that the risk of bird strikes will always be
a part of aviation operations (ALPA, 2009). However, actions by aviation stakeholders (e.g.,
airport operators) and pilots can reduce the risk of aircraft accidents due to birds (Dolbeer et al.,
2016; MacKinnon, 2004). The target population for this study was flight students and instructors
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in the Purdue University professional flight program, and from Purdue aviation (14 CFR Part
141 GA pilots). Pilots of this program (Cassens, 2015) and from Purdue aviation frequently
pursue a career as a corporate or an air carrier pilot. The student pilots typically earn their private
and commercial pilot certificates during the first two years. In addition, a number of these pilots
earn their flight instructor certificates. The typical age range of the student pilots is between 18
and 22. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), flight instructors operating
under 14 CFR Part 141 must assume responsibility for training student pilots to meet the safety
standards required for certification (FAA, 2008). The duties of a certified flight instructor (CFI)
include assisting the student pilot to become an efficient and safe planner and inflight manager of
their flights. Moreover, a CFI should help the student pilot to develop the skills and knowledge
necessary to be proficient during their flight activities. In theory, these student pilots and CFIs
are expected to have the knowledge and skills to take actions to mitigate the risk of bird strikes.
The researcher used both quantitative and qualitative methods during this study. The
quantitative method included an analysis of pretest-posttest scores. The qualitative method
included an examination of participant responses pertaining to safety risk management,
aeronautical decision-making, and the safety management of bird hazards through three openended questions in both the pretest and posttest, as well as a short follow-up online survey
questionnaire having ten open-ended questions. According to Patton (2015), qualitative data
facilitate the study of issues in detail and depth. The strengths of a short-survey questionnaire
include a cost-effective data collection method, diverse perspectives on the same topic, and highquality data from participants. Most importantly, qualitative data elucidate what the numbers
mean. The application of these strategies provided comprehensive insight into the aeronautical
decision-making and safety risk management processes of 14 CFR Part 141 pilots when faced
with the risk of bird strikes.
Due to some similarities with Keller’s study (2015), this project incorporated concepts
and methods for instruction based on research pertaining to adult learning for the experimental
group (Alexander, 2012; Caffarella & Daffron, 2013; Ertmer & Newby, 2013; Isbell, 2012;
Merriam, Caffarela, & Baumgartner, 2007; Schunk, 2000). This research project used a pretest
posttest experimental and control group design to evaluate the effectiveness of a safety training
protocol (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2007; Leedy & Ormrod, 2015; Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). The
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treatment utilized in this study was developed in an attempt to enhance 14 CFR Part 141 pilots’
aeronautical knowledge and skills pertaining to the safety risk management of birds to aviation.
The training protocol, as well as the pretest, posttest, and short follow-up online questionnaire
questions were developed based upon previous research addressing the safety management of
wildlife to aviation (Avrenly & Dempsey, 2014; Dolbeer, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2011; ICAO,
2012; Eschenfelder, 2005; MacKinnon, 2004; Mendonca, 2008a, 2008b, 2011; 2016; Nicholson
& Reed, 2011), the safety culture tenets (Adjekum, 2014; Adjekum et al., 2015; Antonsen, 2009;
Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007; Gill & Shergill, 2004; Junior et al., 2009; Reason, 1997,
1998; Thaden & Gibbons, 2008), the aeronautical decision-making tenets (Cassens, 2010;
Cassens, Young, Greenan, & Brown, 2010; FAA, 2016a; Kochan, Jensen, & Chubb, 1997;
Winter, 2013; Winter, Fanjoy, Lu, Carney, & Greenan, 2014), the safety management systems
(SMS) pillars (DeFusco et al., 2015; ICAO, 2013a, 2013b; Junior et al., 2009; Ludwig, Andrews,
Veen, & Laqui, 2007; Mendonca & Carney, 2017), and information retrieved from the analysis
of bird strikes to aviation in the U.S. (Dolbeer, 2015; Dolbeer et al., 2015; Dolbeer et al., 2016).

1.2

Research Questions

To determine if a safety training protocol can effectively enhance 14 CFR Part 141 GA
pilots’ knowledge and skills to mitigate the risk of bird strikes to aviation, the following research
questions were addressed in this study:
Research Question 1. Is there a relationship between flight experience, measured in flight
hours, and the safety management of bird hazards by the participants, in terms of pretest
scores?
Research Question 2. Is there a statistically-significant difference in pre-and posttests
scores between and within the control and experimental groups?
Research Question 3. From the pilots’ perspective, how do 14 CFR Part 141 GA pilots
manage to fly safely, given the threat of aircraft accidents due to birds?
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1.3

Significance of the Study

According to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), “it is a pilot’s inherent
responsibility to be alert at all times for and in anticipation of all circumstances, situations, and
conditions affecting the safe operation of the aircraft” (DOT, 2017, p. 28). As previously noted,
there has been a steady increase in the implementation and improvement of safety strategies by
airport operators to reduce the risk of wildlife strikes since the 1990s (DeVault, Blackwell, &
Belant, 2013; Dolbeer et al., 2016). Such strategies have reduced the risk of strikes at and around
the airport environment (Blackwell et al., 2009; DeFusco & Unangst, 2013; DeFusco, Junior,
Cooley, & Landry, 2015; Dolbeer; 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2011; Dolbeer et al., 2016; Martin et al.,
2011). However, the risk of damaging strikes outside the airport jurisdiction has increased,
especially for GA aircraft (Dolbeer et al., 2016).
A research study addressing a safety training protocol that could enhance GA pilots’
knowledge and skills to manage the risk of bird strikes is in keeping with ICAO and FAA safety
efforts. A core ICAO objective is to enhance civil aviation safety (ICAO, 2017). To achieve this
objective, ICAO recommends the implementation of targeted safety strategies to address safety
hazards (ICAO, 2016). One of the top priorities of the FAA is to reduce the GA accident rate by
2018 (FAA, 2016b). The FAA and several aviation stakeholders have been working together
using a data-driven approach to develop safety strategies towards accident prevention.
Findings from this research can assist the GA community in having a greater
understanding of how 14 CFR Part 141 pilots perceive, process, and manage the risk of bird
strikes. The results of this study can also lead researchers during future and more-concentrated
safety efforts. Finally, this study is important because its findings and conclusions can help
develop and/or enhance pilots’ safety training, which may be used to ultimately mitigate the risk
of aircraft accidents due to bird strikes.

1.4

Assumptions

This study utilized the following assumptions:
1. Participating pilots were trained in accordance with FAA standards, guidance, and
policies, and are considered prepared to carry out flight operations.
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2.

Participating pilots were aware of how to interpret Notices to Airmen (NOTAM), the
Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), the Aeronautical Information Publication
(AIP), and bird-hazard related material.

3. Participating pilots have been trained on how to make efficient, appropriate, and safe
aeronautical decisions.
4. Actions by pilots can reduce the risk, probability, and/or severity of bird strikes.
5. Participants were honest with their responses.
6. It was feasible to develop a safety training protocol based upon previous research
addressing the safety management of wildlife to aviation, the safety culture, safety
management systems (SMS) and aeronautical decision-making (ADM) tenets, and
information retrieved from the analysis of bird strikes to aviation in the U.S. that
could enhance GA pilots’ knowledge and skills to manage the risk of bird strikes.
7. The questions designed by the researcher to be used during the pretest and posttest
were valid and reliable.

1.5

Limitations of the Study

1. The study sample size was limited to flight students and instructors in the Purdue
University professional flight program and from Purdue Aviation (14 CFR Part 141 GA
pilots).
2. The available population was estimated to contain approximately 296 possible
participants from which to create a sample.
3. Not all 17 recruited participants completed the study in its entirety, creating a small
sample size.

1.6

Delimitations of the Study

1. A period of one academic semester was used to conduct the data collection for the study.
2. Participants were flight students and instructors in the Purdue University professional
flight program and from Purdue Aviation (14 CFR Part 141 GA pilots).
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3. The safety training protocol addressed procedures and techniques to be used by pilots to
mitigate the risk of bird strikes, including the reporting of bird strikes by pilots.
However, it did not address procedures by pilots after a bird strike has occurred.

1.7

Definitions of Key Terms

Aircraft Accident. “An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time
as all such persons have disembarked, in which: (a) A person is fatally injured, (b) The
aircraft sustains major structural failures or damage, or (c) The aircraft is missing or
completely inaccessible” (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2016, p.1-1).
Aeronautical Decision-Making (ADM) – “A systematic approach to the mental process used by
pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set of
circumstances. It is what a pilot intends to do based on the latest information he or she
has” (FAA, 2016a, p. G-2).
Bird Strike – “A bird strike has occurred when:
1. A pilot reports striking one or more birds;
2. Aircraft maintenance personnel identify aircraft damage as having been caused by a
bird strike;
3. Personnel on the ground report seeing an aircraft strike one or more birds;
4. The bird’s presence at the airport had a significant negative effect on a flight (such as
aborted takeoff or landing, high-speed emergency stop, or aircraft leaving pavement area
to avoid collision with an animal); or
5. Bird or other wildlife remains are found within 200 feet of the centerline of a runway,
unless another reason for the animal’s death is identified” (Cleary & Dickey, 2010, p.
114).
Hazard – “A present condition, event, object, or circumstance that could lead to or contribute to
an unplanned or undesired event such as an accident” (FAA, 2016d, p. 1-2).
Safety – “The state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct
support of the operation of aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level”
(ICAO, 2013a, p. 1-2).
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Safety Culture – “The set of enduring values and attitudes regarding safety issues, shared by
every member of every level of an organization. Safety Culture refers to the extent to
which every individual and every group of the organization is aware of the risks and
unknown hazards induced by its activities; is continuously behaving so as to preserve and
enhance safety; is willing and able to adapt itself when facing safety issues; is willing to
communicate safety issues; and consistently evaluates safety related behaviors” (Piers,
Montijn, & Balk, 2009, p. 2).
Safety Management System (SMS) – “A systematic approach to managing safety, including the
necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures” (ICAO,
2013a, p. 1-2).
Safety Risk Management – “A systematic, explicit, and comprehensive approach for managing
safety risk at all levels and throughout the entire scope of an operation and lifecycle of a
system. It requires the disciplined assessment and management of safety risk” (Junior et
al., 2009, p. 17).

1.8

Summary

This chapter provided an introduction to the study and its scope. After addressing the
research questions, the assumptions, limitations, and delimitations of the study were covered. A
definition list of key terms was included to assist readers in understanding the meaning of
unfamiliar terms. The next chapter provides the literature review that undergirds this research
project.
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CHAPTER 2.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The objective of this literature review is to provide an overview of the current
knowledge and research regarding the following areas: safety culture, SMS, ADM,
current data and information regarding wildlife strikes to aviation, wildlife hazard
management, and pilots’ actions that can reduce the risk of bird strikes.

2.1

Safety Culture

According to the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO), an
unhealthy safety culture has contributed to several major accidents involving complex
systems, such as nuclear power, health care, aerospace travel, petroleum processing, and
aviation operations (CANSO, 2013). The expression “safety culture” first appeared
during the investigation of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. An unhealthy safety culture
was also a contributing factor to the mishap of Continental Express flight 2574 in 1991
(Thaden & Gibbons, 2008). A member of the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) suggested, in a dissenting opinion, that the probable cause of this mishap
included a poor safety culture that would not “encourage and enforce adherence to
approved maintenance and quality assurance procedures” (NTSB, 1992, p. 54). Since
then, the aviation industry has placed a strong interest in a robust safety culture as a
strategy to prevent mishaps. A definition of safety culture is provided in Chapter 1.
Personnel in an organization with a strong safety culture understand the risks
associated with their job’s tasks and environment, report hazards and safety concerns, and
apply procedures intelligently. Additionally, they exercise employee’s rights and
responsibilities. Most importantly, personnel consider the impact on safety in everything
they do (Antonsen, 2009; Cooper, 2000; Goodheart & Smith, 2014; Junior et al., 2009;
Lupoli, 2006; Reason, 1998; Wiegmann, Thaden, & Gibbons, 2007). The investigations
of several high profile aircraft accidents have shown that an unhealthy safety culture was
a major factor that contributed to the mishaps (CANSO, 2013). Therefore, the continuous
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improvement of an organization’s safety culture is probably the best defense against
aircraft accidents.
According to Piers et al. (2009), safety culture is a multi-dimensional construct
with several key elements, which includes a just culture, a reporting culture, a learning
culture, a flexible culture, and an informed culture. In a just culture, top-management
acknowledges that the great majority of errors are unintentional, and generally takes
actions to mitigate latent conditions that make mistakes more likely to occur. However,
unreasonably reckless malevolent acts, blatant disregard of rules, and malicious intent or
gross negligence can lead to punishment (CANSO, 2013). The just culture is achieved
when every single member of an organization firmly believes that justice will always be
applied. The organization should not punish unsafe acts without analyzing their
circumstances and origins. On the other hand, it is equally unacceptable to give immunity
from sanctions to actions of unjustifiable unsafe behavior. A just culture is indispensable
for a reporting culture (Reason & Hobbs, 2003).
In a reporting culture, personnel and stakeholders are encouraged and really
motivated to voluntarily report safety hazards that have not contributed to negative
consequences, even if that means reporting their own errors (CANSO, 2013; Reason,
1998). They do so without fear of any administrative or enforcement actions or of being
ridiculed. The reporting culture allows organizations to identify latent risks and take
timely and appropriate actions to prevent accidents (Piers et al., 2009). Learning has
always been seen as a valued lifetime process (Reason, 1997). Organizations should
constantly learn from safety-related data and information, and take actions to improve
organizational safety. In a learning culture, top-management keeps personnel updated on
safety hazards and mitigation strategies implemented. Moreover, past near-misses,
incidents, and even accidents are considered safety lessons, the groundwork to enhance
aviation safety. In an organization with a flexible culture, staff do not blindly apply
procedures, and understand the risks associated with their jobs. In addition, employees
are capable to adapt to changing demands while respecting the organization’s safety goals
(CANSO, 2013; Junior et al., 2009). In an informed culture, management fosters a culture
where people understand the risks inherent to their jobs. Personnel are encouraged to
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identify safety hazards and the corresponding changes to mitigate these threats. Most
importantly, management provides the knowledge and skills, usually through training,
necessary for them to work safely and efficiently (Junior et al., 2009).
It may seem difficult to quantify the safety culture of an organization (Junior et
al., 2009). However, several authors have identified elements of a sound safety culture.
According to Wiegmann et al. (2007), senior management commitment to safety,
personnel motivation and commitment to safety, a formal safety system, and an informal
safety system are indicators of a safety culture. Yet, qualitative and/or quantitative
methods can be used to assess the safety culture of an organization. Thaden and Gibbons
(2008) developed a framework conceived to estimate the safety culture indicators of
aviation organizations. The organization’s commitment to safety, formal and informal
safety indicators, and operations interactions are key components needed to diagnose the
safety culture of organizations. All elements are equally important. Additionally, those
components should have an integrated relationship and lead the organization to
continually and effectively address safety hazards and mitigate safety issues. Junior et al.
(2009) presented the typical signs of a robust safety culture, which include: management
and personnel commitment to safety; clear organizational policies and guidelines
outlining the principles, processes, and methods with respect to safety; proactive risk
identification, assessment, and mitigation methods; and safety training to help workers do
their jobs safely.
Safety training is a catalyst of a safety culture. Training promotes a high level of
safety awareness and responsibility for mitigating risks, encourages people to report
safety hazards, and provides employees with the tools to work safely and effectively. The
safety management of wildlife and the key elements of a safety culture are connected
through safety training (DeFusco et al., 2015). Moreover, a sound safety culture is
paramount to an efficacious SMS; conversely, an efficacious SMS helps develop and
maintain a healthy safety culture (Junior et al., 2009).
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2.2

Safety Management Systems

ICAO has implemented several measures to improve civil aviation safety
worldwide (Cardoso, Fernandez, & Maurino, 2008). The Safety Management Annex, or
Annex 19 - Safety Management, which became applicable in 2013, consolidated safety
management provisions previously contained in six other ICAO Annexes. Annex 19
provides Standards and Recommend Practices (SARPs) to facilitate the development and
implementation of State safety programs and SMS (Gnehm, 2013). According to Ludwig
et al. (2007), the adoption of a systemic approach to safety management is paramount to
enhance the safety of flights. Stolzer, Halford, and Goglia (2008) define SMS as “a
dynamic risk management system based on quality management system (QMS)
principles in a structure scaled appropriately to the operational risk, applied in a safety
culture environment” (p. 18).

SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
SAFETY POLICY & OBJECTIVES
1. Management commitment and responsibility
2. Safety accountabilities
3. Appointment of key safety personnel
4. Coordination of emergency response planning
5. SMS documentation
SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT (SRM)
1. Hazard identification
2. Safety risk assessment and mitigation

SAFETY ASSURANCE
1. Safety performance monitoring and measurement
2. The management of change
3. Continuous improvement of the SMS

SAFETY PROMOTION
1. Training and education
2. Safety communication

Figure 2.1 The Pillars and Elements of an SMS. Adapted from the “Safety Management
Manual (3rd Ed.)” by ICAO, 2013a, Montreal, Canada: Author.
An SMS is a safety tool to help ensure the safe operation of aircraft through
effective management of safety risks (ICAO, 2013a, 2013b). The ICAO SMS framework
includes four pillars and twelve elements, representing the minimum requirements for
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SMS implementation (see Figure 2.1). The safety policy is the underpinning of the SMS
(Arendt, Yantiss, & Vegega, 2006). The safety policy is where the organization sets
objectives, assigns responsibilities and accountabilities, and sets standards (FAA, 2015;
ICAO, 2013b). The policy also establishes and conveys the top-management’s
commitment to the safety performance of the organization to its employees. By reading
the safety policy, all personnel will understand that safety is a priority for topmanagement, and is expected to be a priority for them as well (Junior et al., 2009).
The heart of an SMS is the Safety Risk Management (SRM) process. Daily risks
are an innate component of the aviation industry. Even though it is practically impossible
to eliminate all risks; through the SRM process risks can be reduced to an acceptable
level, sometimes even eliminated (FAA, 2016a; ICAO, 2013a; Lu, Bos, & Caldwell,
2007; Ludwig et al., 2007; Mendonca & Carney, 2017). The paramount objective of any
safety program is to identify hazards, analyze and assess associated risks, and develop
and implement controls for those hazards and risk factors (Arendt et al., 2006).
Identifying hazards is a key step in managing safety risks. The hazard
identification element of an SMS allows safety experts and managers to address risks in a
proactive way (Cleary & Dolbeer, 2005). Junior et al. (2009) presented several
characteristics of a successful hazard reporting system. The system should be, among
others: voluntary; impartial; confidential; non-punitive (in order to generate trust in the
individuals reporting hazards); easy to be reached by any person willing to report
hazards; and able to safeguard confidentiality. Additionally, such systems must engender
enough trust that persons are willing to report their errors, and encourage and even
reward people to provide safety-related information. Risk assessment, a process that
associates hazards with risks, considers both the probability of such an event occurring
and the severity of the consequences (FAA, 2016a; ICAO, 2013a, 2013b; Junior et al.,
2009). A risk assessment matrix, like the one shown in Table 2.1, could be used in the
analysis of safety hazards. The assessment may show that certain hazards have an
acceptable level of risk, while others require mitigation. Thus, it assists aviation
managers in verifying the risk associated with a certain operation. Most importantly, the
risk assessment process helps managers to decide if it is reasonable to proceed with a
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specific activity. A number of factors should be considered when developing a risk
matrix, including the uniqueness of the organization, and especially the safety culture and
peculiarities of its operation (Bastos, 2005; FAA, 2015; Vincoli, 2006).
Table 2.1
Safety Risk (Index) Assessment Matrix
RISK SEVERITY
RISK
PROBABILITY

Catastrophic

Hazardous

Major

Minor

Negligible

A

B

C

D

E

Frequent 5

5A

5B

5C

5D

5E

Occasional 4

4A

4B

4C

4D

4E

Remote 3

3A

3B

3C

3D

3E

Improbable 2

2A

2B

2C

2D

2E

Extremely
improbable 1

1A

1B

1C

1D

1E

Note. Adapted from the “Safety Management Manual (3rd Ed.)” by ICAO, 2013a,
Montreal, Canada: Author.
Risk mitigation strategies should address the risk probability, the risk severity, or
both (Junior et al., 2009). In most cases, however, the effect is on both the probability and
the severity simultaneously. Mitigation actions can include modifications to existing
standard operating procedures (SOPs), introduction of new or enhanced training
programs and SOPs, and increased awareness or control (e.g., NOTAM; safety
campaigns; reducing exposure to hazardous operating conditions). “Almost invariably
these alternatives will involve deployment or re-deployment of the three traditional
aviation safety defenses — technology, training, and regulation” (ICAO, 2013b, p. 5.19).
Another important safety concept addressed by SMS is continuous improvement
(ICAO, 2013b). The safety assurance pillar of the SMS provides the tools to
systematically ensure the performance and effectiveness of safety risk controls developed
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under the SRM process. This SMS component also assures that the organization is
meeting or even exceeding its safety objectives through the collection, analysis, and
assessment of data and information (ICAO, 2013b; Junior et al., 2009; Ludwig et al.,
2007). The sources of information to support the safety assurance processes include
safety reporting systems, safety audits, and aircraft accident and incident investigations
(ICAO, 2013b). Safety assurance and SRM, despite different, must complement each
other. According to Junior et al., (2009), the focus of the safety assurance component is
to improve the performance of the SMS itself. It ensures that the risk mitigation strategies
developed during the SRM process are being effective, and not leading to unintended
hazards.
An organizational safety effort will not succeed solely by mandate and/or strict
adherence to SOPs and safety policies. The last SMS pillar, safety promotion, is designed
to ensure that personnel have a strong foundation regarding their safety responsibilities,
the organization’s safety policy and objectives, and reporting procedures. Moreover,
safety training and communication provide frontline employees with a sound foundation
regarding the SRM processes (FAA, 2015; ICAO, 2013b; Junior et al., 2009; Ludwig et
al., 2007; Mendonca, 2008a). Safety promotion affects both the organizational and safety
cultures, and supplements the organization’s safety policy, SOPs, and processes,
providing an invaluable tool that supports safety efforts (ICAO, 2013b).
The safety training program ensures employees are given the required competence
and knowledge to execute their duties safely and efficiently (ICAO, 2013b). Safety
training should be an on-going, recurring activity, and never just a one-time thing.
Moreover, training should be frequently reviewed and updated, and based on current
data, information, and safety needs. This review ensures that the skills necessary to
perform each job adequately are provided in a timely manner to each professional before
they start doing the work (Junior et al., 2009).
There should be a formal means in place to ensure ongoing communication
processes across all levels of the organization (Ludwig et al., 2007). Following ICAO
(2013b), the safety communication element of an SMS will assure personnel are aware of
the risks involved in their jobs, convey safety-critical information, raise awareness of
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safety risks, and explain the reasons specific SOPs are introduced or changed. The major
goal of the safety promotion component is to foster a safety culture (Ludwig et al., 2007).
Junior et al. (2009) added that every pillar of the SMS contributes to the development and
maintenance of a healthy safety culture.
Several studies have integrated the SMS tenets to the management of wildlife in
aviation (Allerton et al., 2015; DeFusco, 2016; DeFusco et al., 2015; Dolbeer & Wright,
2009; Junior et al., 2009; Mendonca, 2008a, 2016; Mendonca, Keller, & Wang, 2017).
First, both SMS and the wildlife management processes involve reactive and proactive
discovery of hazards. Information derived from safety reports facilitates comprehension
of the causes of hazards, and assists in defining safety strategies. In addition, it helps
identify the effectiveness of safety interventions. The efficiency of using SRM processes
to manage safety risks is applicable to both wildlife management and SMS. A core
component of both SMS and the management of wildlife is continuous improvement
(ICAO, 2013a, 2013b). Finally, safety promotion processes provide the mechanisms
through which lessons obtained from accident and incident investigations and other
safety-related activities (e.g., hazard reports; safety audits; safety reports; information
derived from the analysis of bird-strike related data) are made available to the
organization’s personnel in order to enhance aviation safety.

2.3

Aeronautical Decision-Making

The aviation industry highly depends on collegiate flight schools as a source of new
pilots for several reasons, including international competition for pilots, the industry
expansion, and the increasing number of retiring pilots (Cassens, 2010). Part 141
collegiate flight programs should provide those pilots, entering the market with usually
little flight experience, the knowledge and skills to fly safely. Aeronautical decisionmaking (ADM) training helps to ensure those young pilots will become capable flight
crews in the flight deck of an aircraft, having the necessary skills to efficiently conduct
their flights (FAA, 2016a).
ADM is a systematic approach that encourages pilots to identify hazards and
manage risks. Additionally, it helps aviators to make timely and safe decisions (FAA,
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2016a; Winter, 2013; Winter et al., 2014). The importance of ADM for accident
prevention led the FAA to require ADM be taught within Part 141 collegiate flight school
pilot ground training curricula (Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Chapter
I, Subchapter H, Part 141, 2017; FAA, 2016a).
A key component of ADM is SRM (FAA, 2016a). The use of ADM processes and
practices can significantly reduce or even eliminate the risk of aircraft accidents (Cassens
et al., 2010). Four fundaments of SRM should undergird ADM processes by pilots:
1. It is practically impossible to fly without risks, but pilots must not accept
unnecessary risks;
2. Risk decisions should be made by pilots only when they can assess the risks
and develop and implement risk controls;
3. Pilots must only accept risks when the benefits outweigh the risks;
4. Pilots should incorporate SRM processes into planning at all stages of the
flight, including the preflight planning stage.
The FAA (2016a) provides several checklists that can be used by pilots during
their ADM processes. The “PAVE” checklist allows aviators to identify, assess, and
mitigate hazards. The Pilot in command (P), Aircraft (A), enVironment (V), and External
pressures (E) (PAVE) checklist helps pilots to divide risks into those four categories.
Under the “V” component, for example, pilots should gather information using all the
possible resources (e.g., Aeronautical Information Publication [AIP]; Aeronautical
Information Manual [AIM]; Automatic Terminal Information Service [ATIS]; NOTAM).
Identified hazards should then be assessed (risks) to see if they can be mitigated prior to
each flight (e.g., choose the flight route wisely; be ready to divert). If not, the flight
should be either postponed or even canceled. Flights should only be continued after the
implementation of risk mitigation strategies. The transfer, eliminate, accept, or mitigate
(TEAM) checklist helps pilots to effectively select the best strategies after identifying
hazards and assessing their associated risks. For example, the decision to proceed with
the flight despite a high risk of bird strikes, identified during the planning phase, can be
transferred to higher levels of the organization (e.g., chief pilot). A second option could
be to eliminate the risk (FAA, 2016a). If crewmembers decide to divert to another airport
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due to the presence of birds near/or on their destination, the risk could be practically
eliminated (MacKinnon, 2004). A third option could be just to accept the risk considering
that the benefits greatly outweigh the consequences of a possible bird strike. Finally, the
most efficient and safe decision by pilots should be to mitigate the risk. Strategies that
could be adopted by aviators to reduce the risk of aircraft mishaps due to birds will be
explored in the bird hazard to aviation section of this chapter.
The use of internal and external resources before and during flight operations is
vital for safety. Identifying and using those resources are key steps of ADM. Following
the FAA (2016a), pilots should develop the skills to intelligently evaluate the impact of
those resources on safety, and whether there is enough time to use them. Copilots are
excellent internal resources who can assist the captain during his/her ADM processes.
External resources include air traffic controllers (e.g., relay information about the
presence of birds at or around the airport), NOTAMs (FAA, 2016a), the AIM, and the
wildlife strike resources available through the FAA website (e.g., guidance on how to
report wildlife strikes) (FAA, 2016c).
In the past, several researchers believed that good ADM was an incidental product
of flight experience (FAA, 2016a). The investigation of high-profile accidents have
identified poor ADM processes by experienced flight crews (NTSB, 2010a, 2013, 2014).
Further studies by researchers as well as the FAA have demonstrated that ADM can be
taught. Kochan, Jensen, Chubb, and Hunter (1997) conducted a research project to
develop new models of ADM and develop strategies to improve safety in the general
aviation community. To achieve these objectives, final reports of aircraft accidents were
analyzed, and a critical literature review on decision making was conducted. Four studies
that included cognitive task analysis and structured and semi-structured interviews
involving pilots with different flight experience and backgrounds were conducted. These
four studies had the following goals: to identify the distinctive characteristics of expert
pilots; to analyze the processes those pilots used to become experts; and to develop
training that could enhance pilots’ ADM skills. The results of this series of studies
indicate that some factors should be considered while developing strategies to enhance
pilots’ ADM expertise: their capabilities of making sound judgements; their aviation
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experience, their SRM and dynamic problem-solving skills, and the pilots’ attentional
control during normal and abnormal operations.
Following Kochan et al. (1997), ADM expertise is generally gained through years
of aviation experiences and training. The number of hours flown helps pilots develop
ADM expertise. Expert aviators apply good SRM techniques, carefully following the
SRM processes. Dynamic problem solving refers to the pilot’s capability of resolving
poorly defined and/or dynamic problems. Pilots frequently use updated information so as
to make new decisions and take new actions. Aviators are expected to apply a safety
assurance process and frequently make decisions avoiding closing options. Lastly, pilots
should be able to focus on tasks that require attention while keeping other secondary
matters outside the flight deck. Attentional control also refers to the pilots’ capabilities of
making technical decisions without the interference of external factors (e.g., pilot’s
general goal-completion orientation).
Empirical research studies (Keller, 2015; O’Hare, Mullen, & Arnold, 2010;
Winter, 2013; Winter et al., 2014) have demonstrated that adequate and specific safety
training could enhance pilots’ ADM skills. Keller (2015) developed training modules
designed to enhance GA pilots’ knowledge, skills, and aptitude pertaining to Visual
Flight Rules (VFR) into deteriorating-weather condition encounters. The foundation of
Keller’s (2015) study was provided by empirical data (Ambs, 2014; Johnson, Wiegmann,
& Wickens, 2006) that indicated training could enhance pilots’ ADM skills. Results
indicated that the training protocols did not significantly enhance the participants’ ADM
process. However, Keller (2015) suggested that confounding variables, such as flight
experience, can bias the results. Keller (2015) recommended immersive and focused
strategies as a more effective intervention in enhancing GA pilots’ ADM skills to avoid
continued VFR operations into Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). O’Hare,
Mueller, and Arnold (2010) demonstrated that participants who engaged in case-based
training performed much more safely in a simulated flight during which pilots
encountered low visibility conditions. Reflection pilots made safer decisions than the
other participants of the study. Moreover, the reflection pilots indicated they were more
likely to adhere to VFR standards, discontinue the flight earlier, and have better visibility
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at the termination point than the other pilots of the study. O’Hare et al. (2010) concluded
that case-based reflection in pilot training could enhance pilots’ ADM, thereby mitigating
the risk of aircraft accidents due to poor decision-making. Winter (2013) conducted a
study to investigate if a reflexive learning treatment could enhance pilots’ ADM skills
when faced with an irreversible emergency. The training did appear to improve the
overall decision-making of the experimental group in deploying the airframe parachute
system after experiencing an engine failure while enroute during Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) conditions.
Most aircraft mishaps are caused, in part at least, to deficiencies in pilots’ ADM
(Cassens, 2015; Keller, 2015; NTSB, 2009, 2013; O’Hare et al., 2010). As previously
noted, empirical information has indicated that adequate and specific safety training can
improve ADM in dynamic situations. Bird ingestions after takeoff, such as occurred with
U.S. Airways flight 1549 in 2009, will probably require immediate actions by
crewmembers using established SOPs. However, there is usually enough time during
flight planning and even during the flight for aviators to gather information, assess risks,
and implement controls that are expected to reduce risks to an acceptable level (FAA,
2016a, 2016d; ICAO, 2013a, 2013b). As previously noted, a goal of ADM is to help
aviators make the wisest decision through a set of steps, including SRM processes.
Therefore, ADM is a tool applicable to the safety management of birds by pilots.

2.4

Bird Hazard to Aviation

The mishap of U.S. Airways flight 1549 in 2009 raised the public’s awareness
and concern about the threat wildlife pose to the safety of flights (Marra et al., 2009;
Martin et al., 2011). According to the NTSB (2010b), the bird strikes to both engines
occurred at 2,800 feet above ground level (AGL), and at a distance of about 4.5 miles
from LaGuardia Airport (LGA). Therefore, the strikes occurred beyond the usual
management of wildlife on LGA jurisdiction (Blackwell et al., 2012; Dolbeer, 2006a;
Dolbeer et al., 2015), and would not have been prevented by LGA’s wildlife management
strategies and best practices (NTSB, 2010b). According to Dolbeer (2007), despite
successful, wildlife management programs at airports have done very little-to-nothing to
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mitigate occurrences outside the airport jurisdiction. “Only through the skill of an
experienced flight crew did all 155 people on board survive the crash landing on the
Hudson River” (Marra et al., 2009, p. 298).
During the investigation process by the NTSB, the captain of U.S. Airways flight
1549 asserted that the company’s training was fundamental for him to successfully
manage the emergency (NTSB, 2010B). However, the NTSB also pointed out that
wildlife-strike mitigation training was not included in the company’s “ground school
curriculum or simulator syllabus” (NTSB, 2009, p. 58). Moreover, a ground-school
instructor affirmed that this theme had emerged in class during “what if” scenarios. In
such cases, instructors attempted “to answer the questions to the best of their knowledge”
(NTSB, 2010b, p. 58).
The aviation industry has faced the risk of loss of life and properties due to
aircraft accidents resulting from wildlife strikes since the dawn of aviation (Dale, 2009).
According to DeFusco et al. (2015), “the threat has only increased over time” (p. 3).
These safety occurrences have resulted in, on average, 112,536 hours of aircraft
downtime and $191 million in monetary losses for the United States civil aviation
industry per year, from 1990 to 2015 (Dolbeer et al., 2016). During this period, 392
people were injured due to 194 bird strikes reported to the FAA, and 25 persons were
killed due to 11 bird strikes. Wildlife strikes have destroyed more than 247 airplanes and
killed 262 people since 1988 all over the world.
Key elements that contribute to the escalating risk of aircraft accidents due to
birds include successful environmental programs funded by conservation and
governmental organizations since the 1970s; increased air traffic; and wildlife adaptation
to urban areas (Cleary & Dolbeer, 2005; Dolbeer, 2011; Dolbeer et al., 2015; Dolbeer et
al., 2016). Thus, recognizing that bird threats to aviation are of significance and
increasing, aviation stakeholders have increased safety efforts to reduce the risk of
aircraft accidents due to wildlife hazards (DeFusco & Unangst, 2013).
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2.4.1

Federal Aviation Administration

The Federal Aviation Administration is an operating arm of the U.S. DOT that
regulates and oversees commercial aviation (Wells & Wesveen, 2004). The FAA’s
leading concern is the promotion and regulation of civil aviation to ensure its safe and
orderly growth. The FAA is responsible for the safety of the world’s most complex and
largest aviation system (FAA, 2016e). The FAA achieves the Agency’s objectives
through strategies and programs to “promote continued operational safety (surveillance,
oversight, education, inspections), establish safety rules and regulations (rulemaking),
and certify the aviation competency of people (pilots) and organizations (individual
airlines) and the airworthiness of aircraft and equipment” (FAA, 2015b, p. 1).
Most aircraft accidents and incidents due to wildlife occur at or around the airport
environment (DeFusco et al., 2015; DeFusco & Unangst, 2013; Dolbeer et al., 2016).
Successful environmental protection and natural resources programs by government and
private organizations have contributed to significant increases of populations of largebodied species, such as snow geese, turkeys, and vultures (Cleary & Dolbeer, 2005).
Certain species have body mass that far exceeds the current engine and airframe
certification standards (e.g., Canada goose). Concurrently, natural areas that often
separated airports and urban areas have decreased in quantity and/or size (DeFusco et al.,
2015). In addition, wildlife attractants such as sources of food, shelter, and water are
frequently found at the airport environment (Belant & Ayers, 2014).
There are SARPs in ICAO Annex 14 (Aerodromes) requiring ICAO member
States to certify airports used for international operations. During the certification
process, airport operators should submit an airport certification manual to the civil
aviation authority for acceptance or approval. This manual will include information about
the airport SMS, facilities, services, operating procedures, and equipment. Additionally,
as a part of the airport SMS, the airport operator should develop and implement wildlife
management programs to mitigate the risk of wildlife strikes at the airport and its
surroundings (ICAO, 2012, 2013c). In the U.S., the FAA requires airports certified under
14 CFR Part 139 to conduct a wildlife hazard assessment (WHA) when an aircraft
incident or accident due to wildlife has occurred at or near the airport. In addition, 14
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CFR Part 139 airport operators are required to conduct a WHA when animals, posing a
threat to aviation operations are “observed to have access to any airport flight pattern or
aircraft movement area” (DeFusco & Unangst, 2013, p. 11). All 14 CFR Part 139 airports
have conducted a WHA or are finalizing their assessments (Dolbeer et al., 2016).
Based upon the WHA results, the flight operations at the aerodrome, and the
perspective of the airport users and the certificate holder, the Agency could determine the
airport operator must develop and put into action a wildlife hazard management program
(WHMP). The WHA should be used as the groundwork for the WHMP, which will
become a component of the airport certification manual. The WHMP should provide
measures to mitigate the risk of accidents due to wildlife strikes (DeFusco et al., 2015;
Rillstone & Dineen, 2013). The majority of GA airports do not have to meet the FAA
standards to mitigate the risk of wildlife strikes to aviation (Cleary & Dickey, 2010).
However, many GA airports have voluntarily developed their WHA and WHMP
following the FAA standards. Yet, public use GA airports that receive federal grants
should accept the obligations and conditions associated with the grant assurances (NTSB,
2009; Williams, 2007). Unfortunately, funding for most GA airports is limited, thus
restricting their capability to take effective actions to mitigate wildlife hazards.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), in a partnership with the FAA since
1995, has assisted the Agency with the production of yearly and special reports on
wildlife hazards to aviation. Those reports provide information developed from scientific
analyses of the data from the National Wildlife Strike Database (NWSD) (Dolbeer et al.,
2015). The last annual report was published in December, 2016, and covers wildlife
strikes from 1990 through 2015 (Dolbeer et al., 2016). For this period, approximately
97% of the 169,856 wildlife strikes reported to the FAA involved birds. Approximately
98% of these reported strikes occurred in the U.S. Fifty-two percent of the bird strikes
occurred at night, 63% during daytime, and 52% between July and October, “which is
when birds are migrating and populations are at their annual peak in North America
following the nesting season” (Dolbeer et al., 2016, p. 7). The majority of bird strikes
happened during the arrival phases of flight (descent, approach, and landing roll) while
35% occurred during the departure phases of flight (takeoff run and climb). For
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commercial and GA aircraft, respectively, 71% and 73% of the bird strikes occurred
below 500 feet AGL, 82% and 88% at the airport environment, and 92% and 97% below
3,500 feet AGL. For the purpose of this study, the bird-rich zone is defined as the
airspace where most bird strikes occur. The current bird-rich zone is below 3,500 feet
AGL. Analyses of data also indicate that the likelihood of a damaging bird-strike to both
GA and commercial aircraft is higher above 500 feet AGL. Furthermore, above 500 feet
AGL, “the number of reported strikes declined consistently by 34 percent and 44 percent
for each 1,000-foot gain in height for commercial and GA aircraft, respectively” (Dolbeer
et al., 2016, p. xiii). This report concluded that data indicate successful safety strategies
by airport operators have decreased the number of damaging strikes for commercial
aviation since 2000. However, in agreement with Dolbeer (2011), Doppler, Blackwell,
DeVault, and Juricic (2015), and Martin et al. (2011), such efforts have been practically
ineffective in mitigating the risk of bird strikes outside the airport surroundings.
The FAA has addressed the management of wildlife hazards with aircraft through
partnerships, outreach, regulatory guidance, data collection and analysis, and research.
Wildlife research has been conducted by the FAA Technical Center; by the USDA
National Wildlife Research Facility; and by the Center of Excellence in Airport
Technology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The research falls into the
categories of harassment techniques, habitat modification, and the capabilities and
feasibility of an avian radar for monitoring birds at and around airports (NTSB, 2010b).
Research studies have also addressed strategies for restricting access of hazardous
wildlife species to attractive features at and around airports, and the behavior of yearround residents and migratory species posing a safety hazard and challenge for the airport
(Dolbeer et al., 2016).
The Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) is an aviation industrydriven, applied research program that introduces innovations to the airport industry, and
adapts current or develops new technologies to meet demands that are not being
adequately addressed by existing federal research programs. The ACRP is sponsored by
the FAA. According to Crites et al. (2017), the ACRP gives airport operators an
opportunity to look at aviation-related problems from a more global perspective. In

25
addition, they provide a more unbiased view for all airport operators to be able to rely on
to solve their individual problems on a more consistent and scientific basis. Six ACRP
reports have been published addressing the safety management of wildlife hazards by
airport operators (Allerton et al., 2015; Belant & Ayres, 2014; Cleary & Dickey, 2010;
DeFusco et al., 2015; DeFusco & Unangst, 2013; Rillstone & Dineen, 2013;), and are
available from the Transportation Research Board (TRB) of the National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (Dolbeer et al., 2016). These reports could be used
by airport operators to balance wildlife protection, airport legal responsibilities, and
aviation safety. As previously noted, the FAA has conducted a successful multifaceted
process for reducing the risk of wildlife strikes at and around airports. However, a few
operational efforts have been launched by the Agency to date, to mitigate wildlife strikes
away from the airport jurisdiction, and those do not include actions by pilots (Dolbeer,
2011).
2.4.2

Costs of Bird Strikes

Competition is fierce in the aviation industry. Operating costs are high; thus,
profits are usually small. The aviation workplace is filled with safety hazards, including
wildlife. Some cannot be totally eliminated (e.g., birds; weather). Nevertheless, aviation
operations must safely thrive. According to the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF), birds are
a serious hazard to aviation (FSF, 1989). A one-pound bird striking an aircraft at 200
knots could have an an impact force of 5,320 foot-pounds (ft-lb). A collision of a fourpound turkey vulture, ranked as an extremely high-safety risk bird species in the U.S.
(Dolbeer & Wright, 2009), with an aircraft flying at 250 knots can result in an impact
force of 38,000 ft-lbs (MacKinnon, 2004). This collision can result in serious damage to
the aircraft. Moreover, it can lead to an aircraft accident involving serious injuries and/or
fatalities. Even if no one gets hurt, a huge amount of money will be spent in the
restoration or substitution of damaged components and downtime costs of a damaged
airplane.
Today’s airplanes are finely-engineered precision machines. A bird strike, no
matter the size of the bird and/or the aircraft airspeed, will probably lead to a thorough
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inspection. A bird ingestion to the engine can result in significant damage to engine
components, even though it may not be immediately apparent. Thus, an engine inspection
is generally always required after a bird strike. A small amount of damage to the first
stage of a fan section in the engine will result in the repair or replacement of some
components and significant costs. Minor damage to a jet engine fan blade can cost a
significant amount of money. Replacing an engine can reach millions of dollars, and the
aircraft will be out of service for several days (MacKinnon, 2004).
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Figure 2.2 Possible Costs of an Aircraft Accident due to a Bird Strike. Adapted from
the “ICAO accident prevention programme (Doc. 9422)”, by ICAO (2005).
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There are several costs associated with wildlife strikes (see Figure 2.2) (FSF,
2002; ICAO, 2012; MacKinnon, 2004). Direct costs are those incurred in the replacement
and/or repair of damaged parts. Indirect costs, also known as the uninsured costs, are
frequently influenced by different factors (e.g., extent of damage to the airplane; size of
the organization's fleet). Examples of indirect costs include the transport of mechanics
and replacement parts to the site, and downtime costs of a not-airworthy aircraft.
Ancillary costs are those incurred by regulatory agencies, airport operators and users, air
carriers, and other organizations that have to deal with the consequences of an accident or
incident due to a strike (e.g., runway closure; additional fuel used by other aircraft during
delays; legal liabilities).
According to MacKinnon (2004), ancillary costs are generally disregarded when
assessing the total costs of wildlife strikes to aviation. The hull-loss and fatality refer to
the astronomical direct and indirect costs resulting from a fatal mishap due to wildlife
involving a large transportation aircraft. For example, an accident involving an air carrier
airplane carrying 350 people can easily surpass US$1 billion in resulting costs and
liability issues. According to the FSF (2002), the non-insurable costs can surpass the
direct costs by 20 times.
Annually, conservative estimates of the direct costs associated with wildlife
strikes to aviation all over the world range from US$1.21 to US$1.36 billion (Anderson et
al., 2015). Projected total costs are substantially higher, especially if indirect and
ancillary costs are assessed. In addition, assuming a reporting rate of 30%, and also that
only a small percentage of the strikes reported indicate an adverse effect with damage and
costs estimates, the annual costs of aircraft accidents due to wildlife could easily surpass
US$4.10 billion.
2.4.3

GA Aircraft Accidents and Incidents due to Bird Strikes

According to the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), there
were 210,000 GA aircraft based in the U.S. in 2015 (GAMA, 2017). The GA industry
supports 1.1 million jobs in the U.S., and US$219 billion in total economic output.
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Each direct job in the GA industry supports 3.3 jobs elsewhere in the U.S. economy
(GAMA, 2015). Annually, the GA community flies 24 million hours to more than 5,000
public airports. Interestingly, 67% of the flight hours are for business purposes.
Additionally, the GA industry represents the primary training arena for aviation
professionals, including flight crews. GA is defined as “all aviation other than military
and scheduled commercial airlines” (GAMA, 2017, p. c-2).
As previously noted, globally, more than 262 persons were killed as a
consequence of wildlife strikes, including birds, since 1988. Yet, mishaps due to wildlife
have destroyed or caused damage beyond repair to 247 airplanes during the same period.
Although not a major contributing factor of fatal aircraft accidents, bird strikes are a
critical economic and safety hazard. The risk of damaging strikes to GA aircraft has
increased since 1990. From 1990 through 2015, 14% of the bird strikes in the U.S.
involved GA aircraft. However, approximately 29% of these strikes caused damage to the
aircraft. For comparison, only eight percent of the strikes to commercial aviation caused
damage to aircraft. Seventy-three percent and 97% of the reported bird strikes to GA
aircraft occurred below 500 feet and 3,500 feet, respectively. Fifty-one percent and 93%
of the damaging strikes to GA aircraft occurred below 500 feet and 3,500 feet,
respectively. Interestingly, even though only 27% of the bird strikes to GA aircraft
occurred above 500 feet, these incidents accounted for almost 50% of the damaging
incidents. During the same period, approximately 60% of the mishaps in which the
aircraft were destroyed occurred at GA airports. Additionally, 63% of the aircraft
damaged beyond repair or destroyed were small GA airplanes (Dolbeer et al., 2016).
General aviation airports are frequently located in rural areas (Dolbeer et al.,
2016), operate with minimum staff, and lack funding sources to establish safety programs
and strategies to mitigate the risk of wildlife strikes to aviation (Cleary & Dickey, 2010).
Certain activities that can attract wildlife (e.g., on-airport agriculture) are fundamental for
the financial viability of the majority of the GA airports. Many GA pilots do not fly
frequently; thus, they are less experienced, and may not be current on how to prevent or
handle a bird strike. Accidents involving the general aviation (GA) community due to
bird strikes have caused fatalities (Cleary & Dickey, 2010; Dolbeer et al., 2015). For
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example, in 2003 a flight instructor and a student pilot suffered fatal injuries after a
Cessna 172 was hit by a black vulture at 800 ft. AGL. The pilots were not able to
maintain lift after the bird hit the leading edge of the left wing. In October 2007, a flight
instructor and a student pilot from the University of North Dakota crashed after a Piper
PA-44 Seminole struck one or more Canada geese. Both pilots suffered fatal injuries
(Cleary & Dickey, 2010).
Two pilots and three passengers perished in March 2008 in Oklahoma City, when
a Cessna 500 Citation I struck an unknown number of American white pelicans, entered a
steep descent, and crashed (NTSB, 2009). The NTSB conducted a thorough accident
investigation process. The bird strikes occurred at around 3,000 feet above mean sea level
(MSL), or 1,800 feet AGL two minutes after the aircraft took off from Wiley Post Airport
(PWA), a public use GA aerodrome in Oklahoma. On the day of the mishap, the FAA
airport facilities directory entry for PWA contained a remark warning users regarding the
presence of flocks of birds at and around the PWA airport. In addition, queries of the bird
avoidance model (BAM) indicated a medium risk of bird strikes around PWA at the
period of the accident. The BAM, currently a component of the avian hazard advisory
system (AHAS), is a safety tool that was developed by the U.S. Air Force. It provides
aviation professionals with data and information relative to the likelihood of bird strikes
in user-selected locations.
The NTSB conducted a bird-strike analysis identified the kinetic energy (KE) of
the strike was well beyond the airframe and engine certification standards applicable to
the Cessna 500 (NTSB, 2009). The KE, for the purpose of this study, is the energy
imparted on engines and airframes by wildlife strikes (Dolbeer, 2007; Eschenfelder,
2005; Eschenfelder & Hull, 2006; Nicholson & Reed, 2011; NTSB, 2009, 2010). The
aircraft was flying at approximately 190 knots when it collided with at least one
American white pelican, whose weight could reach 20 pounds. In this scenario, the KE
far exceeded the demonstrated certification values for the accident aircraft. The KE
scheme will be explored in the next section of this study. The NTSB (2009) also
contended that the underreporting of wildlife strikes as well as incomplete reports (e.g.,
bird species) have hindered the proper assessment of the problem, and the development,
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implementation, and evaluation of safety programs. In addition, the NTSB (2009) posited
that pilots should make use of information about the activity of birds likely to be
encountered at and near the airports of operation to devise operational strategies for
mitigating the risk of bird strikes.
According to the Spanish Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes
de Aviación Civil (CIAIAC), a Socata TB-20 crashed in January 2016 after colliding with
a griffon vulture as the pilot was flying over the Serrania de Cuenca National Park, in
Spain (CIAIAC, 2016). Part of the aircraft left wing detached after the strike, rendering
the aircraft uncontrollable. The mishap killed the pilot and three members of his family.
The Spanish aeronautical information publication (AIP) warned pilots in regards to bird
gathering areas all year along the accident route. That information included the
probability of vulture breeding colonies. According to ICAO (2003), the AIP “forms the
basic element of the integrated aeronautical information package. It contains aeronautical
information of a permanent nature and temporary changes to this information of long
duration” (p. 5-1). The AIP provides information about birds at and in the vicinity of
airports, including information about bird migratory activity. In the case of the U.S. AIP,
pilots can locate information about the major North America flyways and migratory bird
activity (DOT, 2017).
The Socata TB-20 does not have to undergo bird impact analysis during the
certification process. The aircraft, which was flying at 140 knots, collided with a bird
weighing six-to-nine pounds. The KE imparted on the aircraft during the impact ranged
from 11,455 ft-lb trough 17,171 ft-lb. Had the pilots reduced power down for a cruise
speed of 100 knots, the resulting KE could be between 5,800 ft-lb through 8,692 ft-lb, a
substantial decrease that could have averted this accident.
It is the responsibility of the pilot in command of an aircraft to become familiar
with all available information that could negatively impact the safety of the flight
(Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter F, Part 91,
2017). Both the NTSB (2009) and the CIAIAC (2016) mentioned in their reports that the
information about the risk of bird strikes was available to flight crews by the time of each
accident. Some questions could then be raised:

31
1. Did the pilots know about the risk of bird strikes at those specific locations,
time of the year, and altitude? If not, why?
2. If they knew that information, would they have the technical knowledge and
skills to mitigate the risk of an accident due to birds?
With hindsight, it is reasonable to postulate that with adequate planning and
actions by the flight crews the risk of these deadly aircraft accidents due to bird strikes
could have been mitigated.

2.5

Safety Management of Bird Hazard to Aviation

Until the 1950s people believed that aircraft accidents due to wildlife were acts of
God, that no actions by aviation professionals could effectively mitigate the risk of
mishaps due to wildlife. Thus, no one could be held responsible in case of aircraft
accidents due to wildlife strikes (MacKinnon, 2004). Research studies have demonstrated
that mitigating the risk of wildlife strikes to aviation is possible through scientific
interventions (Avrenly & Dempsey, 2015; Cleary & Dolbeer, 2005; Colunga, Burgos,
Ortiz, & Buces, 2011; DeFusco et al., 2015; DeVault et al., 2013; Dolbeer et al., 2016;
Mackinnon, 2004; Nohara, 2011, 2016; Oliveira, 2008). The FAA has mandated Title 14
CFR Part 139 airport operators to develop and implement strategies to mitigate wildlife
hazards (Cleary & Dickey, 2010; DeFusco et al., 2015; Dolbeer, 2007; Rillstone &
Dineen, 2013). Failure to follow the FAA provisions can result in fatal aircraft accidents
as well as large financial penalties for airport operators, public outcry, and adverse media
coverage (Dale, 2009). Additionally, a parallel criminal investigation to apportion blame
and liability may follow the mishap (Mateou & Mateou, 2010; Nemsick & Passeri, 2012;
Solomon & Reles, 2011). The apportionment of blame and liability could easily extend to
other aviation operators, such as air carriers and flight schools. Both are heavily regulated
by the FAA, and thus are expected to take actions to ensure their pilots will have the
knowledge and skills to prevent aircraft accidents.
“Management efforts to reduce the risks of bird strikes have primarily focused on
airports since various historical analyses of bird strike data for civil aviation have
indicated the majority of strikes occur in this environment” (Dolbeer et al., 2016, p. 15).
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There has been a steady increase in the implementation and improvement of safety
strategies at airports to reduce the risk of wildlife strikes since the 1990s (DeVault et al.,
2013). According to Dolbeer et al., (2016), “these efforts are likely responsible for the
general decline in reported strikes with damage and a negative effect-on-flight from
2000-2015 in spite of continued increases in populations of many large bird species” (p.
xiv). However, a trend analysis of bird strike data involving wildlife strikes to civil
aircraft in the United States from 1990 to 2015 indicates that this assumption should be
revised. Despite being successful, these efforts have not been effective in reducing bird
strikes outside the environment of airports (Dolbeer et al., 2015; Dolbeer et al; 2016).
Integration of science with management systems and safety concepts, the application of
new strategies and methodologies at airports, and national guidelines can further improve
the safety of the aviation industry (Blackwell et al., 2012; Dolbeer, 2009; Dolbeer, 2013;
Dolbeer et al., 2015; Dolbeer et al., 2016). Moreover, these efforts require enhanced risk
management and ADM training for flight crews, air carrier operations personnel, and
ATC personnel (Dolbeer et al., 2016; Eshenfelder & DeFusco, 2010; FAA, 2016a;
MacKinnon, 2004).
Several factors influence the risk of an accident due to a bird strike, including
actions by crewmembers (Avrenli & Dempsey, 2014; Dolbeer, 2006a, 2006b;
Eschenfelder, 2005; Klope, Beason, Nohara, & Begier, 2009; MacKinnon, 2004). Even
though it is practically impossible to eliminate the risk of bird strikes, such as occurred
with U.S. Airways flight 1549, crewmembers play a vital role in the accident prevention
process (MacKinnon, 2004; Nicholson & Reed, 2011). According to MacKinnon (2004),
flight crews can reduce the probability and/or severity of the strikes, through appropriate
preflight preparation and the use of adequate flight procedures. The “Sharing the skies:
An aviation guide to the management of wildlife hazard” manual (MacKinnon, 2004)
dedicates an entire chapter to increase the safety awareness of flight crews. Additionally,
this document presents actions that should be taken by pilots to prevent accidents due to
wildlife. The risk of bird strikes to aviation cannot be successfully mitigated without
effective policy guidance for the flight crews, including training for pilots, and adherence
to that policy (Eschenfelder & DeFusco, 2010).
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As previously noted, pilots should anticipate hazardous conditions and take the
necessary actions to mitigate safety risks, including wildlife hazards (DOT, 2017). There
are several sources of aeronautical information that could be used by pilots in order to
mitigate the risk of bird strikes, including the AIM, AIP, NOTAMs, the FAA airport
facility directory, and the AHAS. For example, there are four major migratory flyways in
the U.S. (Atlantic; Mississippi; Great Lakes; Central) and numerous smaller flyways
which cross these major north-south migratory routes (DOT, 2017; FAA; 2016f). The
majority of bird strikes in the U.S. occurs between July and October, the period when
birds are migrating and the populations are at the peak in North America (Dolbeer et al.,
2016). A study by Drey, Martin, Belant, DeVault, and Blackwell (2014) found that the
risk of bird strikes at and around Mississippi airports, located along the Mississippi and
the Atlantic flyways, significantly increased during the migration periods. The AHAS is a
powerful ADM tool that could be used by pilots during the planning phase of their
flights, especially when flying through routes that pass along the North American
migratory flyways (NTSB, 2009). According to Kelly (2002), the benefits of AHAS
include near-real-time detection and verification of birds in the atmosphere, as well as a
forecast of bird movements within a low level flight arena for the contiguous 48 U.S.
states and Alaska. Therefore, by using information from the AHAS, pilots can implement
more effective safety management strategies to mitigate bird strikes.
Safety promotion, an important SMS pillar, ensures aviation professionals have
the necessary dexterity and knowledge to carry out their responsibilities proficiently and
safely (Junior et al., 2009). In case of wildlife hazard management training programs, the
information provided should be supported by current data from wildlife-strike events
within the aviation industry (MacKinnon, 2004). Moreover, training programs should
incorporate findings from scientific studies addressing the theme (Avrenly & Dempsey,
2014; Dolbeer, 2006a). However, there is virtually no training for pilots addressing the
risk management of wildlife. There are ICAO SARPs specifically addressing the
management of wildlife in aviation (e.g., Annex 14). Similarly, the FAA provides
extensive regulations and guidance material towards the safety management of wildlife
(e.g., ACRP Synthesis 39 – Airport Wildlife Population Management). The great
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majority of those materials are designed for airport operators. In summary, there are no
ICAO SARPs or guidance material addressing the training of pilots focusing on wildlife
hazard mitigation nor is any required by the FAA. According to the Flight Safety
Foundation (FSF), many pilots are reluctant to take potential strikes seriously, despite
previous aircraft accidents due to birds (FSF, 1989).
The management of wildlife is a defense in depth, including ICAO SARPs,
regulations by civil aviation authorities, aircraft construction and certification standards,
strategies by airport operators, and safety training for aviation professionals
(Eschenfelder & Hull, 2006). Several authors have also addressed the need for continuous
research. Dolbeer, Seubert, and Begier (2014) for example, suggested research addressing
the use of technology (e.g., bird detecting radar) and methods to increase aircraft
detection by birds (e.g., aircraft lights; radar) in order to reduce the risk of accidents.
Nohara (2016) demonstrated the benefits of avian radar for assessing the risk of bird
strikes off-airport. Avian radar data could be used to determine spatial zones and times
with high-risk bird concentrations. Such information is vital for in-flight SRM by pilots.
“The FAA wildlife hazard management long-term goals include integration of avian
radar and bird migration forecasting into airspace management” (Dolbeer et al., 2016, p.
xix).
Several studies have addressed wildlife hazard management; more specifically,
bird hazard to aviation. Dolbeer (2006a) demonstrated that from 1990 tthrough 2004 only
five percent of the bird strikes causing substantial damage to aircraft occurred above
3,500 feet AGL. Moreover, during the period studied, bird strikes declined consistently
by 32% every 1,000 feet above 500 feet AGL. The author stated that wildlife
management programs should focus on the airport environment, but also recommended
that flight crews should minimize flight time and airspeed below 3,500 feet AGL.
The degree of aircraft damage and effect on the flight from bird strikes are
directly related to KE, derived from the bird mass and the square of the speed of the
aircraft (Eschenfelder, 2005; Nicholson & Reed, 2011; NTSB, 2009, 2010). Most
aviators are not aware of the energy derived from the bird mass (determined by the
wildlife species) and the square of the speed of the collision (see Figure 2.3). The aircraft
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speed is much more critical in case of a bird strike than the mass of the animal. For
example, an increase in aircraft airspeed from 100 to 125 knots (25%) will result in a
56% increase in the KE.
a

Figure 2.3. The kinetic Energy Equation. Adapted from the “Strike certification standards
and damage mitigation”, by O’Callaghan, (n.d.).
Note. This picture refers to a Brazilian Air Force aircraft that collided with a
black vulture (approximately 3 pounds) in 1999.
The kinetic energy can be expressed in different units. In aviation, it is generally
expressed in foot-pounds (ft-lb) (Croft, 2016; Eschenfelder & Hull, 2006; O’Callaghan,
n.d.), even though several authors (Eschenfelder, 2005; Dolbeer, 2006a; Nicholson &
Reed, 2011) have expressed KE in pounds (lb). To calculate KE in foot-pounds (ft-lb),
the bird weight in pounds should be converted to slugs, a unit of mass, and the airspeed in
knots converted to feet-per-second before the calculation process (M. A. F. Pires,
personal communication, January 13, 2017). As an example, a collision of an adult male
Canada goose that weighs 14 pounds and is flying directly toward an aircraft at thirty
knots, with the airplane flying directly toward the bird at 250 knots, would generate a KE
of approximately 48,590.96 ft-lb; well beyond the design limits of the general structure of
the aircraft (O’Callaghan, n.d).
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A study by Avrenly and Dempsey (2014) identified factors statistically
associated with the risk of an engine failure due to a bird strike. This study sheds some
light on Dolbeer’s (2007) findings. For instance, the risk of an engine failure is
substantially higher during the departure phases of flight, especially during the initial
climb-out. Following Dolbeer (2007), faster rotation of the engine during the departure
phases of flight compared to arrival can explain these differences. Furthermore, the
greater risk of bird strikes associated with the multiple tasks and challenges pilots have to
deal with after an engine failure explain the preponderance of hull losses following a
strike during departure. Therefore, during departure lower altitudes should be cleared as
rapidly as possible (Avrenly & Dempsey, 2014). Another interesting finding by Avrenly
and Dempsey (2014) was that a bird strike during twilight is 90% more likely to cause
substantial damage to the engine than a strike during the day, controlling for flight phase,
number of birds, bird size, altitude, and sky conditions. Similarly, a strike during cloudy
conditions is 80% more likely to cause an engine failure than a strike during clear sky
conditions, controlling for flight phase, number of birds struck, bird size, altitude, and
daylight conditions. The authors recommend pilots should use speeds and flap settings
that provide the best angle of climb speed instead of the best rate of climb speed. Climb
speeds close to Vx (best angle of climb speed) are safer because Vy (best rate of climb
speed) is higher than Vx. In case of a bird strike, the energy imparted on the aircraft
airframe or engines (KE) will be smaller. However, pilots should also remember that
climb speeds closer to Vy could reduce the time spent in the bird-rich zone. ICAO (2012)
suggested that pilots should maintain Vx until clearing the bird-rich zone. This procedure
will ensure that the airplane climbs above the bird-rich zone as fast as possible, while
maintaining a relative slow airspeed.
According to Dolbeer (2006b), 80% of birds will attempt to avoid an approaching
aircraft. A study by Bernhardt, Blackwell, DeVault, and Brohl (2010) concluded that
birds usually take evasive behavior in response to an approaching aircraft. Some studies
explored the use of aircraft lighting as a strategy to reduce the risk of aircraft accidents
due to birds (Blackwell et al., 2012; Blackwell & Bernhardt, 2004; Dolbeer & Barnes,
2017; Doppler et al., 2015). The use of the aircraft external lights could, for example,
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enhance the detection of the aircraft by Canada geese (Blackwell et al., 2012). Canada
geese were involved in the highest number of incidents with damage to aircraft from
1990 to 2010 (Blackwell et al., 2012). This bird species is ranked as the seventh most
hazardous wildlife species to aviation (Dolbeer & Wright, 2009), and was responsible for
the accident of U.S. Airways flight 1549 (NTSB, 2010b).
According to Varela, Palacios, and Goldsmith (1993), vision in birds is normally
less sensitive than in humans to the red end of the spectrum. Dolbeer and Barnes (2017)
analyzed reported bird strikes that occurred in the U.S. from 1990 through 2015. First
they selected the incidents involving business and commercial aircraft that had two
underwing or fuselage mounted turbine-powered jet engines. Then, Dolbeer and Barnes
(2017) selected the incidents that occurred to engine #1 or engine #2, excluding data with
strikes involving both engines and those with no-engine strikes. Dolbeer and Barnes
(2017) identified evidence of bias towards birds striking the engine #1, on the side of the
aircraft where the red navigation light is located, compared to engine #2, where the green
light is located. They suggested that operational changes, such as the use of anti-collision
strobe lights, especially during periods of nocturnal bird migration, as a strategy to
mitigate the risk of bird strikes. However, as cited by Blackwell et al. (2012), by Dolbeer
and Barnes (2017), and by Doppler et al. (2015), further investigation is paramount to
improve the potential effectiveness of the use of the aircraft external lights to reduce the
risk of bird strikes. Despite a need for further studies, but considering the possible
benefits for the safety of flights, several authors suggest the use of the aircraft lights (e.g.,
strobes, rotating beacons, landing lights), especially below 10,000 feet AGL, to stimulate
avoidance behavior in birds (Blackwell et al., 2012; Dolbeer, 2006b; Dolbeer & Barnes,
2017; FSF, 1989; MacKinnon, Sowden, & Kelly, 2003; MacKinnon 2004).
Sheridan, Randolet, DeVault, Seamans, Blackwell, and Juricic (2015) studied the
effects of radar on bird behavior. They found that during the taxi phase of flight a moving
radar unit may enhance escape response by birds. Their findings suggest that radar,
similarly to aircraft lights, could enhance avoidance behavior of certain species of birds.
The authors also noted that birds evaluated the approaching radar experiment as
“threats”, and showed earlier escape responses. The authors argued that the aircraft
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weather radar, for example, can allow certain species of birds to escape in order to avoid
an approaching aircraft during taxi procedures. However, this strategy may not work at
higher speeds, such as during takeoff roll or cruise. Nevertheless, more studies are needed
to validate these findings.
In case of a bird encounter, flight crews should pull up, consistent with good
flying techniques, to attempt to pass over them (Dolbeer, 2006b; DOT, 2017;
Eschenfelder & DeFusco, 2010; Eschenfelder & Hull, 2006). Following Dolbeer (2006b),
birds above 500 feet AGL will usually dive to avoid a conflicting aircraft. However,
pilots should also be aware that birds flying close to the ground (e.g., during the aircraft
takeoff roll or close to touchdown) exhibit unpredictable maneuvers when threatened. If
birds are encountered on final approach and landing is assured, it could be safer to
continue through the flock of birds and land than to perform a go-around (ICAO, 2012;
Nicholson & Reed, 2011). Pilots should initiate a missed approach only if the procedure
can be initiated without bird ingestions (MacKinnon, 2004). This strategy will reduce the
KE associated with the aircraft engines at high speeds, and also the probability of
multiple bird ingestions (and/or strikes) at low altitude and low aircraft energy states
(Nicholson & Reed, 2011).
Wildlife programs should be constantly evaluated to see if they are achieving their
goals, and whether they need to be improved and/or extended (Cleary & Dickey, 2010).
The FAA NWSD is vital to provide the empirical groundwork for strategies to mitigate
the risk of wildlife strikes (Dolbeer, 2006b). Aviation stakeholders, including flight
schools, airport operators, and air carriers cannot solve a problem they do not fully
understand. In addition, without wildlife hazard data it is difficult to justify certain
management methods, such as habitat modification or even population management
(Cleary & Dolbeer, 2005), or to defend an aviation operator during litigation in case of an
aircraft accident due to wildlife (Dale, 2009). ICAO Annex 14 provides a Standard
requiring ICAO member States to establish a national NWSD and the correspondent
processes for collecting data regarding wildlife strikes to aircraft (ICAO, 2013c). In the
U.S., the reporting of wildlife strikes to aviation is voluntary by aviation operators
(Dolbeer, 2015). FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-32B provides guidelines for
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aviation professionals to report wildlife strike events to the FAA (FAA, 2013). These
guidelines describe situations when they are encouraged to report (e.g., damage or
evidence of a wildlife strike has been identified on the airplane). Aviation professionals
can report wildlife strikes electronically (preferred method), or by mail using FAA Form
5200-7. The FAA (2013) highlights that the accurate identification of wildlife species is
vital for the safety management of wildlife hazards to aviation. Therefore, the Agency
recommends that aviation professionals send bird remains to the Smithsonian Institution
Feather Identification Lab, in Washington, DC for identification.
The reporting of wildlife strikes by pilots will greatly enhance the management of
safety (Anderson et al., 2015; Cleary & Dolbeer, 2005; DeFusco et al., 2015; Dekker &
Buurma, 2005; Dolbeer et al., 2016; Mendonca, 2016). According to the U.S. DOT
(2017), information obtained from strike-reports is utilized to develop safety standards,
to develop and evaluate the effectiveness of WHMP by airport operators, and to reduce
the costs of strikes. Furthermore, a scientific approach to this safety hazard also depends
on data and information from strikes (Cleary & Dolbeer, 2005; Dolbeer, 2006b;
Mendonca, 2008b; Moreno, 2016; Nicholson & Reed, 2011). Information from current
strike data, in addition to findings from scientific studies, should be used to enhance the
safety training of pilots (Avrenly & Dempsey, 2014; Dolbeer, 2006a; Dolbeer et al.,
2015; MacKinnon, 2004). Unfortunately, it is estimated that only 47% of the wildlife
strikes at Part 139 certificated airports are reported to the FAA (Dolbeer et al., 2016).
In the U.S., from 1990 through 2015, the great majority of strikes were reported
by airport personnel. Only 23% of the 166,276 wildlife strikes were reported by pilots.
Most importantly, approximately five percent of the wildlife strikes that occur at and
around GA airports are reported to the Agency (Schwarz et al., 2014). Therefore, there is
an urgent need for increased reporting with more detailed information about aircraft
incidents due to wildlife strikes by the GA community (Drey et al., 2014; Dolbeer et al.,
2016; Schwarz et al., 2014). Pilots should be aware that the identification of the bird
species struck is vital for airport professionals conducting wildlife hazard management
strategies, and for aircraft manufacturers and aviation authorities working on
airworthiness standards (Dolbeer et al., 2016). Additionally, such information could be
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used to assist safety professionals during the investigation of mishaps (Dove, Dahlan, &
Heacker, 2009), and to identify species that pose the highest hazard to aviation (Dolbeer
& Wright, 2009). The FAA (2013) provides guidance that could be considered by GA
pilots in regards to the reporting and identification of the wildlife struck.
From 1990 through 2015, there were 24,478 incidents reported in which the
strikes caused damage to the aircraft and/or resulted in an adverse effect on the flight
(e.g., aborted takeoff). In regards to the monetary costs of strikes, only 2% of the total
reported strikes provided information about the direct aircraft repair costs, and only 1.5%
of these reports gave an estimate of the indirect costs. According to Dolbeer et al. (2016),
several reports providing estimates of the costs were submitted before the damage and
aircraft downtime had been fully assessed. A more complete accounting of the costs of
wildlife strikes will permit a better understanding of how these damaging incidents vary
temporally and geographically, thus allowing a better allocation of the aviation
stakeholders’ finite resources (Anderson et al., 2015; Dolbeer et al., 2016). It is estimated
that the costs of wildlife strikes to the aviation industry are at least two or more times
higher than the current estimates (Cleary & Dickey, 2010; DeFusco & Unangtst, 2013;
Dolbeer et al., 2016). According to Dolbeer et al. (2016), “a problem that cannot be
measured or defined cannot be solved” (p. 101).
No single strategy will ever successfully reduce the risk of bird strikes (DeVault,
Blackwell, & Bellant, 2013). Therefore, an integrated approach to the safety management
of birds requires the proactive participation of pilots, especially outside the airport
environment where wildlife mitigation strategies by airport operators probably has no
effect. As previously noted, some situations, such as bird ingestion after takeoff, will
probably call for an expeditious crew reaction using SOPs. However, there is usually
sufficient time prior and during a flight for pilots to gather information, analyze
hazardous situations that may occur, assess the risk, reach a decision, and then take the
adequate actions (ICAO, 2013a, 2013b; FAA, 2008; 2016a).
The hazards and associated risks encountered during flight operations are
considerably different from those involved in daily activities (FAA, 2009). During a
regular flight, crewmembers must make several decisions under hazardous conditions
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(FAA, 2016a). To fly safely, flight crews need to assess the degree of risk and determine
the best course of action to mitigate risks. Pilots’ abilities to make safer decisions are
based on flight experience, available data and information, and training and education.
Currently, no safety program or tool successfully mitigates the risk of bird strikes in
every location, in every phase of flight or altitude, and for every species (DeVault et al.,
2013). Therefore, safety efforts will require enhanced safety training for aviation
professionals, especially pilots. As aforementioned, pilots play an important role in the
accident prevention process regarding bird hazard (Dolbeer, 2006b; Eschenfelder, 2005;
MacKinnon, 2004; Mendonca, 2011, 2016). MacKinnon (2004) suggested three areas
where air operators should concentrate their efforts: SOPs, pilots’ training and education,
and the reporting of wildlife strikes.
Part 141 collegiate flight schools, an important subset of the GA industry, must
give priority to flight crew training, preparing pilots to efficiently manage the risk of
wildlife strikes. Pilots’ initial and recurrent training should cover current wildlife-strike
data and information (see Appendix A). Following MacKinnon (2004), these training
“sessions provide opportunities to review typical wildlife-strike scenarios and the most
appropriate procedures for addressing associated hazards” (p. 190). Several mitigation
strategies and recommendations are available to stakeholders of the aviation industry,
especially airport operators; however, there is basically no guidance addressing training
for pilots regarding recommended practices that could reduce the risk of aircraft accidents
due to bird strikes (Eschenfelder, 2005; Eschenfelder & DeFusco, 2010; Eschenfelder &
Hull, 2006; Mendonca, 2011, 2016).
Excellence in aviation operations requires technical and mental skills, and both
are acquired and maintained through training and practice (ICAO, 2013b). Safety training
will not only provide the necessary knowledge necessary for pilots to effectively manage
the bird hazard issue, but also motivate them to do so (FAA, 2016a; ICAO, 2013a; Junior
et al., 2009; Mendonca, 2016). Following Dolbeer (2009), “birds and aircraft are
competing for airspace in increasingly crowded skies” (p. 166); therefore, the need for a
different strategy to improve aviation safety is real and urgent, and involving
crewmembers in an integrated approach using SMS and ADM concepts is fundamental.
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After all, there are several actions by pilots that could mitigate the risk of aircraft
accidents due to birds (Anderson et al., 2015; Avrenly & Dempsey, 2014; Blackwell et
al., 2012; Dekker & Buurma, 2005; Dolbeer, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2011; Doppler et al.,
2015; DOT, 2017; ICAO, 2013b; Eschenfelder, 2005; Eschenfelder & DeFusco, 2010;
Eschenfelder & Hull, 2006; FSF, 1989; Klope et al., 2009; MacKinnon, 2004; Mendonca,
2008a, 2008b, 2016; Nicholson & Reed, 2011). Such actions will ensure a measurable
and positive impact in any aviation operator’s bottom line. For instance, a ten-percent
reduction in the number of damaging bird strikes could reduce the annual cost of wildlife
strikes to the U.S. civil aviation industry by at least US$ 19 million (Dolbeer et al., 2016).

2.6

Summary

In this Chapter, a thorough review of previous studies on the safety management
of bird hazard to aviation was conducted. The review included discussion of the elements
of a safety culture, the pillars of a safety management system and how they integrate with
the safety management of wildlife, concepts of aeronautical decision-making, and the
role of the Federal Aviation Administration in preventing aircraft accidents due to
wildlife. In addition, empirical studies addressing the safety management of birds were
covered, in order to demonstrate the need for further research in this area.
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CHAPTER 3.

METHODOLOGY

The risk of accidents due to bird strikes is an intrinsic component of the aviation
system (Cleary & Dolbeer, 2005). Even though it is practically impossible to completely
mitigate such risks, actions by pilots can reduce the probability and/or the severity of bird
strikes (Avrenly & Dempsey, 2014; Dolbeer, 2006b; MacKinnon, 2004). Analyses of
bird-strike data demonstrate that the risk of accidents involving the GA community has
increased from 1990 through 2015 (Dolbeer et al., 2016). However, little to no work has
been done to mitigate the risk of accidents due to wildlife involving the GA community,
especially pilots (Cleary & Dickey, 2010). The purpose of this study was to determine if
a safety training protocol could effectively enhance CFR Part 141 GA pilots’ knowledge
and skills to reduce the risk of bird strikes to aviation.
This chapter discusses the quantitative and qualitative procedures that were used
in this project. The discussion includes the research design, Institutional Review Board
(IRB) procedures, the population addressed, sampling procedures, data collection, data
analysis, reliability, validity, and threats.

3.1

Research Design

According to Leedy and Ormrod (2015), there are four types of true experimental
designs: pretest-posttest experimental and control group design, posttest-only control
group design, Solomon four-group design, and within-subjects design. The researcher
selected the pretest posttest experimental design for this study, because it is more robust
than the posttest-only control group design. In addition, this design was chosen over the
Solomon four-group design, because the latter requires a larger sample and more
resources (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). Finally, in a within-subjects experimental design all
participants receive two or more different treatments simultaneously. The possible effects
of the treatments are then measured. This approach is not in alignment with the purpose
of this study, a single treatment.
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The pretest posttest design, which assists in reducing confounding variables, is the
most popular among researchers (Salkind, 2012). Considering that pilots were randomly
assigned to the experimental and control groups, any differences observed after the safety
training should be due to the treatment. The researcher will be able to investigate if the
safety training enhanced the pilots’ knowledge and skills to mitigate the risk of bird
strikes. Additionally, the inquirer will have a reasonable basis to draw conclusions about
a cause-and-effect relationship with the treatment. As previously noted, this design
effectively addresses internal validity issues. This study used a pretest posttest
experimental and control group design to evaluate the effectiveness of a safety training
protocol. The experimental design consisted of two groups. In the first group, or the
control group, participants received no treatment. In the second group, or the
experimental group, participating pilots attended a safety training workshop administered
by the researcher. This design allows the effects of the treatment to be clearly identified
as the cause of any enhancement measured in pilots’ skills and knowledge to mitigate
bird hazards (Gall et al., 2007). Moreover, it can eliminate confounding variables as to
why the change has taken place (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). The safety training utilized in
this project was focused in an attempt to enhance 14 CFR Part 141 pilots’ aeronautical
knowledge and skills pertaining to the safety risk management of birds to aviation. Table
3.1 outlines the research design process.
Table 3.1
Research Experimental Design
RANDOM
ASSIGNMENT

GROUP 1

PRETEST

TREATMENT

POSTTEST

GROUP 2

PRETEST

NO
TREATMENT

POSTTEST

Note. Treatment was an interactive workshop (safety training).
In addition to the quantitative section, there was a qualitative section to allow the
researcher to access unquantifiable facts and have a better understanding of the
participants’ knowledge and skills to mitigate the risk of bird strikes. The qualitative data,
that were collected through three questions in both the pretest and the posttest, and in ten
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open-ended questions in the follow-up survey questionnaire, also assisted the researcher
in explaining the quantitative results in more detail (Patton, 2015).

3.2

Research Questions

The purpose of this study was to determine the effectiveness of a safety training
protocol designed to enhance 14 CFR Part 141 GA pilots’ knowledge and skills to reduce
the risk of bird strikes to aviation. Specifically, this study sought answers to the following
questions:
Research Question 1. Is there a relationship between flight experience, measured
in flight hours, and the safety management of bird hazards by the participants in
terms of pretest scores?
Research Question 2. Is there a statistically-significant difference in pre-and
posttests scores between and within the control and experimental groups?
Research Question 3. From the pilots’ perspective, how do CFR Part 141 GA
pilots manage to fly safely, given the threat of aircraft accidents due to birds?

3.3

Population and Sample

The target population for this study included flight students and instructors in the
Purdue University professional flight program and from Purdue aviation (in both cases 14
CFR Part 141 GA pilots). Certificated flight schools operating under 14 CFR Part 141
must meet stringent standards and teach an approved curriculum. Additionally, the
courses approved by the FAA must provide ground training on required aeronautical
knowledge areas, including the safe and efficient operation of aircraft (Electronic Code of
Federal Regulations, Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter H, Part 141, 2017). These strictures
help to ensure a high-level of aviation safety and efficiency (FAA, 2016a; Mendonca &
Carney, 2017).
A mixing purposeful and probability design was used in order to increase the
credibility and relevance of the study (Patton, 2015). Initially, the purposive sampling
was used by the researcher to recruit 14 CFR Part 141 pilots from the target group.
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Purposive sampling allows researchers to have an in-depth understanding of vital issues
for the purpose of the study and research questions (Patton, 2015). These participants
represent a diverse perspective on the safety management of birds by GA pilots.
According to MacKinnon (2004), flight schools are the cradle of the GA community.
Most importantly, flight schools assist aviators in honing their knowledge and skills that
are vital to mitigate wildlife hazards. This sampling method creates threats to validity.
These threats are discussed in a later section of this Chapter. After an assessment of the
participants’ demographics (e.g., flight experience), they were randomly distributed into
the two groups using a proportional stratified random sampling technique (Leedy &
Ormrod, 2015; Patton, 2015; Sekaran, & Bougie, 2013).
In a true experimental design participants are randomly assigned to groups. This
design, which includes a control group, offers a high degree of control, thus greater
internal validity (Salkind, 2012). According to Leedy and Ormrod (2015), the random
assignment of participants to groups, including a control group, provides a powerful
argument for a cause-and-effect relationship. Each important segment of the participants
(e.g., student pilot; private pilot; flight instructor) were expected to be adequately
represented. Therefore, diverse and more valuable data could be obtained (Sekaran &
Bougie, 2013).

3.4

Sample Size

Pilots, students and flight instructors in the Purdue University professional flight
program and from Purdue aviation (14 CFR Part 141 GA pilots) were invited to
participate. It is prohibitive, in terms of resources, to collect data from an entire
population (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). However, an appropriate sample size and sampling
design allow researchers to use the results obtained and make generalizations about the
population being studied (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015; Salkind, 2012). Following Sekaran
and Bougie (2013), the sample size is influenced by the desired effect size, and the alpha
and beta levels. “Effect size is a statistical measure of the size of an effect in a
population” (Privitera, 2015, p. 248). The effect size provides a statistical estimate of the
magnitude of an effect (e.g., mean difference) (Nakagawa, 2004). An effect size of .8 is
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considered large, 0.5 medium, and 0.2 small (Cohen, 1992; Ellis, 2010; Privitera, 2015).
An exhaustive search failed to find an appropriate effect size from previous research.
Therefore, for this study, the researcher expected an effect size of 0.5, since a medium
effect size could be considered meaningful for the purpose of the current study. In
addition, by deciding about an expected effect size, the researcher could determine the
recommended sample size for this project.
The alpha level is also called a Type I error (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015) or level of
significance (Salkind, 2012). It occurs when researchers reject the null hypothesis even if
the treatment has not worked (Salkind, 2012). A level of significance of 0.05 is
traditionally used by researchers in social sciences (Graveter & Forzano, 2015). The
researcher used a level of significance of 0.05. A type II error occurs when researchers
inadvertently fail to reject the null hypothesis, even though the data indicate the treatment
has worked (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). The beta value, also known as statistical power,
controls the Type II error. The likelihood of a Type II error is inversely related to a Type
I error. By increasing the sample size, the researcher can reduce the probability of a Type
II error (Salkind, 2012). Rubin (2012) recommends a statistical power of 0.8 for social
scientists. Based on a priori Alpha level of .05, Beta level of .8, and an estimated effect
size of .5, Ary, Jacobs, Razavieh, and Sorensen (2006) recommended a minimal sample
size of 39 participants, Cohen (1992) suggested 64 participants in each group, and Gall et
al. (2007) recommended a minimum of 15 participants in each group for a cause-effect
experimental research. The population for this study is limited to approximately 279
pilots from the Purdue professional flight program (G. Vicky, personal communication,
August 31, 2017), and 17 pilots from Purdue Aviation (J. Paulsen, personal
communication, October 12, 2017), totaling 296 possible participants.

3.5

Variables

For the quantitative section, and in order to answer Research Question 1, the
independent variable (IV) was the participants’ flight hours, and the dependent variables
(DV) were the participants’ pretest scores. The participants’ flight experience, measured
in flight hours, was anticipated to not significantly increase the pretest scores of both
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groups. In case of Research Question 2, the (IV) was the interactive workshop (treatment)
sessions in which each 14 CFR Part 141 pilot who belonged to the treatment group
participated. The treatment consisted of safety training (interactive workshop) developed
by the researcher. The DV were the pretest and posttest scores. The treatment was
anticipated to significantly increase the posttest scores of the treatment group.

3.6

Procedures

The researcher must ensure ethical practices during the research process (Salkind,
2012). The inquirer followed the Purdue University guidelines established by the Human
Research Protection Program (HRPP). The Purdue University HRPP is tasked with the
responsibility to protect the welfare and rights of human subjects participating in research
conducted under the auspices of the University (Purdue University, 2017). The HRPP
supports the researchers’ endeavors while promoting the highest ethical standards. The
researcher submitted a non-exempt Institutional Review Board (IRB) application to the
HRPP Office. Initially, the researcher had considered, as the population of interest, only
pilots from the Purdue professional flight program. However, in order to make it possible
to increase the sample size, and also to have a broader view of the phenomena being
studied, the researcher submitted an amendment to an approved IRB protocol to include
pilots from Purdue Aviation as a part of the population of interest. After the IRB
approval, the researcher started the research processes. See Appendix B for the research
authorization document. Two e-mail invitation letters were sent to the flight students and
instructors in the Purdue University professional flight program and from Purdue aviation
(14 CFR Part 141 GA pilots) (see Appendix C). Invitation letters were also posted at
Hangar 6 and at Purdue Aviation facilities. Flight students and instructors in the Purdue
University professional flight program and from Purdue aviation (14 CFR Part 141 GA
pilots) were invited to participate in the study. As aforementioned, this was expected to
result in a larger number of participants, as well as a broader perspective of the safety
management of birds by an important subset of the GA community.
The study was conducted in four phases. First, the researcher provided a welcome
and information briefing during two sessions that occurred on September 20th and
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September 21st, 2017 . The researcher followed the same procedure in both sessions.
Participants reviewed and signed the experimental and control group informed consent
forms, (see Appendices D and E), if they decided to participate. Pilots were asked to sign
both consent forms because they had not yet been assigned to one of the two groups. The
researcher ensured that all the participants’ questions were answered, and that they had
fully understood the conditions before signing the informed consent forms.
After the welcome and information briefing, pilots who volunteered to participate
in the study were asked to sign an attendance list. The purpose of this list with the
participants’ names and e-mails was to allow the researcher to send e-mails to both
groups with the links to the follow-up survey questionnaire. In addition, they allowed the
researcher to give the gift cards to participants, as explained later in this section. The
principal investigator (PI) will keep those files (attendance lists with the participants’
names and e-mails, pretest, posttest) in a locked cabinet at the SATT, and will destroy
them one year after the conclusion of this study.
Participants of the study were then asked to answer a short demographics survey
questionnaire (see Appendix F). After an assessment of the participants’ answers, both
the researcher and the PI used the proportional stratified random design technique to
randomly assign them to the control and experimental groups, as suggested by Leedy and
Ormrod (2015), and Sekaran and Bougie (2013). One factor considered by the researcher
and the PI was the participants’ flight experience, measured in accrued flight hours.
Another factor considered was whether the participant had taken any academic course
during his/her career addressing the safety management of wildlife. For example, the
topic “wildlife hazards to aviation” is generally covered during some courses at the
School of Aviation and Transportation Technology (SATT) at Purdue University, and
could bias the findings of the current study. Finally, the researcher asked pilots of both
groups to take the pretest. Participants of the experimental group received an even
number as their respective codes. Participants of the control group received an odd
number as their respective codes. Participants of both groups used these codes during the
pretest, posttest, and follow-up survey questionnaire. Those codes were used during the
analysis of data by the researcher in order to protect PII from being released.
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On September 27th, 2017, the researcher conducted the first session of the
experiment, the safety training designed to enhance pilots’ knowledge and skills to
reduce the risk of bird strikes. Five pilots of the experimental group participated in this
workshop. The second session was provided on September 28th, 2017, and three pilots
attended the workshop. The safety training was provided as an interactive workshop for
the experimental group. Participants were given a lecture on the safety management of
birds by pilots, integrating SMS and ADM concepts (see Table 3.3 for the Interactive
Workshop Outline). Both groups were then solicited to take the posttest at the appropriate
session. The experimental group took the posttest immediately after the workshop. Five
participants of the control group took the posttest on September 28th, and two on
September 29th, 2017. On October 6th, 2017, a short follow-up online survey
questionnaire with ten open-ended questions was administered to the participants of both
groups, who had taken the pretest and posttest, in order to collect qualitative data. The
short follow-up online survey questionnaire was hosted on Qualtrics® secure servers for
reliability, privacy, and confidentiality considerations.
Identifying information was not used during the analysis of data, making all
research data anonymous. Participants were compensated with refreshments during the
pretest, safety training, and posttest sessions. In addition, they received a $25 gift card
upon completion of the short follow-up online survey questionnaire. After the data were
collected and findings analyzed, the researcher offered the same safety training to the
control group, so that all participants were able to benefit from this project. In addition,
the researcher compiled the resources used to develop the treatment and distribute to
students of both groups for future consultation.

3.7

New Assessment Instrument

When a new assessment instrument is developed, researchers should provide
information about the instrument’s reliability and validity following rigorous procedures
(Polit & Beck, 2006). Inquirers should go through the appropriate process of gathering
evidence to support a rational argument about the instrument’s adequate use (Douglas &
Purzer, 2015). DeVon and Ferrans (2003) defined validity as “an estimation of the extent
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to which a measurement tool reflects what it intends to measure” (p. 124). Different types
of validity have been identified to test the goodness of measures (DeVon et al., 2007;
Salkind, 2012). Salkind (2012), Leedy and Ormrod (2015), and DeVon and Ferrans
(2003), for example, suggested three types of validity, construct, criterion, and content
validity to support the overall validity of the instrument.
DeVon et al. (2007) conducted a study whose goals included a review of the
tenets of validity and reliability. In addition, their study provided guidance for enhancing
the strength of the validity and reliability of psychometric instruments. Following DeVon
et al. (2007), “all types of validity fall under the broad heading of construct validity” (p.
156) (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 Construct Validity: A Model. Adapted from “A psychometric toolbox for
testing validity and reliability”, by DeVon et al., (2007). Journal of Nursing Scholarship,
39(2), 155-164.
a

Construct validity reflects and testifies to the theories around which the
instrument has been designed (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013; Westen & Rosenthal, 2003).
Face and content validity are under the heading of translational validity, whereas
concurrent, predictive, convergent, and discriminant validity are termed criterion validity.
Construct validity, which provides the link between the theories and the
conceptualization of the assessment tool, is a difficult and time-consuming type of
validity to establish (Salkind, 2012).
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There are several ways to assess the construct validity of an instrument. An
instrument has face validity when it measures the construct of interest and appears valid
to examinees who take it, and to the researcher who develops and administers it. Experts,
laymen, or potential users of an instrument should review it for syntax, appropriateness,
grammar, and organization (DeVon et al., 2007). Face validity is subjective and
debatable, but the easiest outlook of validity (Sartori, 2009; Shi, 2012). Some authors
believe face validity is too vague and subjective to demonstrate construct validity
(Newfields, 2002; Trochim, 2006). However, there are researchers who have supported
the application of face validity as it increases the instrument’s users’ acceptance of the
testing procedure (DeVon et al., 2007; Sartori, 2009; Shi, 2012). Therefore, face validity
has been frequently reported by researchers (Hermans, Spruytte, Cohen, Audenhove, &
Declercq, 2016; Keller, 2015; Mendonca, 2008; Shi, 2012).
Content validity is recommended when the elements in the instrument represent
the universe of the domain under study (DeVon et al., 2007; Hogan, Greenfield, &
Schmidt, 2001; Polit & Beck, 2006). Content validity involves two phases. First, the
researcher develops a pool of scale items based on a concerned construct, and its
abstractions, peculiarities, and importance, undergird by a robust literature search and
review (Mastaglia, Toye, & Kristjanson, 2014). Secondly, the researcher should consult a
panel of experts who will review the items and validate them as appropriate indicators of
the construct being measured (DeVon et al., 2007). Researchers should develop a large
number of potential items during the initial stages of instrument development. Later, they
could be reduced based on the reviews of the experts. Different approaches have been
proposed to quantify the content validity process (Lynn, 1986). The average congruence
percentage (ACP) was a recommended method several years ago (Polit & Beck, 2006). A
group of experts is asked to indicate whether each item on the pool is relevant to the
construct being measured. The researcher then computes the percentage of items
considered relevant for each expert. Finally, the inquirer computes the average of the
percentages across experts. An ACP of 90% (or higher) is deemed appropriate.
Interestingly, a national group of experts will confer a higher level of validity than local
experts (Sullivan, 2011).
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Another method to quantify the content validity is the content validity index
(CVI). Initially, the researcher should compute the content validity of individual items.
Three or more experts are solicited to rate each scale item in regards of their relevance to
the fundamental construct. Polit and Beck (2006) advocated a four-point scale, ranging
from one = not relevant to four = highly relevant, to be used for determining whether
items should be maintained or eliminated. The content validity index for each item (ICVI) is calculated as “the number of experts giving a rating of three (quite relevant) or
four (highly relevant), (…) divided by the number of experts” (Polit & Beck, 2006, p.
491). The I-CVI should be one if there are three to five experts, or no lower than 0.78 if
there are six to 10 experts in the panel, in order to retain an item (Lynn, 1986). In the
judgment phase, also known as phase two, the researcher should compute the scale-level
CVI (S-CVI). The S-CVI can be calculated by “determining the mean I-CVI for all of the
retained items” DeVon et al; 2007, p. 157). An I-CVI that meets Lynn’s (1986) criteria
and an S-CVI of 0.90 or higher is recommended, for an instrument to have a high content
validity (Polit & Beck, 2006). Several authors have used content validity procedures to
validate assessment tools (Keller, 2015; Shi, 2012; Moreno, 2016; Sterba et al., 2007).
Criterion validity is a measure of the extent to which the results of a test are
related to some criterion (DeVon et al., 2007; Salkind, 2012). It is concerned with either
how well an assessment instrument predicts future performance or estimates present
performance. This can be done by establishing one or more of the validity types under the
broad heading of criterion validity (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Concurrent validity is
established when the instrument scale discriminates individuals who are known to be
different, which means that they are expected to score differently on the assessment tool.
Predictive validity is achieved when the test differentiates individuals in a manner that
predicts performance on some future benchmark (DeVon et al., 2007). Discriminant and
convergent validity are closely related concepts. Different variables should indicate low
correlation with each other (discriminate) whereas different measures of the same
construct should converge, or show high correlation with each other (concur).
Douglas and Purzer (2015) conducted a study to identify common misconceptions
in regards to validity. Researchers can pursue ineffective paths and present results that are
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not valid if using poorly-constructed assessment instruments. The first misconception is
that any new assessment tool should have content, construct, and criterion validity.
Validity is neither fragmented nor limited in scope. There are several aspects and sources
of evidence to consider, but only one validity. Validity is the description and
interpretation of an instrument, and the consequences of its use, never a property of it. In
summary, there is only a valid use of an instrument, not a valid instrument. Another
misconception is that if an assessment instrument has been used and published it is valid.
A published assessment instrument may not function in another setting with other
participants. Additionally, the researcher should not assume that just because the
assessment tool was used and published that it is automatically of high quality. Validating
the appropriateness of an assessment instrument is an ongoing process, it is a goal that
researchers should continuously strive for. Some believe that validation does not require
theory, another misconception. The process of validation should be grounded in theory. It
is vital that the researcher aligns theory with instrument design so as to ensure the
instrument will measure what it is supposed to measure. If not, the contributions to the
body of knowledge, an attribute of research, will be limited.
Reliability is an indication of the level of internal consistency and stability of the
measuring device over time (Borg & Gall, 1989; Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Reliability is
vital, but not the only element of validity (Devon et al., 2007). There are a few methods
for assessing the reliability of an instrument, among them split-halves, test-retest, and
internal consistency. A widely-used measure of reliability is the Cronbach’s alpha
coefficient, or just Cronbach’s alpha (DeVon & Ferrans, 2003; DeVon et al., 2007; Steif
& Dantzler, 2005). Advancements in statistical packages have facilitated the calculation
of the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. Therefore, alternative forms of reliability assessment
have become less popular. The coefficient alpha is closely-related with the other methods
of reliability assessment. If all subparts of an assessment instrument measure the same
attribute, the instrument is internally consistent. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient
“estimates reliability by computing an average inter-item correlation between all items on
the test” (DeVon & Ferrans, 2003, p. 125).
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The degree of reliability in an assessment instrument depends, to a great extent,
upon the use of the results of a study. For example, if the results of a study will be used as
the groundwork for decision(s) that cannot be easily corrected and/or could lead to
undesired consequences, only instruments with a high-level of internal consistency are
acceptable. In such cases a reliability of 0.95 should be the desired standard (Ary, et al.,
2006). In general, an alpha of 0.70 is acceptable for research studies (Adjekum et al.,
2015; DeVon & Ferrans, 2003). However, Clark and Watson (1995) suggested that
researchers should strive for a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of at least 0.80. Several
researchers have used the coefficient alpha to show internal consistency reliability
(Adjekum et al., 2015; Guzey, Harwell, & Moore, 2014; Keller, 2015; Shi, 2012; Walala,
2016).
Salkind (2012) addressed some factors that can positively or negatively affect
reliability. A larger sample generally provides results that are more reliable and
representative. The researcher of the current study did put forth substantial and repeated
efforts to recruit the largest sample possible. The environment or conditions where the
test will be taken should be standardized. Different conditions (e.g., noise) can affect
people’s performance. The pretest and posttest sessions were conducted at Purdue School
of Aviation and Transportation Technology (SATT) classrooms. The instrument items
should be moderate, which means having different levels of difficulty so as to reflect an
accurate picture of the participants’ performance. There were different levels of difficulty
in the assessment tool developed by the researcher (Collins, 2006; McCoubrie, 2004;
Tarrant et al., 2006). The instructions of the tests should be standardized, so that persons
taking the test in different locations and/or time will have the same understanding of the
guidance provided. The researcher provided standardized and straightforward guidance
on both tests (see Appendixes G and H). Following Ary et al. (2006), the greater the
number of questions in a test, the greater the reliability of the tool, as long as all the
questions in the assessment tool belong in the universe of items. According to Ferketich
(1991), multiple choice questions (MCQs) with more than two options can reach a
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.8 or higher with less than 30 questions. The assessment
tool had 25 MCQs, with four options each, and three open-ended questions. The
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reliability of a test also increases as the heterogeneity of the test takers increases.
Participants of this study were expected to have different aviation backgrounds and flight
experience. The technique used to measure the reliability of a test can have an impact in
the coefficient of reliability. Certain methods, such as the Cronbach’s alpha, provide
better estimates. Finally, more objective scoring (e.g., multiple choice) yields more
reliable results. The pretest and posttest included MCQs.

3.8

Validation of the Assessment Instrument

An exhaustive search failed to find an assessment tool addressing the safety
management of wildlife by pilots, used in previous research projects that could be used
during the current study. The researcher found survey questionnaires used by Mendonca
(2008a, 2008b), and Moreno (2016), but these only addressed safety culture and SMS
concepts, and the reporting of bird strikes. A study by Mendonca (2011) assessed two
Brazilian airlines’ pilots’ knowledge of recommended practices that could reduce the risk
of accidents due to bird strikes. However, Mendonca (2011) used a Likert scale in that
project. In addition, some questions were tailored for airline pilots. Therefore, adequate
questions to be used in this study had to be developed by the researcher, based on
previous studies conducted by several authors (see Appendix A), and validated in
accordance with the procedures and possible limitations explained in this section.
Researchers face many challenges related to the validity and reliability of the
research tools. Poorly-developed instruments can cause researchers to pursue ineffective
paths, resulting in the loss of resources (Douglas & Purzer, 2015). The training protocol,
as well as the pretest, posttest, and short follow-up online questionnaire questions were
developed, based upon previous research addressing the safety management of wildlife to
aviation (Avrenly & Dempsey, 2014; Dolbeer, 2006a, 2006b; 2007, 2011; Eschenfelder,
2005; MacKinnon, 2004; Mendonca, 2008a, 2008b, 2011, 2016; Nicholson & Reed,
2011), the safety culture tenets (Adjekum, 2014; Adjekum et al., 2015; Antonsen, 2009;
CANSO, 2013; Choudhry et al., 2007; Gill & Shergill, 2004; Junior et al., 2009; Reason,
1997, 1998; Thaden & Gibbons, 2008), the aeronautical decision-making concepts
(Cassens, 2010; Cassens et al., 2010; FAA, 2016a; Kochan et al., 1997), the safety
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management systems (SMS) tenets (DeFusco et al., 2015; ICAO, 2013a, 2013b; Junior et
al., 2009; Ludwig et al., 2007), and information retrieved from the analysis of bird strikes
to aviation in the U.S. (Dolbeer et al., 2016) (see Appendix A).
The list of questions used during the pretest, posttest, and follow-up survey
questionnaire underwent a validation process. First, the inquirer asked a group of two
Purdue University students, and two faculty members to review the assessment
instrument for organization, grammar, appropriateness, and syntax (face validity), as
suggested by Borg and Gall (1989), DeVon et al, (2007), and Sartori (2009). They were
also asked whether the instrument flowed logically. The researcher then made the
necessary modifications, following the suggestions provided by the Purdue students and
faculty members. After the face validity process, the researcher followed the CVI method
suggested by DeVon et al (2007), Polit and Beck (2006), and Sullivan (2011) to increase
the validity and reliability of the measurement instrument.
The researcher solicited a panel with six experts to assist with the content
validation process. This panel included one aviation safety professional, one ICAO
professional, one researcher who has conducted studies towards the safety management
of wildlife, one experienced pilot, and two professors teaching aviation-related courses
who are also experienced pilots and researchers. As previously noted, an assessment of
the content validity of the test will increase its validity and reliability. The researcher
asked the experts conducting the content validity process to review 55 MCQs and 27
open-ended questions. Ten MCQs and one open-ended questions had I-CVI below 0.78
and were eliminated. The retained questions (Bank of Questions) are presented in
Appendix G. See Table 3.2 for the I-CVI of the retained items. A Cronbach’s alpha
analysis indicated a coefficient of 0.603 (low reliability) for the pretest, and 0.823 (high
reliability) for the post-test (Field, 2009).
Developing and validating a new assessment tool is always a challenge (Sullivan,
2011). The assessment tool developed by the researcher is tied to a strong body of
literature. Despite the possible limitations on the validity and/or reliability of this new
assessment tool, the researcher followed scientific processes to enhance its reliability and
validity. In agreement with Sullivan (2011), the researcher stated the assessment tool
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development process, reliability measures, and information needed to lend credibility to
this “homegrown” instrument. Most importantly, the researcher acknowledges that it
could be improved and used during further research to improve aviation safety. The final
product was a bank of questions (Appendix G) that was used to develop the pretest, the
posttest, and the follow-up survey questionnaire during the current study.
Table 3.2
I-CVI of the Retained Items
Question
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

I-CVI
1
1
1
1
0.83
0.83
1
1
1
0.83
1
1
0.83
1
1
1
1
0.83

Question
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

I-CVI
1
0.83
1
1
0.83
1
0.83
1
1
1
0.83
1
1
0.83
0.83
0.83
1
0.83

Question
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

I-CVI
0.83
1
1
1
0.83
1
1
0.83
1
1
1
0.83
1
0.83
0.83
1
0.83
1

Question
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
-----------

I-CVI
1
1
1
0.83
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.83
0.83
1
1
0.83
0.83
0.83
----------

a

3.9

Pretest

The pretest was conducted in a classroom at the SATT (see Appendix H for the
pretest questions). It was administered approximately one week before the treatment, in
order to increase the external validity (reduce the interacting testing effects). As
previously noted, each participant was given a code and then asked to complete a pretest
of 25 MCQs and three open-ended questions designed to assess the participants’ birdhazard management knowledge and skills to mitigate the risk of bird strikes to aviation.
All participants were asked the same questions in the same order. The pretest was offered
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in multiple sessions, as discussed in the next chapter. Once complete, participants in the
experimental group proceeded to the next stage of this study: the safety training.
MCQs are objective and offer many advantages (Collins, 2006; Salkind, 2012;
Tarrant, Knierim, Hayes, & Ware, 2006). For example, MCQs have been used to assess a
wide range of “learner knowledge in a short period of time” (Collins, 2006, p. 544). In
addition, MCQs can accurately discriminate students with different levels of knowledge
and abilities (Tarrant et al., 2006). However, there are liabilities associated with MCQs.
For example, it could take up to one hour to construct a good MCQ (Collins, 2006;
Tarrant et al., 2006). The researcher developed the pretest MCQs based on empirical
guidelines (Collins, 2006; Ferketich, 1991; Haladyna, Downing, & Rodriguez, 2002;
Haladyna, Downing, & Steven, 1989a, 1989b; McCoubrie, 2004; Tarrant et al., 2006). In
order to allow students to provide creative answers, increase the kind and amount of
content that can be assessed (Salkind, 2012), and to gather qualitative information
(Patton, 2015) needed to answer research question three, three open-ended questions
were added to the pretest. As previously noted, all questions were drawn from a pool of
questions (see Appendix G) that were validated in accordance with the procedures
described in previous sections of this study.

3.10 Learning Theories
Researchers have studied the application of learning theories tenets for decades
(Kolb, 1984; Merriam et al., 2007). The goal is to create effective learning environments
that meet the needs of adult learners. Ertmer and Newby (2013) conducted a study to
provide instructional designers with familiarity in regards to three relevant learning
theory approaches: cognitive, behavioral, and constructivist. Learning theories provide
the groundwork for instructional designers to identify the tactics, techniques, and
instructional design for optimal instructional actions and performance.
Cognitive learning theories stress the role of the environmental conditions as a
facilitator of internal mental structures and learning (Merriam et al., 2007). The learners’
memory as well as values, attitudes, beliefs, and thoughts have a prominent role in the
learning process. Demonstrations and explanations of concepts are important factors that
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work as environmental inputs for learners. “Cognitive theories place greater emphasis on
presenting material so that learners can organize it, relate it to what they know, and
remember it in a meaningful fashion” (Schunk, 2000, p. 13). Instructors should help
learners to relate new information to existing knowledge and make knowledge
meaningful to learners. Transfer occurs when students comprehend how to apply
knowledge in different settings and contexts (Ertmer & Newby, 2013; Isbell, 2012). In
addition, instructional designers and instructors should consider techniques (e.g.,
analogies) to assist learners to relate new information to existing knowledge. In summary,
the organization of the information to be transferred, the learners’ previous knowledge
and memory, and the processes involved in constructing meaning are indispensable
components of learning. Practical group activities and discussions form the foundation of
pedagogical practices for cognitivist theorists (Merriam et al., 2007).
Behavioral theories contend that the environment shapes behavior. In addition,
learning is viewed as a change in the frequency and form of behavior. The learner is
viewed as reactive to environmental conditions, stimuli, and how responses are
reinforced. In a behaviorist setting, the instructor makes decisions and controls the
classroom so that learners can make the appropriate responses and be reinforced.
Behavioral concepts of instruction are closely related to learning because a major goal of
the learning process is to produce changes in behaviors (Schunk, 2000). Instructional
designers and professors using behavioral theories should determine cues that elicit the
desired behavior. Appropriate reinforcement should be used at each step of the learning
process in order to assist the learner in gradually approaching the desired behavior
(Ertmer & Newby, 1993, 2013).
Constructivist theories postulate that learning is a process of constructing meaning
instead of acquiring it. People are active learners who should construct knowledge for
themselves. Constructivist approaches emphasize that persons in an apprentice role learn
from the instructor. In addition, they have the freedom to construct knowledge differently
through social models, apprenticeships, and peer collaboration groups (Merriam et al.,
2007; Schunk, 2000). From the constructivist perspective, teaching involves providing
experiences that “induce cognitive conflict, and hence encourage learners to develop new
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knowledge schemes that are better adapted to experience” (Merriam et al., 2007, p. 291).
Therefore, learning is an active endeavor that requires engagement and a critical
exploration of the view of others. The role of the instructor is to facilitate learners’
involvement in authentic tasks, anchored in meaningful context tasks, in which learners
become actively involved.
The learning theories are a rich source of instructional techniques and tactics that
undergird a reasoned and intelligent strategy selection. The selection of a specific
strategy that could best fit a given context with specific learners is often constrained by
limited time and resources. In addition, the task of translating learning theories concepts
into practical application is neither straightforward nor simple. Several factors influence
the learning process; thus, instructional designers should be versed on how to give
learners multiple types of experiences to enhance the learning process. After all, no single
learning theory provides complete established principles for the entire design process
(Ertmer & Newby, 1993, 2013; Isbell, 2011).
For example, the cognitive strategies conceivably work best with tasks involving
problem-solving tactics and other tasks involving pattern recognition (e.g., recognizing
and dealing with the risk of bird strikes). A behaviorist training approach can efficiently
facilitate mastery of procedural tasks of a profession, discrete behaviors that should be
incorporated and practiced until they become professional habits (e.g., prudent flight
planning by pilots). Constructivist strategies are traditionally suited to deal with poorlydefined issues, taking what the learners already know and adding to that construct a more
precise mental model of the real world. Constructivist methods can be used, for example,
to teach aeronautical decision-making concepts needed to mitigate the risk of bird strikes
(Knecht, Ball, & Lenz, 2010).

3.11 Interactive Workshop
The interactive workshop was developed by the researcher and facilitated by the
PI. The PI holds a Ph.D. degree in Atmospheric Science, and has been a professor of
aviation and transportation technology at Purdue University since 1972. The PI has
approximately 50 years of experience as a pilot, with more than 11,100 flight hours.
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Along his career as an aviation professional, the PI has come across the bird hazard issue
several times (e.g., as a pilot; as an active consultant and expert witness in aircraft
accident litigation cases; and as an aviation professor).
Moreover, the researcher was assisted by a retired Brazilian Air Force officer.
With an extensive background in aviation safety, this military pilot retired as a colonel
after approximately 32 years in the Air Force. As a colonel, this professional held the
position of the Brazilian Aeronautical Accident Investigation Center (CENIPA) chief for
two years. This professional holds a Master’s degree in aviation safety from the
University of Central Missouri (UCM). This safety professional has worked as the ICAO
Accident Investigation Section (AIG) chief for more than 10 years.
Caffarella and Dafron (2013) presented the following definition for workshops:
Intensive group activities that emphasize the development of skills and
competencies in a defined content area. An emphasis is placed on participants
being able to use what they have learned in different situations such as in their
workplaces or various life roles they play (p. 263).
There were three learning objectives for this interactive workshop. Upon the
termination of the interactive workshop, pilots were expected to:
1. Identify various sources of information related to bird hazard;
2. Demonstrate the ability to think clearly and analytically about the safety
management of bird hazards; and
3. Discuss several mitigation strategies applicable to the safety management of
bird hazards by pilots.
The treatment was delivered during two two-hour sessions in September 2017.
The workshop had four primary sections. These sections included the introduction and an
initial briefing, an overview of the SMS and ADM tenets, bird-hazard information
acquisition and interpretation, and a review of information derived from previous studies
that could enhance the participants’ knowledge and skills to mitigate the risk of bird
strikes (see Table 3.3 for the interactive workshop outline). In addition, one relevant
aircraft accident involving a GA aircraft due to bird strikes was examined (NTSB, 2009).
Finally, the researcher conducted a recap and answered the participants’ final questions.

63
During the workshop, a two-way discussion was encouraged by the researcher. After the
data were collected and analyzed, participants received a compilation of the resources
used to develop this interactive workshop (e.g., the FAA Serial Report Number 22)
(Dolbeer et al., 2016) for further consultation.
Table 3.3
Interactive Workshop Outline
A

1) Workshop Introduction
a) Introductions
b) Overview and objectives of the workshop
2) Safety Management Systems and Aeronautical Decision-Making
a) Safety Risk Management
i) Hazard identification
ii) Safety risk assessment and mitigation
b) Safety Promotion
i) Safety culture
ii) Safety training and communication
iii) Break
3) Bird Hazard to Aviation
a) Brief overview
i) Information derived from the analysis of bird strikes in the U.S.
ii) Bird hazard data acquisition
iii) Kinetic energy
iv) Planning a safer flight in regards to bird hazards
v) Pilots’ actions to mitigate the risk of bird strikes
vi) Aircraft accident due to bird strikes – a case study
4) Workshop Conclusion
a) Workshop recap
b) Discussion and final questions
a

Employment of a workshop has been an effective interactive instructional method
for short-term education for several years (Andrews, 1997). Workshops, whose main
purpose is concentrated education, are flexible and cost-effective because of their short
duration. Some authors (Andrews, 1997; Brooks-Harris & Stock-Ward, 1999) have
suggested that workshops can assist participants to develop competencies, build (or
enhance) new skills, and increase performance on their jobs. The presenter of the
workshop should act as a facilitator of experiential learning (Brooks-Harris & StockWard, 1999). The facilitator should acknowledge the differences in participants’ learning
styles and design, and conduct a workshop that addresses and appeals to participants’
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different needs. Following Andrews (1997), people enroll in interactive workshops
because they strongly believe workshops will provide them with the knowledge and skills
they need or desire. In addition, they participate in workshops because these interactive
learning activities are generally focused and job-related.
Brooks-Harris and Stock-Ward (1999) proposed two approaches for workshop
design: something for everyone, and measure and match. The major assumption of the
something-for-everyone design is that there will be different learning styles among
participants; therefore, the facilitator should plan learning activities that attend to the
participants’ needs. This approach will not require a needs assessment procedure prior to
the workshop to collect information that should guide the design. In contrast, the
measure-and-match design does require an assessment of participants’ learning
preferences before the workshop. Then, the developer should tailor the workshop strategy
to meet the preferences (needs) of the styles in the group or the predominant style. Both
methods offer advantages and disadvantages. The major disadvantage of the measureand-match design is that the results of the participants’ learning styles assessment could
reveal a diversity of needs that will require the workshop developer to plan learning
activities similar to the something-for-everyone design. Interestingly, both workshop
designs can be developed based upon almost any learning theory.
An interactive workshop using the something-for-everyone design was the
adequate protocol for this study because of the instructional material and learning
outcomes (Keller, 2015), constrained resources (Andrews, 1997), and a variety of
learning styles (Brooks-Harris & Stock-Ward, 1999). Despite the large use of workshops
as an effective instructional method, there are not many studies assessing the
effectiveness of workshops in aviation (Keller, 2015). This section will provide an
overview of previous studies addressing adult learning.
Ali, Chalder, and Madan (2014) conducted a study geared to assess the
effectiveness of one-day interactive workshops. Those workshops were designed to
enhance the knowledge and skills of occupational health (OH) professionals in
diagnosing and managing fatigue in a workplace setting. Five interactive workshops were
developed and delivered in the United Kingdom. The results showed that a one-day
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workshop is an effective instructional method. The knowledge, skills, and confidence of
participants in diagnosing and managing fatigue in an occupational setting increased after
they attended the interactive workshops.
Workshops are an effective learning tool to improve higher education. Rust
(1998) conducted a study to investigate if 33 workshops delivered by the Oxford Centre
for Staff and Learning (OCSLD) had changed teaching practices. In addition, the author
attempted to understand if these changes had positive results. Rust (1998) concluded that
workshops provide encouragement and increase participants’ confidence in their
knowledge and skills. Most importantly, workshops can lead to successful changes by
participants.
Eating disorders frequently lead to high levels of stress, physical and
psychological strains, and social impacts among family members. Pepin and King (2013)
conducted a study to investigate the effectiveness of training workshops in improving the
problem-solving skills, well-being, and coping strategies of people caring for someone
with an eating disorder, such as bulimia and anorexia. The treatment was conducted with
15 people in Australia utilizing a collaborative care skills training workshops model
developed in the United Kingdom. Three previous studies had demonstrated the
effectiveness of these training workshops in reducing levels of expressed emotions,
distress, and care burden, as well as improving well-being, general health, and coping
strategies of caregivers. Following Pepin and King (2013), the collaborative care skills
training workshops model can lead to a beneficial impact on interactions between family
members and people with an eating disorder. Findings, which were similar to the
previous studies, also indicated these workshops can help mitigate the devastating effects
of eating disorder on family members and caregivers.
According to the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), approximately
90% of the 496 aircraft accidents identified as Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC)
into IMC, from 2000 through 2015, led to fatalities (AOPA, 2017). The general aviation
(GA) community has particularly been involved in this type of mishap. Keller (2015)
conducted a research project designed to enhance GA pilots’ knowledge, skills, and
abilities to improve their performance when faced with VMC into IMC situations. Keller
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(2015) investigated two training protocols, an interactive online course and an interactive
workshop designed to improve aviation safety. Data were collected through the
researcher’s observation of pilot performance during flight training device (FTD)
sessions, as well as on pretests, posttests, and post-posttests. Findings indicated neither of
the two protocols were effective to boost GA pilots’ aeronautical knowledge and abilities
pertinent to weather and pilot decision-making. The researcher provided plausible
explanations for the results. According to Keller (2015), enhancing GA pilots’ abilities
and knowledge in a short amount of time can be complex. The author also hypothesized
that human factors (e.g., fatigue; frustration) may have played a role during the study.
However, Keller highlighted that a workshop using appropriate instructional methods
does facilitate the learning process of adult learners.
Scientific evidence from multiple fields has demonstrated the effectiveness of
interactive workshops at changing skills, attitudes, knowledge, perceptions, and abilities.
Research has also indicated that appropriate selection of instructional methods from
different learning theories within a workshop can facilitate and enhance the learning
process of adult learners. Finally, empirical evidence has demonstrated that well-designed
workshops with lectures, discussions, case studies, and reflective thinking can foster deep
learning (Ali et al., 2014; Andrews, 1997; Caffarella & Daffron, 2013; Pepin & King,
2013). Therefore, an interactive workshop, incorporating concepts of different learning
theories, was the adequate platform for this study.

3.12 Posttest
Each participant in the experimental and control groups was asked to complete a
posttest. Similarly to the pretest, there were 25 MCQs and three open-ended questions in
the posttest. Three open-ended questions were added to the posttest to gather qualitative
data (Patton, 2015) needed to answer research question three. For the experimental group,
the posttest was applied just after the two interactive workshop sessions. The control
group was solicited to take the posttest after the experimental group. The posttest utilized
questions drawn from the bank of questions (see Appendix G). Thus, there were four
MCQs that were slightly different from questions on the pretest. In addition, the

67
questions were randomly scrambled for the posttest. See Appendix I for the posttest
questions. All participants were asked the same questions in the same order.
Approximately seven days after the second session of the posttest, all participants were
asked to answer a follow-up survey questionnaire with ten open-ended questions
addressing the safety management of birds by pilots.

3.13 Follow-up Survey Questionnaire
Qualitative data can assist researchers to illuminate systemic issues and potential
solutions. The sources of qualitative data include interviews, fieldwork and observations,
and documentation. According to Patton (2015), written responses to an open-ended
survey questionnaire are a rich source of material that provide the inquirer with
information about things that cannot be measured. Questionnaires help researchers save
time because individuals can complete them without any intervention from the inquirer
(Salkind, 2012). In addition, persons may feel more comfortable to truthfully respond to
an electronic questionnaire because their anonymity is virtually ensured. According to
Sekaran and Bougie (2013), online questionnaires are inexpensive, can reach globally,
and allow individuals to respond at their convenience. There are also disadvantages
associated with electronic questionnaires. Completion and return rates are usually low.
The researcher followed the guidelines by Leedy and Ormrod (2015), Salkind (2012), and
Sekaran and Bougie (2013) while designing the questionnaire, in order to increase the
quality and rate of responses. A 30% response rate is considered acceptable in scientific
studies (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013).
There were ten open-ended questions in the survey questionnaire (see Appendix
J). The open-ended questions did not limit the participants to a choice from among a few
alternatives. Most importantly, qualitative data can increase the strength and credibility of
this research study. The questions were drawn from the bank of questions developed by
the researcher (See Appendix G). The survey questionnaire was distributed through the
Qualtrics® web-based survey software to the control and experimental groups seven days
after the second session of the posttest (October 06th). Participants were contacted
through an e-mail message that included a cover letter with a link to the survey
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questionnaire (see Appendix K). The cover letter reiterated the importance of the study to
encourage responses, and requested that the participants complete the survey
questionnaire by the deadline date. As aforementioned, participants used their codes to
answer the online short-survey questionnaire. Considering that at least 30% response rate
was not achieved after four days, a follow-up e-mail was sent to the remaining
participants. The survey questionnaire link stayed live for a period of one week. As
previously noted, after the data had been collected and analyzed, a voluntary lecture was
offered to the control group participants so that all participants were able to benefit from
this study.

3.14 Data Analysis
Descriptive data from participants were investigated. Descriptive statistics allow
the researcher to have an accurate understanding about the data (Salkind, 2012). In
addition, they are the groundwork for significant tests and inference (Moore et al., 2014).
The statistical tests used to analyze the quantitative data for this study were the Pearson
product-moment correlation, the independent t-test, the paired t-test. In addition, the
researcher used a few nonparametric tests: the Spearman’s rank-order correlation, the
Kendall’s Tau-b (τb) coefficient, the Mann-Whitney U test, the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, and the related-samples sign test. Nonparametric tests are less sensitive to violations
of assumptions, especially normality (Field, 2009). In addition, nonparametric tests could
be more robust than their parametric counterparts in case of a small sample size (Bridge
& Savilokswy, 1999).
The MCQs in the pretest and posttest were used for the quantitative analysis. In
order to determine if there is a relationship between two variables, the Pearson productmoment correlation is the appropriate statistic (Field, 2009; Privitera, 2015). A
correlation identifies the strength and direction of the relationship between two factors.
However, a significant relationship between variables will not indicate causality. There
are five assumptions that should be met to test for the significance of a linear
relationship: the two variables should be measured on a continuous scale, the two
continuous variables should be paired, bivariate normality, linearity, and no significant
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outliers (Privitera, 2015). In addition, the researcher used two nonparametric statistical
tests to further investigate the relationship between the participants’ flight experience and
the safety management of bird hazards by them: the Spearman’s rank-order correlation,
and the Kendall’s Tau-b (τb) coefficient. There are three assumptions that should be met
to use these tests, a monotonic relationship between the two variables, two continuous or
ordinal variables, and two variables representing paired observations.
Privitera (2015) suggests researchers should use the independent-samples t-test, or
just independent t-test, as the adequate parametric test to compare the mean difference
between the control and the experimental groups. There are four assumptions that must
be met to use the independent t-test: normality, independence, homogeneity of variance,
and at least interval measure data (Field, 2009, Privitera, 2015). The Mann-Whitney U
test, a nonparametric alternative test to the independent t-test, could be used to investigate
whether the total ranks in the control and experimental group are significantly different.
Four assumptions should be met to use this nonparametric statistical test: a dependent
variable that is measured on a continuous (or ordinal) level; an independent variable that
consists of two categorical independent groups (e.g., control and experimental groups);
and independence of observations. Finally, the user of the Mann-Whitney U test should
determine if the “distribution of scores for both groups of the independent variable have a
different or similar shape” (Laerd Statistics, 2017a, para 5).
The “paired t-test has four assumptions: no significant outliers (…), approximate
normally-distributed data points (…), having a continuous level measurement (…), and
related groups” (Laerd statistics, 2017b, para 3). The researcher also used two
nonparametric tests that are equivalent to the paired-samples t-test, the Wilcoxon signedrank test, and the related-samples sign test, as explained in the next chapter. There are
three assumptions that should be met to use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test: a dependent
variable that is measured at the ordinal or continuous level; an independent variable that
consists of two categorical independent groups (e.g., control and experimental groups);
and the differences between the two related groups are symmetrical in shape (Laerd
Statistics, 2017c). There are four assumptions that should be met in order to use the sign
test: a dependent variable that is measured at the ordinal or continuous level; an
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independent variable that consists of two categorical independent groups; independent
observations; and the difference scores are from a continuous distribution (Laerd
Statistics, 2017d).
According to Patton (2015), “the challenge of qualitative analysis lies in making
sense of massive amounts of data” (p. 521). Additionally, there is no way to perfectly
replicate the inquirer’s analytical thought process. There are several methods for
analyzing qualitative data (Jirwe, 2011). The researcher used the deductive content
analysis approach, as suggested by Elo and Kyngas (2008) and Patton (2015), to analyze
the participants’ responses to the open-ended questions in the pretest and the posttest, as
well as the post-survey questionnaire. Content analysis is a method of analyzing
qualitative data that allows the inquirer to test theoretical issues to enhance understanding
of the data. Additionally, it allows researchers to subjectively interpret the context of
qualitative data through coding and the identification of patterns and themes (Hsieh &
Shannon, 2005). According to Patton (2015), “the core meaning found through content
analysis are patterns and themes” (p. 541).
Researchers can use deductive content analysis when the structure of the analysis
is operationalized on the basis of previous conceptualizations and theories. Thus, using
the theories and concepts discussed in Chapter 2, the researcher identified key
conceptualizations as initial coding categories (Cavanagh, 1997; Hsieh, & Shannon,
2005). The inquirer then highlighted the participants’ answers that appear to represent a
specific concept. The inquirer analyzed the data using constant comparative analysis until
reaching a level of saturation in which no relevant categories or themes continued to
emerge from the data across the participants. Yet, qualitative data that could not be
categorized with the initial coding scheme were given a new code. Some codes were
eliminated during the analysis of the data and the remainder joined into common
categories. Themes were generated from the analysis of the qualitative data.
The research questions of this study were analyzed as follows:
Research Question 1. Is there a relationship between flight experience, measured
in flight hours, and the safety management of bird hazards by the participants in terms of
pretest scores?
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A Pearson product-moment correlation was used to identify if there was any
relationship between the participants’ flight experience and the safety management of
bird hazards by pilots. In addition, the researcher used the Spearman’s rank-order
correlation and the Kendall’s Tau-b (τb) coefficient, two nonparametric tests, to measure
the strength and direction of the relationship between those two variables (Field, 2009). It
was hypothesized that there would be no significant relationship between the pilots’ flight
experience and the safety management of bird hazards by pilots.
Research Question 2. Is there a statistically-significant difference in pre-and
posttests scores between and within the control and experimental groups?
An independent t-test was used to determine if there was a significant difference
between pre-test and post-test scores between the control and experimental groups. A
paired samples t-test was used to determine if there was a significant difference in preand post-test scores within the two groups. The researcher also used three nonparametric
tests to further investigate the data, the Mann-Whitney U test, the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, and the related-samples sign test, as suggested by Privitera (2015). The hypothesis
was an improvement in scores for the experimental group.
Research Question 3. From the pilots’ perspective, how do CFR Part 141 GA
pilots manage to fly safely given the threat of aircraft accidents due to birds?
Research question three was designed to be generative in nature to permit the
identification of core themes (Patton, 2015). As a part of the pretest, the posttest, and
especially the follow-up survey questionnaire, pilots were asked open-ended questions
that could assist the researcher in answering the Research Question 3. The researcher
qualitatively analyzed these data using a deductive content analysis strategy.

3.15 Threats to Internal and External Validity
Following Leedy and Ormrod (2015), regardless of the research methodology,
researchers must give careful thought to the meaningfulness, accuracy, and credibility of
the study. Internal validity refers to the confidence researchers place in the cause-andeffect relationship in an experimental study. Sekaran and Bougie (2013) identified seven
major threats to internal validity: history, maturation, testing, selection, mortality,
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statistical regression, and instrumentation. Factors that occur outside an experiment may
have an impact on the dependent variable. Such factors are referred to as the history
effect, and may offer a more reasonable explanation, rather than the treatment, for the
differences observed between the control and experimental groups. For example, an
aircraft incident involving a Purdue University pilot due to a bird strike may increase
local pilots’ situational awareness with an effect on this study. The researcher was
informed about a bird strike involving two pilots in the Purdue University professional
flight program. This incident occurred after the posttest, but prior to the follow-up survey
questionnaire, and will be explored in chapter 5. In addition, the topic bird-hazard was
discussed during safety meetings before and especially after the cited bird strike. Those
events could have affected the internal validity of this study.
Maturation generally is a function of the passage of time, and could potentially
produce effects that are similar to the treatment (Ary et al., 2006; Salkind, 2012). For
instance, theoretically, participants of this study got more flight experience as time
elapsed. In addition, they were more likely to be in contact with the “bird hazard” issue
during ground training (Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Chapter I,
Subchapter H, Part 141, 2017). The researcher collected data in approximately three
weeks. Therefore, maturation should not contaminate the results of this study.
Testing effects may compromise the internal and external validities of a study.
Exposure of the participants of this study to the pretest affect the dependent variable, the
posttest. Following Sekaran and Bougie (2013), a testing effect occurs when the pretest
sensitizes the pilots’ responses to the posttest (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). The researcher
spaced the pre- and post-tests out so participants could not clearly remember the pre-test
questions. However, when determining the time between pre- and posttest administration,
the researcher should balance the participant memory or bias of the assessment against
other threats to internal validity, such as participants discussing the experiment and
history effect. The pretest questions were rearranged prior to the post-test as an attempt to
reduce possible participants’ memory of the items. In addition, as aforementioned, there
were slightly-modified questions in the posttest that were drawn from the bank of
questions.
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The selection of pilots can affect both the external and internal validities of this
study (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Selection bias occurs as a consequence of unmatched or
inadequate selection of participants for the control and experimental groups. Random
assignment is the best remedy against selection bias. This study did not randomly select
its participants. The purposive sampling was used by the researcher to recruit 14 CFR
Part 141 pilots. However, the researcher used the proportional stratified random sampling
technique as a strategy to mitigate selection as a threat to internal validity (Leedy &
Ormrod, 2015; Sekaran, & Bougie, 2013).
Participation in this study was voluntary. The Part 141 pilots had the right to
withdraw at any time during the project. Mortality could happen, causing pilots to drop
out during this study (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Considering that this study did not last a
long time, the potential for mortality being a threat to internal validity was negligible
(Yu, 2015). In addition, the pretest and posttest were completed in no more than 20
minutes each, and the treatment in approximately two hours in order to provide minimal
impact on the participants’ schedules. This was expected to best enable all participants
the opportunity to complete the study. Only two participants of the control group dropped
out during the project.
Statistical regression refers to a tendency for participants who score extremely
low or high on a pretest to score towards the mean on subsequent tests. This study used a
pretest posttest design, thus limiting the number of tests administered to participants to
reduce the threat of regression on internal validity. Additionally, in order to reduce the
testing and the statistical regression effect on the internal validity of the current study,
approximately a week period elapsed between the pretest and the posttest administrations.
Instrumentation effects usually arise during an experimental research project
when the researcher changes the measuring instrument. Changes in the pretest posttest
may produce significant findings that cannot be attributed to the treatment (Sekaran, &
Bougie, 2013). Christensen, Johnson, and Turner (2011) recommend researchers should
not change the research instrument. Fatigue could also cloud the participants’ judgement,
resulting in differences due to instrumentation. This study used similar questions on both
the pretest and posttest. In addition, the assessment tools had 25 MCQs, and three open-
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ended questions to reduce the instrumentation effects threat to the internal validity of the
study.
External validity refers to the extent of the generalizability of an experimental
study to other settings, subjects, and measurements (Ary et al., 2006; Sekaran & Bougie,
2013). Sekaran and Bougie presented the five threats to the external validity of a study:
selection, setting, pretest, subject effects, and experimenter effects. Selection threat may
occur when the participants of a study are not representative of a target population. For
example, if researchers were interested in assessing the effectiveness of bird-hazard
mitigation training on commercial pilots, but used GA pilots, there would be a major
threat to the external validity of the study. This project identified a major problem
impacting the safety of GA pilots. This study focused on an important subset of the GA
aviation community, Part 141 pilots.
Studies conducted in a lab setting will most likely yield results different from
similar studies conducted in the “real world” (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). The present
study was conducted in a University setting, a classroom, using an instructional method,
an interactive workshop. During their ground and flight training, GA pilots receive
instruction in a classroom on aeronautical knowledge areas that include the efficient and
safe operation of an aircraft (FAA, 2016a). Thus, a university classroom was the adequate
setting for the purpose of this study.
Pretest, or interacting testing effects occur when the pretest decreases or increases
the subject’s reaction to the treatment. Interactive testing effects can compromise the
external validity of the current study. However, true experimental designs, including
pretest and posttest, are rigorous, powerful, and effective at establishing cause and effect
(Ary et al., 2006). Additionally, the training was conducted a week after the second
session of the pretest, thus reducing the interactive testing effects. Subject effects refer to
the participants’ feelings, attitudes, motivation, and receptivity that develop during the
experiment and that could have an impact on the generalizability of the findings. For
example, if the participants of a scientific project become aware of the purpose of the
study, they may attempt to provide the researcher with data that confirms the hypothesis.
The researcher sought to mitigate subject effects by concealing the dependent variables of
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the study. Moreover, the pretest occurred approximately one week prior to the interactive
workshop provided to the experimental group.
Lastly, experimenter effects occur when the behavior of the participants is
influenced by the conscious or unconscious behavior of the researcher (Ary et al., 2006;
Siegwarth, Larkin, & Kemmner, 2012). Empirical evidence indicates that the extent to
which the researcher glances and/or smiles at the participants of an experiment could bias
the findings of the study. To reduce experimenter effects, the researcher attentively
followed the research protocol and strived to remain neutral throughout the data
collection and treatment processes.
Leedy and Ormrod (2015) recommend a representative sample of the population
in order to enhance the external validity of a study. Following Sekaran and Bougie
(2013), sample sizes larger than 30 are appropriate for the majority of studies. In
addition, simple true experimental studies with tight control methods (e.g., inclusion of a
control group; random assignment to groups) are possible with 10 to 20 participants.
Leedy & Ormrod (2015) recommend researchers should use an array of strategies to
enhance the internal validity of a study: inclusion of control and experimental groups; the
random assignment of participants to the experimental and control groups; and
triangulation. Several types of triangulation can be used. This study used different
methods of data collection (final reports of aircraft accidents due to bird strikes; pretest
and posttest; follow-up survey questionnaire with open-ended questions), collected data
in different periods, and used different theories and concepts (e.g., SMS; ADM) to
understand the data. Following Leedy and Ormrod (2015), triangulation will increase the
validity and credibility of this study. Finally, Sekaran and Bougie (2013) suggested that
the researcher should provide an in-depth description of the study. As a consequence, if
other researchers want to transfer the results to other situations, organizations, and
settings, they are responsible for evaluating how valid such transfer is. In different words,
that was expected to increase the external validity of the study.
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3.16 Summary
This chapter addressed the details of the methodology to answer the research
questions. A review of the research design was conducted, along with the population and
sampling parameters. The variables of interest were discussed and the units of
measurement were identified. Finally, threats to the validity of the study were addressed.
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CHAPTER 4.

RESULTS

This study was conducted to determine if a safety training protocol could
effectively enhance CFR Part 141 general aviation pilots’ knowledge and skills to reduce
the risk of bird strikes to aviation. The orientation and pretest were offered in two
sessions, the first on September 20th, and the second on September 21st, 2017, both at the
SATT. The researcher followed the same procedure during both sessions. There were
seven and ten pilots in the first and second orientation sessions, respectively. Pilots who
decided to participate in the study reviewed and signed the informed consent forms, as
explained in the previous chapter. Participants were then asked to answer a short
demographics survey questionnaire (see Appendix F). After an assessment of the
participants’ answers, both the researcher and the PI used the proportional stratified
random design technique to randomly assign them to the control and experimental
groups, as suggested by Leedy and Ormrod (2015), Patton (2015), and Sekaran and
Bougie (2013). Pilots were informed of which group they had been assigned, their
respective codes, and then asked to write down their names and e-mails in an attendance
list before the pretest. Participants of the experimental group received an even number as
their respective code. Participants of the control group received an odd number as their
respective code. Only the researcher, the PI, and each participant know each individual
code. Participants of both groups used these codes during the pretest, posttest, and
follow-up survey questionnaire. Finally, participants of both groups were asked to take
the pretest.
The researcher sent three e-mails providing information on the safety training and
posttest to the participants of the experimental group. Additionally, three e-mails were
sent to the control group participants providing details about the posttest. Approximately
a week after the pretest, the researcher conducted the experiment, the safety training
designed to enhance pilots’ knowledge and skills to reduce the risk of bird strikes. The
first session occurred on September 27th, and the second one on September 28th, both at
the SATT. Five and three participants attended the first and second sessions, respectively.
The safety training was provided as an interactive workshop for the experimental group,
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as explained in chapter 3. Participants of the experimental group completed the posttest
immediately after the safety training. The control group completed the posttest in
multiple sessions: five pilots on September 28th, just after the safety training provided to
the experimental group, and two on September 29th in a single session provided at the
SATT. It should be noted that two participants of the control group did not take the
posttest, therefore, they were not asked to complete the follow-up survey questionnaire.
Seven days after the posttest, a short follow-up online survey questionnaire with
ten open-ended questions was administered to the participants of both groups who had
taken the pretest and posttest in order to collect qualitative data. The short follow-up
online survey questionnaire was hosted on Qualtrics® secure servers for reliability,
privacy, and confidentiality considerations. Demographic information and statistical
analyses pertaining to the research questions are discussed in this chapter.
It was expected that there would be no significant relationship between the
participants’ flight experience and their safety management of bird hazards. In addition, it
was expected that participants in the treatment group would have higher
posttest scores than participants of the control group. Most importantly, it was expected
that the safety training, delivered as an interactive workshop, would enhance the
knowledge and skills of participants in the experimental group to mitigate the risk of bird
strikes. The qualitative data were analyzed to add depth and details to the statistical
findings, and also to get information that could not be found in quantitative data (Patton,
2015).

4.1

Demographic Data

Participant demographic and flight experience information was collected as part
of the study. This information included total flight hours, ratings and certifications held,
and any academic course addressing the safety management of wildlife hazards that had
been taken by participants. Seventeen pilots from the Purdue Professional Flight Program
and from Purdue Aviation volunteered to participate in the study. Eight pilots were
assigned to the experimental group, and nine pilots to the control group. The participants
of the experimental group had an average of 187.78 total flight hours, with a range from
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15 to 345. The participants of the control group had an average of 96.75 total flight hours,
with a range from 15 to 246 (see Appendix L for SPSS output RQ1). Considering all
participants, their flight hours averaged 144.94, with a range from 15 to 345 and a
standard deviation of 110.78. No participants reported they had attended a safety course
addressing wildlife hazards. Only four pilots in the control group and four in the
experimental group, respectively, reported they had completed self-study addressing this
theme. All eight informed they had between 0.1 and three hours of self-study addressing
the wildlife hazard theme. One participant of the control group reported he/she had
previously experienced a wildlife strike.
Table 4.1
Summary of Participant Demographic Information

a

Control Group

Experimental
Group

9
187.78
115.65
15
345

8
96.75
88.08
15
246

2
7
5
2
2
1

4
4
2
2
1
2

4
2
3
0

1
1
5
1

Flight Hours
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Certifications and Ratings
Frequencies
Student Pilot
Private
Instrument
Commercial single-engine
Commercial multi-engine
CFI
Training Environment
Part 61
Part 141
Combination
Collegiate Aviation Program
a

Two pilots in the control group and four in the experimental group reported they
were student pilots, meaning that they had not yet earned any ratings or certifications as a
private pilot or higher. This option was not available in the demographics assessment
form. However, all six student pilots manually added this information to their responses.
In addition, they stated they were working with a four-year collegiate aviation program to
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earn their certificates and ratings. Information on pilot ratings and certificates was
collected and is displayed in Table 4.1.

4.2

Research Questions

The following sections outline and address the three research questions, and
provide a summary of the appropriate statistical analysis. The data were processed using
multiple statistical tests with the use of the software program SPSS Statistics 23. The a
priori alpha level selected was 0.05 (α = 0.05). Initially, there were eight and nine
participants in the experimental and control group, respectively.
4.2.1

Research Question 1

RQ1: Is there a relationship between flight experience, measured in flight hours,
and the safety management of bird hazards by the participants, in terms of pretest
scores?
Nine participants from the control group and eight from the experimental group
took the prestest in two sessions at a Purdue SATT classroom. As previously noted, both
the pretest and the posttest contained 25 MCQs and three open-ended questions. Those
questions were validated using the face validity procedures (Borg & Gall, 1989; DeVon
et al, 2007; Sartori, 2009). After concluding the face validity process, the researcher
followed the CVI method to increase the reliability and validity of the measurement
instrument (DeVon et al, 2007; Polit & Beck, 2006; Sullivan, 2011). Only the MCQs
were utilized during the quantitative analysis of this study. A score of “zero” for an
incorrect answer and “four” for a correct answer was assigned. Descriptive statistics
regarding the pretest and the posttest scores for each group can be found in Table 4.2 (see
Appendix L for SPSS output RQ1). A high Cronbach’s Alpha will not always mean a
high-degree of internal consistency (Field, 2009; Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). According
to Clark and Watson (1995), there are no clear rules addressing acceptable Cronbach’s
alpha levels. However, previous researchers have reported alpha levels ranging
from .60-.90 as acceptable. A Cronbach’s Alpha analysis indicated a coefficient of 0.603
for the pretest, which was determined to be a low internal reliability value (Field, 2009).
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Table 4.2
Descriptive Statistics for the Pretest and Posttest
GROUP

N

Mean

Control Group Pretest
Experimental Group Pretest
Exp & Control Groups Pretest
Control Group Posttest
Experimental Group Posttest
Exp & Control Groups Posttest

9
8
17
7
8
15

56.00
59.5
57.65
58.29
87.50
73.87

Standard
Deviation
15.75
11.12
13.49
12.41
7.54
17.95

Minimum Maximum
32
44
32
32
76
32

88
72
88
68
96
96

a

A Pearson product-moment correlation was first used to identify whether there
was any relationship between the participants’ flight experience and the safety
management of bird hazards by pilots. It was hypothesized that there would be no
significant relationship between the pilots’ flight experience, measured in flight hours,
and the safety management of bird hazards by pilots, in terms of pretest scores. There are
five assumptions that should be met to test for the significance of a linear relationship:
the two variables should be measured on a continuous scale, the two continuous variables
should be paired, linearity, no significant outliers, and bivariate normality (Privitera,
2015). The first two assumptions were met during the research design phase. Pretest
scores and the participants’ flight hours were considered continuous interval. In addition,
the two continue variables, pretest scores and the participants’ flight hours, were paired.
In different words, each case has two values – one for each variable.
A Pearson product-moment correlation assumes a linear relationship between the
two variables, and a visual inspection of a scatterplot is one of the most efficient means to
examine relationships between two data points (Laerd Statistics, 2017e). If the
relationship approximately follows a straight line, you have a linear relationship. A visual
inspection of a scatterplot of the two variables helps determine whether a linear
relationship exists. The researcher inspected the scatterplot and identified that there was
not enough evidence of a linear relationship between the variables. However, the
researcher identified a monotonic relationship between the participants’ flight hours and
pretest scores. This was important because a monotonic relationship is an assumption
underlying the Spearman’s rank-order correlation and the Kendall’s Tau-b (τb)
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coefficient, alternative statistical tests that can be used when the assumption of linearity
between two variables is not met (Field, 2009; Laerd Statistics, 2017f).
Outliers are “extreme scores that fall substantially above or below most of the
scores in a particular dataset” (Privitera, 2015, p. 35). Significant outliers could alter the
strength and direction of a correlation. Therefore, outliers should be kept to a minimum.
The researcher inspected the scatterplot used to test for linearity to identify possible
outliers. In addition, the researcher visually inspected a boxplot and concluded that there
were no outliers in this data set. The assumption of bivariate normality is difficult to
assess. A property of bivariate normality is that both variables are normally distributed if
bivariate normality exists (Laerd Statistics, 2017f). With small sample sizes, it is
recommended to rely on numerical methods while testing for normality. The ShapiroWilk test was used for testing for normality, as suggested by Shapiro and Wilk (1965).
The null hypothesis of the Shapiro-Wilk test is that there is no difference in normal
distribution scores. If the result of the the test is greater than 0.05 (p > 0.05), the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore, the data are expected to be normally
distributed. The results of the Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that both variables were
normally distributed (p > 0.05). Using the Pearson product-moment correlation, there
does not appear to be a statistically-significant relationship between the participants’
flight experience, measured in flight hours, and the safety management of bird hazards by
these participants, in terms of pretest scores, r = 0.263, p > 0.05. In terms of proportion of
variance, the participants’ flight experience statistically explained seven percent of their
pretest scores.
The researcher further investigated the possible relationship between the
participants’ flight experience and their safety management of bird hazards using the
Spearman’s rank-order correlation. According to Field (2009), the Spearman’s rank-order
correlation is a nonparametric statistical test that can be used when the data have violated
parametric assumptions. However, there are three assumptions that should be met before
using this statistical test: a monotonic relationship between the two variables, two
continuous or ordinal variables, and two variables representing paired observations
(Laerd Statistics, 2017g). Those assumptions were met, as previously noted. Results
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indicated, similarly to the previous analysis, that there was not a statistically-significant
relationship between the participants’ flight experience, measured in flight hours, and the
safety management of bird hazards by the participants, in terms of pretest scores, rs(15) =
0.326, p > .05.
The Kendall’s Tau-b (τb) coefficient is another nonparametric correlation statistic
that can be used when data have failed to meet the parametric assumptions. Three
assumptions should be met before using this statistical method. These assumptions are
the same required to use the Spearman’s correlation coefficient. Field (2009) suggested
that the Kendall’s Tau-b (τb) can be used with a small dataset, with a large number of tied
ranks. A Kendall's tau-b (τb) correlation was completed to determine the relationship
between the participants’ flight experience, measured in flight hours, and the safety
management of bird hazards by the participants, in terms of pretest scores amongst the 17
participants of this study. There was a weak, positive association between the
participants’ flight experience and their safety management of bird hazards, which was
not statistically-significant, τb = 0.257, p = 0.167.
In summary, the results of these statistical analyses seem to suggest, in agreement
with the null hypothesis, that there is not a significant relationship between the
participants’ flight experience, measured in flight hours, and their safety management of
bird hazards in terms of pretest scores. However, the data did not meet assumptions
required to complete a Pearson product-moment correlation. Therefore, the researcher
acknowledges concerns over the violation of the linearity between the two variables may
have had an influence on the findings, especially with the limited sample size.
Conversely, the nonparametric tests indicated similar results to the Pearson productmoment correlation.
4.2.2

Research Question 2

RQ 2. Is there a statistically-significant difference in pre-and posttests scores
between and within the control and experimental groups?
The treatment was delivered during two sessions. The first one occurred on
September 27th, 2017, and five pilots of the experimental group attended the workshop.
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The second session occurred on September 28th, 2017, and three pilots of the
experimental group attended the safety training. The posttest was administered following
the safety training sessions. The safety training provided an overview of the SMS and
ADM tenets, bird-hazard information acquisition and interpretation, and a review of
information derived from previous studies that could enhance the pilots’ knowledge and
skills to mitigate the risk of bird strikes. Additionally, an informative, relevant aircraft
accident involving a GA aircraft due to bird strikes was examined (NTSB, 2009). During
the workshop, a two-way discussion was encouraged by the researcher.
As previously noted, nine participants of the control group and eight of the
experimental group took the pretest. However, only seven participants of the control
group completed the posttest. A score of “zero” for an incorrect answer and “four” for a
correct answer was assigned. Descriptive statistics regarding the the posttest scores can
be found in Table 4.2. A Cronbach’s Alpha analysis indicated a coefficient of 0.823 for
the posttest, which was determined to be a high internal reliability value (Field, 2009)
(see Appendix M for SPSS output RQ2).
Bridge and Sawylosky (1999) conducted a study to investigate the comparative
power of the independent t-test and the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test considering violations
to normality and small sample sizes. Findings indicated that the independent t-test was
more powerful than its nonparametric counterpart when the distribution was relatively
symmetric. However, nonparametric tests are generally more powerful with small sample
sizes and/or a distribution with extreme skews or heavy tails.
An independent t-test was the most appropriate statistical test to determine if there
was a significant difference in scores between the pre-and posttest scores of the control
and experimental groups. A study should have at least six participants in each group in
order to proceed with an independent-samples t-test (Laerd Statistics, 2017h). In addition,
four assumptions must be met to use the independent t-test: normality, independence, at
least interval measure data, and homogeneity of variance (Field, 2009; Privitera, 2015).
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test was used to test for normality (Laerd
Statistics, 2017h). The K-S test compares the sampled scores to a normally-distributed set
of scores that has the same standard deviation and mean. If the test is not significant (p >
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0.05), the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Thus, the data are expected to be normally
distributed (Field, 2009). After completion of the K-S test, the experimental group pretest
scores, D(8) = 0.276, p > 0.05, the control group posttest scores, D(7) = 0.284, p > 0.05,
and experimental group posttest scores, D(8) = 0.276, p > 0.05 indicated the data were
normally-distributed. The K-S score for the control group pretest scores indicated a D(9)
= 0.278, p < 0.05. However, the Shapiro-Wilk test suggested this dataset was normallydistributed (p > 0.05). The Shapiro-Wilk test, similarly to the K-S test, is recommended
to test for normality with small sample sizes (Laerd Statistics, 2017h).
The second assumption, independence, means that each observation, or data from
different participants, are independent. The researcher used the stratified random
sampling design to satisfy this assumption, as suggested by Privitera (2015). Moreover,
participants completed their own assessments and did not interact with other participants;
therefore, this assumption was met for both the pretest and posttest. The third assumption
is that the data measured must be at least interval scale. The pretest and postest scores are
considered ratio scale (Privitera, 2015).
The last assumption, homogeneity of variance, means that “the variances in each
population are equal to each other” (Privitera, 2015, p. 279). The Levene’s test assumes
a null hypothesis that there is no difference in variance between samples. If the test
statistic p-value is smaller than 0.05, the null hypothesis should be rejected, and the
variances are assumed to be significantly different (Field, 2009). A violation of this
assumption will generally increase the chance of making a Type I error (Laerd Statistics,
2017h). After completion of the Levene’s test, the pretest, F(1, 15) = 0.013, p > 0.05, and
the posttest, F(1, 13) = 2.039, p > 0.05 were determined to meet the assumption of
homogeneity of variance.
After conducting the independent t-test, the experimental group scored slightly
higher (M = 59.50, SD = 11.12) on the pretest than the control group (M = 56.00, SD =
15.75). However, this difference was not significant, t(15) = -0.521, p > 0.05. There was
a medium effect size d = 0.25. An independent t-test of the posttest scores found that the
experimental group did score higher (M = 87.50, SD = 7.54) than the control group (M =
58.29, SD = 12.41). The difference was determined to be significant t(13) = -5.559,
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p < 0.05, with a large effect size, d = 2.89.
The Mann-Whitney U test is a nonparametric statistics equivalent to the
independent-samples t-test (Field, 2009). The Mann-Whitney U test can be used when the
dataset violates the assumptions of the independent-samples t-test. Four assumptions
should be met to use this statistical test: a dependent variable that is measured on a
continuous (or ordinal) level; an independent variable that consists of two categorical
independent groups (e.g., control and experimental groups); and independence of
observations. Additionally, the user of the Mann-Whitney U test should determine
whether the distribution of scores for both groups of the independent variable have a
similar or different shape (Laerd Statistics, 2017a). If the score distributions are similarlyshaped, the Mann-Whitney U test can be used to make inferences about differences in
medians between the two groups. If the similarly-shaped distributions assumption has
been violated, the descriptive power of this test will be lost. However, valuable
information about the two groups can be obtained by comparing mean ranks. The first
three assumptions have already been demonstrated by the researcher as a part of the study
design.
A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine whether there were significant
differences in scores between the pre-and posttest scores of the control and the
experimental groups. Distributions of the pretest scores and of the posttest scores for the
control and experimental groups were not similar, as assessed by visual inspections of the
distributions of scores for both groups of the independent variable. The control group
pretest scores (mean rank = 8.61) did not differ significantly from the experimental
group pretest scores (mean rank = 9.44) prior to the safety training, U = 39.50, z = 0.341,
p > 0.05, r = 0.08. However, after the safety training the experimental group posttest
scores (mean rank = 11.5) were statistically significantly higher than the control group
posttest scores. For the experimental group (mean rank = 4.00), the scores were U =
56.00, z = 3.264, p < 0.05, r = 0.84.
A paired t-test was used to “determine whether there was a significant difference
in the pretest and posttest scores within each group” (Winter, 2013, p. 61). There are four
assumptions that must be reviewed before conducting a paired t-test: “having a
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continuous level dependent variable such as pretest and posttest scores (…); one
independent variable that consists of two categorical, related groups (…); no significant
outliers present (…), and approximately normally distributed scores” (Laerd Statistics,
2017b, para 3). The first two assumptions were met during the research design phase.
There were no outliers in the data, as assessed by inspection of boxplots, one for the
control group, and one for the experimental group. The difference scores for the control
group pretest and posttest scores were normally-distributed, as assessed by the K-S test
D(7) = 0.21, p > 0.05, and the Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > 0.613). The difference scores for
the experimental group pretest and posttest scores were also normally-distributed, as
assessed by the K-S test D(8) = 0.13, (p > 0.05), and the Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > 0.96).
The paired t-test for the control group indicated there was a small change between
the pretest (M = 60.50, SD = 14.61), and posttest scores, (M = 58.29, SD = 12.41), t(6) =
0.281, p > 0.05, d = 0.11. For the experimental group, the safety training elicited a
statistically-significant increase in posttest scores (M = 87.50, SD = 7.54) compared to
the pretest scores (M = 59.50, SD = 11.20), t(7) = -5.785, p < 0.05. Further analysis
indicated a large effect size d = 2.04 (Privitera, 2015).
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test, a nonparametric test equivalent to the pairedsamples t-test, is used to determine whether there is a median difference between
matched or paired observations (Devore, 2010). There are three assumptions that should
be met to use this nonparametric test: a dependent variable that is measured at the ordinal
or continuous level; an independent variable that consists of two categorical independent
groups (e.g., control and experimental groups); and that the differences between the two
related groups are symmetrical in shape (Laerd Statistics, 2017c). The researcher
attempted to use this test. The two first assumptions were met during the design phase.
However, the distribution of differences for the control group was not symmetricallyshaped. Therefore, the researcher used the related-samples sign test to compare the scores
of the control group participants.
This nonparametric test, another alternative to the paired-samples t-test, is less
powerful than the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Groebner, Shannon, Fry, & Smith, 2011;
Laerd Statistics, 2017c). The sign test is particularly useful to detect effects with small

88
sample sizes (Field, 2009). There are four assumptions that should be met in order to use
the sign test: a dependent variable that is measured at the ordinal or continuous level; an
independent variable that consists of two categorical independent groups; independent
observations; and that the difference scores are from a continuous distribution (Laerd
Statistics, 2017d). All assumptions were met.
A related-samples sign test was completed and showed a non-significant increase
in the control group posttest scores, compared to the pretest scores, z = 0.00, p > 0.05.
However, the experimental group did see a significant increase in scores from the pretest
to the posttest scores, z = 2.475, p < 0.05. Four participants of the control increased their
grades during the posttest when compared to the pretest. On the other hand, three
participants of the control group scored lower in the posttest. Regarding the experimental
group, the data suggest that the safety training induced an improvement in the posttest
scores of all participants.
As previously noted, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test accomplishes the same thing
as the related-samples sign test. However, the magnitude of change is ignored by the
latter (Field, 2009; Laerd Statistics, 2017c). Most importantly, the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test has an increased statistical power for small sample sizes, even when the assumption
of normality is violated (Bridge & Sawylosky, 1999). The distribution of the differences
between the pretest and posttest scores of the experimental group was symmetrical in
shape. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed a statistically-significant increase in the
posttest scores of the participants of the experimental group, compared to their pretest
scores, z = 2.524, p < 0.05. There was also a medium effect size r = 0.63.
4.2.3

Research Question 3

RQ3. From the pilots’ perspective, how do CFR Part 141 GA pilots manage to fly
safely, given the threat of aircraft accidents due to birds?
As a part of the pretest, the posttest, and especially the follow-up survey
questionnaire, pilots were asked open-ended questions in order to collect qualitative data
that could assist the researcher in answering Research Question 3. The researcher
qualitatively analyzed these data using a deductive content analysis strategy (Elo &
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Kyngas, 2008; Patton, 2015). Written responses to open-ended questions can illuminate
systemic issues and potential solutions. Qualitative data assist in understanding
phenomena that have not been adequately researched, such as the safety management of
bird hazards by GA pilots. Additionally, qualitative data elucidate statistical findings
(Patton, 2015). As previously noted, the pilots were asked to answer three open-ended
questions during both the pretest and posttest. Two participants of the control group did
not take the posttest. However, the researcher decided to analyze their answers to the
open-ended questions in the prestest. It was expected that their responses to these
questions could assist in answering research question 3. Moreover, a survey questionnaire
with ten open-ended questions was forwarded to participants of both groups through
Qualtrics® web-based survey software seven days after the second session of the
posttest.
As previously noted, eight and nine participants in the experimental and control
group, respectively, completed the pretest. Question 26 in the prestest asked participants
what they would do after identifying the remains of birds in the aircraft, just after
landing. All 17 participants of the study answered this question. Answers to this question
tended to fall into two groupings. A major concern by ten participants was the need to
notify maintenance personnel. Among them, six pilots only mentioned reporting the
event to maintenance for further inspections, and, if appropriate, maintenance actions.
Quoting one participant, “notify owner/operator immediately so that maintenance actions
can be taken / so that it is documented”. Another pilot stated “clean it up, put a
discrepancy so that mechanics can check to make sure the bird strike has not made the
aircraft unairworthy”.
Another concern expressed by participants was the need to report the strike for
safety purposes. Two participants stated they would notify the ATC tower. Quoting
another participant, “report the strike to KLAF tower and give them the remains of the
bird in a bag so they can send it to be tested someplace”. One participant stated “fill out a
form and notify the chief flight safety officer”. One pilot stated he/she would send the
remains to the Smithsonian Institution Feather Identification Lab for analysis. However,
only two pilots indicated they knew they were expected to report the strike to the FAA
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(FAA, 2013). Quoting one pilot, “file a safety report and report to the FAA. FAA would
like to gather information of the species of birds that are living in the vicinity of the
airport by collecting the corpus and maybe try and move them away”. One participant
stated he/she would report the event to the FAA and submit a National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) safety report.
When questioned why they would do what they stated, three pilots affirmed that
the reporting of bird strikes is a rule, an obligation, if one is a pilot. Quoting one pilot,
“fill out a form and notify the chief flight safety officer. You must report all bird strike
instances, that’s the rule”. Three participants explained they would report the event to
maintenance personnel to ensure the aircraft is airworthy for the proceeding flights. Three
other participants did not explain the reasons they would do what they stated, in case of a
bird strike. Pilots’ answers indicated a misperception of the safety culture tenets,
especially the reporting culture. Most importantly, they were not able to demonstrate an
adequate understanding of the safety management of wildlife hazards by aviation
stakeholders. The reporting of bird strikes by pilots to the FAA is vital to provide an
empirical foundation for national policies and safety strategies to mitigate the risk of
aircraft accidents (Cleary & Dolbeer, 2005).
Pilots were asked, in question 27 of the pretest, why they were expected to inform
ATC about the presence of birds during flight. All 17 participants of the study answered
this question. Interestingly, all respondents demonstrated a sound understanding of this
ADM concept, since such information could be used by other operators flying in the area
while developing risk management strategies to mitigate the risk of mishaps (FAA,
2016a, 2016d). One participant stated that such action would “enhance the situational
awareness of the tower, […] of other aircraft, and warn pilots of an area of increased
threat to the safety of flight”.
The last open-ended question in the pretest was an attempt to have a better
understanding of the participants’ safety training regarding wildlife hazard mitigation.
Two participants did not answer this question. Other than that, all responses indicated
that participants had been provided limited, to no, information about the safety
management of bird hazards during their careers. However, one pilot stated that the FAA
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had issued a recommendation for pilots to fly above 7,000 feet during migratory seasons.
Additionally, this pilot mentioned that her/his flight instructor had recommended that
she/he should climb when encountering birds, since birds dive faster than the airplane.
Some of the participants’ answers are as follows:
“To be honest, I have never been really told anything about mitigation
strategies”;
“I really have minimal knowledge on this. A CFI or two when I was a
flight student told me to dive if on a collision course with birds. If you are
including other wildlife, I have been taught to go around if something is on the
runway, but I really have little to no experience with this, and as a CFI I would
like to have some knowledge to pass onto my students. This test made me realize
how much about this I do not know”;
“Very limited guidance on how to avoid bird strikes if there are birds on
short final”;
“None”;
“No prior training received;
“None so far, except see-and-avoid by my flight instructor. No formal
training”;
“None! Other than a CFI or safety pilot occasionally saying watch out birds, and friends jokingly saying birds after Sully came out”;
“If you see birds fly away from them, provided by my flight instructor”;
“Practically no wildlife mitigation techniques as they usually fly out of the
way before they become an issue”
“No one has really advised me about wildlife mitigation techniques. The
most I have learnt is what to do after a strike – for example, who to notify;
“I had to look up the recommended course of action to avoid a bird after a
near-miss shortly after getting my license (online). I also discussed the topic with
a couple of other pilots recently”;
“It is only brought up occasionally during safety meetings”;
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“Private instructor emphasized on not making any adjustment if wildlife is
encountered during takeoff roll or landing (stay on course). Aviation professor
(from SATT) encouraged researching the local airports geographical /
topographical situation to be more aware of any possible hazards”; and
“If you see birds call it in and avoid collision – my CFI”.
The 14 CFR Part 141 prescribes the minimum curricula for pilot certification
courses by certificated flight schools. Those approved courses must include the efficient
and safe operation of aircraft, and that can involve bird hazards (Electronic Code of
Federal Regulations, Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter H, Part 141, 2017). Safety training is
the cornerstone of a sound safety culture (ICAO, 2013a). Aviation safety, safety culture,
and the safety management of wildlife hazards are linked by safety training and
communication (DeFusco et al., 2015). In summary, the participants’ answers to question
28 in the pretest indicated some flaws in their safety training in regards to the
management of wildlife hazards by pilots. This issue became apparent in the respondents’
answers to most questions in the follow-up survey questionnaire, as explained later in this
section.
As previously noted, two participants of the control group did not take the
posttest. On the other hand, all participants (eight) of the experimental group completed
it. During the posttest, pilots were asked to answer three open-ended questions. Question
26 asked which actions pilots could take to mitigate the risk of an aircraft accident due to
birds, in case they were aware of the presence of birds, in the takeoff path. All of the
seven remaining participants of the control group answered this question. Four of these
participants stated they would delay take off procedures. One of them also posited he/she
would turn the aircraft external lights on. Quoting one of those respondents, “if able,
delay departure if it looks like the birds are not staying in the area”. Interestingly, three
participants of the control group suggested pilots should climb as fast as possible in order
to mitigate the risk of bird strikes (Dolbeer, 2006a). One of them said he/she would do
that in order to “give the birds a chance to dive”. Another participant suggested that pilots
should consider an alternate takeoff path. Quoting one participant from the control group,
“if able, delay departure, if it looks like the birds are not staying in the area”.

93
All pilots from the experimental group also answered this question. Their answers
tended to fall into three groupings. Six participants stated that pilots should delay takeoff
if operationally possible. All participants indicated that if delaying takeoff were not
possible, the recommended actions included maximizing the rate of climb to reduce
flight-time in the bird-rich zone. Five participants also indicated an understanding that by
reducing the airspeed during initial climb-out, the severity and consequent effect-onflight due to a possible strike could be reduced. Quoting one pilot, “if takeoff delay is not
possible, pilot would want to maximize rate of climb until off the bird-rich zone. […] if
possible, reduce airspeed / engine power while maintaining best climb”.
The second open-ended question in the posttest asked participants if they knew
how pilots could obtain up-to-date information about bird hazards during the cruise phase
of flight. In general, participants of both groups provided similar answers. Three
participants of the control group and five participants of the experimental group
suggested pilots could get such information from ATC. One participant in each group
indicated that pilots could obtain information about bird hazards while flying from other
pilots. Interestingly, only two participants of the control group cited ATIS as a resource
to obtain bird-hazard information during flight. One participant of the control group
stated he/she did not know the answer to this question. Quoting one pilot of the control
group, “the pilots could monitor airport ATC frequencies and listen for bird warnings, or
call FSS, but I am unsure if they would have anything for you”. Two participants of the
experimental group argued that pilots could obtain information about wildlife hazards
during flight by using AHAS. Quoting one participant of the experimental group, “use
ATC facilities if possible. If they can, using the AHAS website could be helpful, but that
probably should have been done on the ground”. Another participant of the experimental
group stated, “through PIREPS or ATC. However, pilots should have went (sic) on the
AHAS website before the start of flight, so the pilot can make plans to avoid”.
The last open-ended question in the posttest asked participants what actions they
would take to enhance aviation safety if they saw a flock of birds close to Purdue
University Airport (KLAF). Seven pilots in the experimental group and five in the control
group, respectively, stated they would notify the ATC tower so that ATC professionals
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could relay the information to other aircraft (MacKinnon, 2004). One participant of the
control group stated that he/she would notify ATC about the location, size, and number of
birds, and also that he/she would “tell other pilots about the threat in the hangar”.
Quoting one participant from the experimental group, “report it to the tower so they could
relay the information to other pilots in the area”. In regards to the experimental group,
two participants suggested they would decrease the aircraft airspeed, if operationally
possible. Among them, one said he/she would also climb to reduce the probability of a
strike. Two participants of the experimental group stated they would submit a wildlife
hazard report to the FAA. Quoting one participant of the experimental group, “aviate –
fly slow, climb if able, turn lights on (if safe); communicate – let ATC know so they can
tell other pilots”. Another participant from the experimental group stated, “report it to the
FAA wildlife safety report. If you are in contact with tower, you may notify them so they
can make appropriate announcements to pilots in the vicinity of the airport”.
The follow-up survey questionnaire was sent using the Qualtrics® web-based
survey software to the control and experimental groups seven days after the second
session of the posttest. Six and eight participants of the control and experimental groups,
respectively, answered all questions in the follow-up survey questionnaire. Due to time
constraints, the survey questionnaire link stayed live for a period of one week. The
researcher decided to start the analysis of the answers to the follow-up survey
questionnaire with question nine. Lack of, or inadequate, safety training could be an
explanation for some of the participants’ responses to the remaining questions. The safety
management of wildlife and a sound safety culture are connected by safety training
(DeFusco et al., 2015).
As previously noted, 14 CFR Part 141 flight schools are expected to foster
understanding about wildlife hazards and mitigation strategies by pilots through training
and education (MacKinnon, 2004; Mendonca & Carney, 2017). Superior results cannot
be achieved without training. Effective training and communication are vital components
of a healthy safety culture (ICAO, 2013a; Junior et al., 2009) and the safety management
of hazards (Manuele, 2013; Rodrigues & Cusick, 2012). Question nine asked how the
safety management of wildlife hazards was emphasized during the participants’ flight
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activities, including ground training. The answers to question nine also reflected the lack
of and/or inadequate, training provided to participants addressing bird hazards, as shown
in the third open-ended question in the pretest. Interestingly, participants of both groups
generally provided similar answers to this question. One participant of the experimental
group stated he/she had been taught, during ground training, where to find wildlife hazard
information, and how to use it to enhance flight safety. Additionally this participant also
posited he/she had received information on how to mitigate bird strikes during ground
training. However, in question 28 of the pretest, he/she affirmed he/she had never
received any training or information about this theme in his/her career.
Some of the participants’ answers are as follows:
“Not emphasized in AT 144/145 ground training; at least not as of yet”;
“There is little discussion about bird strikes. The main thing that is gone
over what to do if there is a strike. Very little is spent on educating how to find
information on wildlife strikes and what to do to avoid and mitigate the risk
associated with wildlife strikes”;
“Bird and wildlife strike threats have only been mentioned when we saw
birds while flying. There was not other instruction. However, the study material
of the FAA includes information for example on migratory bird risks that I have
read myself”;
“So far I have yet to get any training in how to avoid birds/wildlife during
my 243 training”;
“In most of our pilot lectures bird strike is not commonly mentioned or
brought up (may have been brought up a few times, but only briefly)”;
“During discussions with my instructor they have been briefly mentioned,
but nothing in-depth”;
“It is only brought up occasionally during safety meetings”;
“It isn’t really”; and
“Not that much”.
Question one asked participants which factors were more critical in case of a bird
strike, and if participants could say why. All 14 participants answered this question. Most
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participants indicated they had a sound understanding of the KE concept applied to the
safety management of bird hazards, as suggested by several authors (Dolbeer et al., 2016;
Eschenfelder, 2005; Eschenfelder & Hull, 2006; MacKinnon, 2004; NTSB, 2009).
Quoting one participant of the experimental group, “the aircraft airspeed because in the
Kinetic Energy equation the velocity of the aircraft is squared”. One participant of the
control group stated “the velocity, because velocity is squared in the kinetic energy
formula”. However, a respondent of the control group indicated that the mass of the bird
is more critical in case of a strike because “it can do more damage to the aircraft”.
The second question asked participants about the safest strategy pilots could
adopt, if operationally possible, to reduce the probability and severity of a bird strike
while flying in the bird-rich zone. They were also asked to explain their answers. All 14
participants answered this question. Respondents of the experimental group indicated
pilots should reduce the aircraft airspeed and flight time while flying through that area.
Those participants suggested that by reducing the aircraft airspeed, the severity of a
possible strike could also be reduced (Dolbeer, 2006a; Eschenfelder, 2005; MacKinnon,
2004). One participant of the control group argued, “decrease airspeed to reduce the
impact strength of a possible bird strike”. Another respondent of the control group
suggested that pilots “should slow the aircraft down to allow time for the birds to fly
away”. One respondent of the control group suggested that pilots should avoid the birdrich zone.
One participant of the control group and six of the experimental group, in
agreement with Dolbeer (2006a), reasoned that pilots could also reduce flight time in the
bird-rich zone to reduce the probability of strikes. One participant of the experimental
group concluded “fly slow and lower the time they spend in the bird rich zone so the
probability of them hitting birds and the severity if they do hit a bird is reduced”. Another
respondent of the experimental group stated, “decrease airspeed and increase the climb or
descent rate so the aircraft is spending less time in the bird rich area as well as going at a
slower speed so if there is a bird strike the damage will not be as bad”. Interestingly, only
one participant of the control group cited another technique, using the aircraft external
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lights, as suggested by MacKinnon (2004). None considered a go-around in the presence
of birds as a strategy to enhance aviation safety.
The FAA (2013, 2017) provides guidance on how pilots can report wildlife
strikes. The U.S. NWSD, which highly depends upon the reporting of strikes by aviation
professionals, provides the groundwork for safety programs and a scientific approach to
reduce the risk and costs associated with strikes (Dolbeer, 2006b; Dolbeer et al., 2016).
Question three was designed to help understand the participants’ knowledge regarding
one safety culture tenet (Reporting Culture) - the importance of reporting bird strikes for
accident prevention (Reason, 1997, 1998). Results retrieved from the control group
responses corroborated the findings in the first open-ended question in the pretest.
Participants were not totally aware of the FAA wildlife hazard reporting system, and how
and in which situations they were expected to report strikes (FAA, 2017a). Their answers
generally reflected a local or immediate concern (e.g., report the hazard to the ATC tower
to warn other pilots), as demonstrated in the pretest. Even though their concerns are also
important, the safety management of wildlife hazards requires the collection of strikedata in a national level database (Dolbeer et al., 2016). One participant stated that “bird
strikes should be reported so that other pilots know of areas where they should exercise
higher caution. Also, air traffic control might have to check the runway after a bird strike
for possible foreign objects”. Quoting another participant of the control group, “you
should report bird strikes because they can contaminate the runway if one was to happen
by the runway surface, but it can also alert other pilots to use caution for birds. Bird
strikes can be reported to ATC over frequency”.
On the other hand, responses from the experimental group participants suggested
a better understanding of the valuable ADM and SMS vital elements, the reporting of
safety hazards (FAA, 2016a; ICAO, 2013). Their responses indicated they would report
the strike to the FAA using the FAA wildlife strike database (FAA, 2017a). Most
importantly, they understood the importance of the U.S. NWSD for the development
and/or enhancement of safety strategies to mitigate wildlife hazards (Cleary & Dolbeer,
2005). Quoting one participant from the experimental group, “you should report bird
strikes to contribute to discussion of aviation safety concerns among other pilots and so
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that the FAA can record data regarding when, how, and why birds are hit. The FAA has
wildlife strike forms that you can fill out on their website”.
Research studies by Avrenly and Dempsey (2014), Dolbeer et al. (2016), and
Nicholson and Reed (2011) clearly indicate that the risk of an aircraft accident due to bird
strikes is higher during takeoff roll and initial climb-out. Higher-rotation of the engines
and increased aircraft airspeed are two factors that could explain such higher risk during
these phases of flight. The experimental group participants’ responses to question four
indicated a good understanding of two interesting concepts, KE and SRM, and how they
relate to the severity in case of a bird ingestion. Quoting one participant of the
experimental group, “takeoff and climb, because the airplane is at full power (speed
increases damage from a bird strike)”. Another respondent argued that the risk of an
aircraft accident due to bird ingestion(s) is higher during takeoff because the “aircraft
engines are using full power and if a bird is ingested it can cause serious damage”. One
participant of the experimental group also mentioned that the risk is higher at and around
the airport jurisdiction since the great majority of wildlife strikes occur at this
environment (Cleary & Dickey, 2010; DeFusco & Unangst, 2013; Dolbeer et al., 2016).
Participants of the control group addressed this question with different
perspectives. One pilot stated “Landing. The engines are operating at low rpm and would
therefore be fairly quiet. As such, the birds will not have much warning from the
approaching aircraft”. One respondent argued the risk was higher during takeoff and
landing because “the birds seem to hover there to look for food or land”. Three
participants cited the takeoff and climb-out phase of flight, but only one explained that
the highest risk of an aircraft accident is during takeoff roll and initial climb-out because
“the thrust setting is high”. Quoting another participant “during takeoff and climb out,
because the aircraft is least maneuverable in these phases”. A participant of the control
group posited that the highest probability of an engine failure due to birds is during
climb-out. He/she argued that this happens because during this phase of flight a “pilot
does not have great visibility in front of them, the aircraft is accelerating, and there is not
much reaction time if at all”. At last, two participants cited the initial climbout, but only
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one was capable of correctly explain why, as suggested by Dempsey and Avrenly (2014),
and Dolbeer (2006a).
An important ADM tenet is that pilots should, before the flight, obtain all
information available that could negatively impact aviation safety (FAA, 2016a).
Question five asked about the aeronautical resources pilots could use to obtain
information on the presence of birds at and around airports. All respondents demonstrated
a certain awareness of the major resources pilots could use to identify bird hazard
information. Participants of both groups mentioned ATC, ATIS, and NOTAM, among
other sources of bird-hazard related information. Only three participants of the
experimental group cited the AHAS as one of those resources. Interestingly, none of
them cited the AIM, AIP, the FAA Airport Facility Directory, and the FAA wildlife
hazard website as sources of wildlife hazard data and information.
Question six presented a situation to assess the participants’ ADM skills regarding
bird-hazard management. They were asked which actions they could take, if while taxiing
to runway 10 at Purdue University Airport (KLAF) they observed the presence of birds at
and close to the runway. Results are supported by some answers to the first open-ended
question in the posttest. One participant of the control group and five of the experimental
group indicated they would delay takeoff, as suggested by MacKinnon (2004).
Additionally, in agreement with Doppler et al. (2015) and MacKinnon (2004), one
participant from each group posited they would turn the aircraft external lights on in
order to make the aircraft more conspicuous for birds. Interestingly, only one participant
of the control group and three from the experimental group stated they would report the
presence of birds to the ATC tower. One participant of the control group and three of the
experimental declared they would climb as fast as possible, as indicated by Dolbeer et al.
(2016), and Eschenfelder and DeFusco, 2010).
The responses to question seven are related to answers in question 28 in the
pretest, and especially question nine in the follow-up survey questionnaire. Participants’
answers to those questions suggested some flaws in their safety training regarding
wildlife hazard management by pilots. Participants were asked to explain which aspects
of the safety management of birds they were familiar with. According to Manuele (2013),
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pilots are not expected to be sufficiently informed about best safety practices if they have
not been trained and educated in the proper procedures. Some of the participants’ answers
are as follow:
“I am familiar with FAA's process of assessing the hazards at airports for
wildlife and how to mitigate the risk of potentially being involved in a wildlife
strike”;
“Reporting”;
“None”;
“I am familiar with FAA's process of assessing the hazards at airports for
wildlife and how to mitigate the risk of potentially being involved in a wildlife
strike”;
“Mowing the grass at airports. Noise producing guns. Targeted and
controlled use of trained raptor birds patrolling the airport area”; and
“Before, almost nothing, now quite a bit more”.
Question eight asked participants why pilots are expected to report the presence of
bird activity during flight to ATC. By reporting bird movements to ATC, aviators will
increase the situational awareness of other pilots flying in the same area (MacKinnon,
2004). Most importantly, air traffic controllers should provide pilots with current birdhazard information at and around airports (DOT, 2015). Again, all respondents showed a
sound understanding of this ADM concept. One participant of the control group stated “it
will increase their situational awareness and allow them to advise any other pilots of the
possible dangers”. Quoting another participant of the experimental group, “so that they
can let other aircraft in the vicinity know”.
In question ten, all participants were asked to describe their recommendations for
pilots to mitigate the risk of bird strikes. In general, the responses of the control group
participants were generic, and of little usefulness for aviators. One participant stated, “be
aware of their presence and keep your eyes outside”. One participant argued he/she had
no recommendations to make. Quoting a respondent, “if I notice birds hanging out
around the ends of the runways I would definitely inform ATC of the presence”. Another
respondent of the control group showed certain knowledge about the fundamental of the
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safety management of bird hazards by aviators. He/she suggested pilots should fly above
7,000 feet AGL during bird migratory periods. However, he/she recommended pilots
should turn on the aircraft lights and transponder. Findings from previous research
studies suggest that the aircraft external lights could enhance the response behavior of
certain bird species, thus mitigating the risk of strikes (Blackwell et al., 2012; Dolbeer &
Barnes, 2017; Doppler et al., 2015; MacKinnon, 2004).
On the other hand, participants of the experimental group indicated, through their
responses, their knowledge and skills to mitigate the risk of bird strikes had improved
after the safety training. One respondent stated, “make use of the AHAS, know to fly
slowly around birds, and always try to overfly birds, do not dive below them”. Quoting
another participant, “in order to mitigate the risk of bird strikes, pilots should actively
learn about new practices about wildlife strikes, and do the correct planning for a flight”.
Quoting another pilot of the experimental group, “just remember to be aware of the
possibility for birds in the area if they are mentioned by Tower or a NOTAM, especially
during climbout. If you are coming up on a bird/flock pitch up and try to climb over them
because birds will generally dive to avoid us. Make sure that if a strike is inevitable or
you are unsure if it will occur, pull some power back and try to reduce your airspeed so
that the severity of the strike is lower”.

4.3

Summary of Findings

This chapter provided an analysis of data obtained from a sample of 17 participants
completing a pretest, 15 participants completing a posttest, and 14 participants that
answered the follow-up survey questionnaire. Descriptive statistics and multiple
statistical tests were completed to answer the research questions. These statistical analysis
were supplemented with the qualitative analysis of the open-ended questions used to
answer research question 3. In addition, the researcher used the deductive content
analysis approach (Elo & Kyngas, 2008; Patton , 2015) to analyze the participants’
responses to the open-ended questions in the pretest, posttest, and follow-up survey
questionnaire to answer research question three.
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The first research question asked if a correlation existed between the participants’
flight experience, measured in flight hours, and the safety management of bird hazards by
the participants, in terms of pretest scores. The findings suggest that there is not a
significant correlation between these two variables. The participants responses to the
open-ended questions in the pretest, as suggested by Patton (2015), helped to illuminate
these quantitative findings.
The second research question asked if there would be any differences in pre-and
post-test scores between and within the two conditions: the control and experimental
groups. The findings indicate that there was no difference between groups on the pretest
assessment. However, a statistically-significant finding was found between the pre- and
posttest scores of the experimental group. This suggests that the treatment did have an
impact on improving participant knowledge and skills to mitigate the risk of bird strikes.
The final research question sought evidence to identify how 14 CFR Part 141 pilots
manage to fly safely, given the threat of aircraft accidents due to birds.
Three primary themes emerged from the participant responses to the follow-up
survey questionnaire. The first theme that became apparent to the researcher was that the
topic “bird hazard” is barely covered during the ground and/or safety training of Part 141
GA pilots. Some participants indicated that this subject was sometimes mentioned by
flight instructors when they saw birds during flight activities. Moreover, their answers
indicated that flight instructors provided insufficient guidance on how pilots could
mitigate the risk of bird strikes. Secondly, participants’ responses suggested a
misperception of the safety culture tenets, underlying practices and values that promote a
high level of risk awareness and aviation safety (CANSO, 2013; Junior et al., 2009).
Those included the adequate reporting of bird strikes (Reporting Culture); a sound
understanding of the inherent hazards (birds) of their working environment (Informed
Culture); and how pilots could mitigate those hazards (Flexible Culture). Additionally,
most participants indicated a misperception of the importance of wildlife-strike data and
information (Learning Culture), especially during the planning phase of their flights, for
aviation safety (Flexible Culture). This theme sheds some light on the third theme.
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Lastly, a theme that became apparent to the researcher was the participants’ poor
familiarity with the safety risk management process regarding bird hazards. A pillar of
ADM is that SRM should be incorporated in all phases of flight, including flight
planning. The first SRM process is hazard identification. Most pilots were capable of
demonstrating how to obtain bird-strike data and information. However, their answers
also indicated they were not aware of important resources that could be used by pilots in
order to collect information needed to increase the safety of their flights (FAA, 2016a;
NTSB, 2009). Initially, participants of both groups indicated an inadequate understanding
of the KE and ADM concepts applied to the safety management of bird strikes.
This theme became even more evident during the analysis of the open-ended
questions in the posttest and follow-up survey questionnaire. Participants of the
experimental group indicated that actions such as reducing the aircraft airspeed and flight
time while flying through the bird-rich zone, or by using the aircraft external lights they
could mitigate the risk of bird strikes. Additionally, their answers indicated they
comprehended the importance of reporting bird strikes to the FAA in accordance with
FAA guidelines (FAA, 2017a). On the other hand, some participants of the control group
also posited that the aircraft airspeed is a major factor in the SRM of bird hazards. In
summary, the control group participants’ responses to the open-ended questions suggest
that they did not have the satisfactory knowledge and skills to mitigate bird hazards.
Moreover, evidence shows that adequate safety training and education (ICAO, 2013a;
Manuele, 2013) could potentially enhance 14 CFR Part 141 pilots’ abilities to mitigate
the risk of bird strikes.
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CHAPTER 5.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter four provided a detailed analysis of the data collected through the pretest,
posttest, and follow-up survey questionnaire. This chapter presents a summary of the
study, provides a discussion of the findings, presents study limitations, and provides
recommendations. Additionally, suggestions for future research pertaining to the safety
management of bird hazards by pilots are presented, along with final thoughts of the
researcher regarding this study.

5.1

Summary of Study

Correct actions by pilots can prevent aircraft accidents due to birds, particularly
outside the airport jurisdiction (Dolbeer; 2006a, 2006b; Eschenfelder, 2005; ICAO, 2012;
Mackinnon, 2004; Mendonca, 2008a; 2011, 2016; Nicholson & Reed, 2011). This
research project provided an in-depth analysis of 14 CFR Part 141 pilots’ knowledge and
skills to mitigate the risk of bird strikes. More specifically, the purpose of this study was
to determine if a safety training protocol could effectively enhance 14 CFR Part 141 GA
pilots’ knowledge and skills to reduce the risk of bird strikes to aviation. The foundation
of this project was provided by previous research findings that indicated training could
address gaps in aviators’ knowledge and skills (Ambs, 2014; Cassens et al., 2010;
Johnson et al., 2006; Keller, 2015; Knecht et al., 2010; Winter, 2013; Winter et al., 2014).
Both the FAA (FAA, 2015, 2016a; 2016d) and ICAO (2013a, 2013b) have advocated that
the safety training of aviation professionals is paramount for aviation safety.
The current study recruited pilots from the Purdue University professional flight
program and from Purdue Aviation (14 CFR Part 141 GA pilots). In order to be eligible
to participate in the study, pilots were required to be at least 18 years old, be enrolled in
the Purdue University professional flight program, and have flown in the last six months.
Participants were asked to provide demographic and flight experience information. They
were then randomly assigned to the control and experimental groups using the
proportional stratified random design technique (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015; Sekaran &
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Bougie, 2013). Initially, pilots in the control group (N = 9) had accumulated more flight
hours (M = 187.77) than the experimental group (N = 8) (M = 96.75). Conversely, there
were two CFIs and one CFI in the experimental group and the control group,
respectively. This could have potentially influenced the results.
The safety training workshop, as well as the pretest, posttest, and short follow-up
online questionnaire questions were developed, based upon previous research addressing
the safety management of wildlife to aviation (Avrenly & Dempsey, 2014; Dolbeer,
2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2011; ICAO, 2012; Eschenfelder, 2005; MacKinnon, 2004;
Mendonca, 2008a, 2008b, 2011, 2016; Nicholson & Reed, 2011), the safety culture tenets
(Adjekum, 2014; Adjekum et al., 2015; Antonsen, 2009; Choudhry et al., 2007; Gill &
Shergill, 2004; Junior et al., 2009; Reason, 1997, 1998; Thaden & Gibbons, 2008); the
aeronautical decision-making tenets (Cassens, 2010; Cassens et al., 2010; FAA, 2016a;
Kochan et al., 1997); the safety management systems (SMS) pillars (DeFusco et al.,
2015; ICAO, 2013a, 2013b; Junior et al., 2009; Ludwig et al., 2007); and information
retrieved from the analysis of bird strikes to aviation in the U.S. (Dolbeer, 2015; Dolbeer
et al., 2015; Dolbeer et al., 2016). The pretest, safety training, and posttest were offered
in two sessions in order to facilitate the participation of pilots in the project.
The questions used during the three assessments underwent a face validity process
(Borg & Gall, 1989; DeVon et al., 2007; Sartori, 2009). After the face validity process,
the researcher followed the CVI method to increase the reliability and validity of the
measurement instrument (DeVon et al., 2007; Polit & Beck, 2006; Sullivan, 2011). All
participants were administered a pretest to obtain information on prior knowledge and
skills to mitigate the risk of bird strikes. Approximately a week after the pretest, the
experimental group participated in an interactive workshop developed by the researcher.
Participants of both groups were asked to complete the posttest after the interactive
workshop. Eight participants of the experimental group took the posttest. However, only
seven participants of the control group completed the posttest. Finally, a week after the
second session of the posttest, a follow-up survey questionnaire was distributed through
the Qualtrics® web-based survey software to the remaining 15 participants of the current
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study. Six participants of the control group and eight of the experimental group,
respectively, responded to this assessment.
The results of the study were analyzed to determine if there was a relationship
between the participants’ flight experience, measured in flight hours, and their safety
management of bird hazards, in terms of pretest scores. In addition, the results were
analyzed to determine if the treatement had a significant impact on the participants’
posttest scores. Quantitative results were completed using the software program IBM
SPSS® Statistics 23. The open-ended questions were qualitatively analyzed using the
deductive content analysis approach (Elo & Kyngas, 2008; Patton, 2015).
From this analysis, the following results were produced:
1. There was no apparent correlation between the participants’ flight experience,
measured in flight hours, and their safety management of bird hazards, in
terms of pretest scores;
2. There was no significant difference within the control group’s pretest and
posttest scores;
3. The treatment significantly increased the posttest scores of the experimental
group; and
4. When examining the qualitative data, three major themes emerged. The first
of these was that the Part 141 pilots had not received adequate training and
education addressing the safety management of bird hazards during their
ground and flight training. Secondly, the participants’ qualitative responses
suggested a misperception of the safety culture elements regarding bird
hazards. Lastly, participants indicated a poor familiarity with the safety risk
management process applied to the safety management of bird hazards.

5.2

Validity and Reliability of Findings

Improper use of statistics increases the likelihood of committing a Type I or Type
II error. Additionally, it frequently increases the need for extra resources (Bridge &
Sawylosky, 1999). An initial concern of the researcher was the sample size. Seventeen
pilots initially volunteered to participate in the study (see Table 4.1 for the Summary of
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Participant Demographic Information). However, only 15 participants completed the
posttest. Sample size has been a theme of debate among researchers and statisticians.
According to Arnaut (2009), a small sample size could result from a decision by the
researcher, or more often, by force. Devore (2010) and Groebner et al. (2011) suggested
that the sample size could be approximately 5% of the population size. Field (2009)
stated that for an alpha level of 0.05 and recommended power of 0.8, twenty-eight
participants are enough to detect a large effect size. Increasing the sample size will
increase the likelihood of detecting an effect, or power (Privitera, 2015).
According to Sekaran and Bougie (2013), the decision on adequate sample size is
challenging. Several factors affect the decision on the sample size, including the research
goals, the confidence level, the size of the population, and of course, time and cost
constraints. Most importantly, with tight experimental controls (e.g., pretest-posttest
experimental and control group design), successful research studies are possible with
sample sizes of ten to twenty subjects. According to Anderson and Vingrys (2001), a
sample of five subjects, despite criticism by some researchers, could be useful in
scientific research. In a well-designed study, even with a small sample size, effects could
be detected by using experimental paradigms and robust statistical analysis. Moreover,
inferences could be made regarding the population of interest.
A study by Bacchetti, Wolf, Segal, and McCulloch (2005) suggested that studies
with small sample sizes could “have more favorable ratios of projected value to
participant burden” (p. 105). The power per participant decreases as the sample size
increases. Studies with large sample sizes could have more power. On the other hand,
they also impose the net burden associated with the participation of more subjects.
Therefore, smaller sample sizes generally have a more positive ethical balance than
studies with large sample sizes. Previous studies encompassed the eight hallmarks of
scientific research, as suggested by Sekaran and Bougie (2013), despite using a small
sample of subjects (Cassens, 2015; Keller, 2015; Ochs & Miller, 2015; Sicker,
Lookabaugh, Santos, & Barnes, 2005; Thaxter et al., 2017; Toth, 2016; Winter, 2013;
Winter et al., 2014).
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The researcher’s recognition of the power properties of different statistical tests
improves the ability to detect treatment differences, and facilitates the replication of the
study. Moreover, it optimizes the use of resources through the application of efficient
statistical tests (Bridge & Saviloswky, 1999). Parametric statistical tests are usually
sensitive to violations of assumptions (Field, 2009). However, research studies have
demonstrated that certain parametric tests are robust, even with small sample sizes (Blair
& Higgins, 1980; Bridge & Sawilosky, 1999; Fay & Proschan, 2010; Heeren &
D’Agostino, 1987; Neave & Granger, 1968). Nonparametric tests, on the other hand, are
less sensitive to violations of assumptions, especially normality (Field, 2009; Privitera,
2015). Nonparametric tests could be more powerful than the parametric tests in case of
small sample sizes. Therefore, the use of a parametric test should not preclude the use of
a nonparametric test. The researcher in the current study used parametric and
nonparametric tests in order to pursue the eight hallmarks of research (Sekaran & Bougie,
2013).
The researcher also used triangulation during the analysis of this study, as
suggested by Sekaran and Bougie (2013) and Patton (2015). Several types of analytical
triangulation can be used. This study used different methods of data collection: final
reports of aircraft accidents due to bird strikes (NTSB, 2009, 2010) (CIAIAC, 2016);
pretest and posttest; follow-up survey questionnaire with ten open-ended questions;
collected data in different periods; and used different theories and concepts (e.g., ADM,
Safety Culture; SMS) to understand the data. Triangulation can add credibility to the
findings, since no single method could fully explain the findings of a study (Patton,
2015).

5.3

Discussion of Findings

Empirical data clearly indicate that the majority of wildlife strikes occur at and
around the airport environment (DeFusco & Unangst, 2013; Dolbeer et al., 2015; Dolbeer
et al., 2016). For GA aircraft, the number of damaging strikes has not decreased in the
airport environment since 1990. Even worse, the number of damaging strikes involving
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GA airplanes outside the airport jurisdiction has significantly increased since 2000.
Airport safety management programs, introduced since 1990, have reduced damaging
wildlife strikes at and around the airport environment. However, such programs have had
little to no effect on the risk of bird strikes outside the airport jurisdiction, such as
occurred with a Cessna 500 Citation in Oklahoma City, in 2008 (NTSB, 2009), and with
U.S. Airways flight 1549, in Weehawken, New Jersey, in 2009 (NTSB, 2010b). For the
GA community, the risk could be even higher. GA airports are frequently resourcesconstrained; therefore many operators cannot develop and sustain safety efforts to
mitigate wildlife hazards. Many GA airports are located in rural areas where wildlife
thrive. For some GA airport operators, certain activities that are known to attract wildlife
are vital for their financial sustainability. Many GA pilots do not fly frequently or
participate in recurrent safety training. Thus, they are less experienced than commercial
pilots, and may not be current on how to prevent or handle a bird strike (Cleary &
Dickey, 2010).
The FAA wildlife hazard efforts have focused on certification standards and
general guidance for Part 139 airports (Dolbeer et al., 2016), airworthiness standards for
aircraft airframes and engines (NTSB, 2010b), the development or enhancement of
technologies (e.g., avian radar), and research (e.g., aircraft use of pulsating lights). In
addition, the FAA has made improvements in the U.S. NWSD in order to increase the
quantity and especially the quality of wildlife strike reporting. To date, the Agency has
conducted few safety efforts directed specifically at understanding and mitigating wildlife
hazards affecting the GA community, especially pilots. The purpose of this study was to
determine if a safety training protocol could effectively enhance 14 CFR Part 141 GA
pilots’ knowledge and skills to reduce the risk of bird strikes to aviation. To accomplish
the purpose of this research, three research questions were formulated.
The first research question was an attempt to understand whether there was a
relationship between the participants’ flight experience, measured in flight hours, and the
safety management of bird hazards by those participants in terms of pretest scores.
Seventeen pilots from the Purdue professional flight program and from Purdue Aviation
volunteered to participate in the study. The researcher used one parametric and two
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nonparametric tests to analyze the data. This study did not find a significant relationship
between the participants’ flight experience, measured in flight hours, and the safety
management of bird hazards by the participants in terms of pretest scores. The dataset
violated the linearity assumption to use the Pearson correlation coefficient. However, the
researcher decided to use this parametric test. Some assumptions might be difficult to
meet with a small sample size (Privitera, 2015). Interestingly, the findings using the
nonparametric tests also indicated that there was not a significant relationship between
the participants’ flight experience and pretest scores.
According to the FAA (2016a), good ADM is not a by-product of flight
experience. Several high-profile accidents have indicated poor ADM processes by
experienced pilots (Lacagnina, 2012; NTSB, 2009, 2010a, 2013, 2014). The pilots who
participated in the current study could not be considered “experienced aviators”. Their
total flight hours ranged from 15 to 345. The pilot of a Socata TB-20 who crashed after
colliding with a griffon vulture in 2016, in Spain, had accumulated 334 flight hours at the
time of the accident (CIAIAC, 2016). On the other hand, the pilot of the accident Cessna
500 had accumulated 6,100 flight hours, including approximately 670 hours in turbinepowered aircraft and 5,000 as a pilot-in-command (PIC). The second pilot had
accumulated almost 1,400 flight hours, including 80 hours in turbine-powered aircraft
(NTSB, 2009). There was information about the presence of birds available for the flight
crews of both flights (this topic was further explored in this section). Such information
should have been used to develop actions to mitigate the risk of bird strikes (Eschenfelder
& DeFusco, 2010; FAA, 2016a; 2016d; MacKinnon, 2004; Nicholson & Reed, 2011). If
the pilot of the Socata TB-20 had reduced power and airspeed and/or climbed to a higher
altitude, the risk of the accident could have been reduced or even eliminated. Similarly,
had the pilots of the Cessna 500 been climbing using settings that provide the best angle
of climb speed, the severity of the strike could have been significantly reduced (Avrenly
& Dempsey, 2014; Dolbeer, 2006a, 2007; Eschenfelder, 2005; MacKinnon, 2004;
Mendonca, 2016; NTSB, 2009). In addition, despite the need for further studies, the use
of the aircraft external lights while flying in the bird-rich zone can enhance the escape-
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behavior of certain species of birds. Therefore, the probability of these strikes could have
been, at least in theory, reduced.
Pilots frequently face flight safety and operational challenges during the different
phases of flight, including departures, initial climb-out, and en-route. Those flight
considerations may include aircraft performance and ATC clearances (NTSB, 2009).
Therefore, flight crews flying through the bird-rich zone may have to consider other
safety requirements during the planning and execution of their flights, but they also
should consider that certain actions can minimize the probability and/or severity of a
possible bird strike.
The FAA (2015, 2016a) and ICAO (2013a, 2013b) have recognized that the
safety training of aviation professionals is vital for aviation safety. Safety training, which
is a catalyst of a sound safety culture (DeFusco et al., 2015), should be based on current
data, information, and safety needs, and should be frequently reviewed and updated
(ICAO, 2013b). Flight crews should not be expected to be sufficiently informed and have
the knowledge and skills to mitigate the inherent hazards of their jobs if they have not
received adequate training (ICAO, 2013a; Manuele, 2013; Reason & Hobbs, 2003). The
interactive workshop was developed and presented by the researcher, with oversight by
the PI. Additionally, the researcher was assisted by the ICAO Accident Investigation
Section (AIG) chief, who has an extensive background in aviation safety. There were
three learning objectives for the interactive workshop. Upon completion of the interactive
workshop, participants were expected to identify various sources of information related to
bird hazard, demonstrate the ability to think clearly and analytically about the safety
management of bird hazards, and to discuss several mitigation strategies applicable to the
safety management of bird hazards by pilots.
Eight pilots attended the safety training, which was delivered as an interactive
workshop. Workshops provide an adequate learning setting to emphasize development of
knowledge, skills, and competencies in a defined content area (Brooks-Harris & StockWard, 1999; Caffarella & Daffron, 2013). The researcher used two parametric and three
nonparametric tests to analyze the data. Findings suggested that the treatment
significantly increased the posttest scores of the experimental group participants, with a
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large effect size. Most importantly, the safety training, delivered as an interactive
workshop, could have increased the participants’ knowledge and equipped them with the
skills (Brooks-Harris & Stock-Ward, 1999) to mitigate the risk of bird strikes
(MacKinnon, 2004).
The researcher pursued other explanations for the results. Pilots in the Purdue
professional flight program participate in weekly safety meetings (A. Running, personal
communication, October 11, 2017). The “bird-hazard” theme is frequently raised and
discussed during these meetings, between August and October, since local historical data
suggest that the risk of bird strikes significantly increases during this period. From 1990
through 2015, approximately 52% of the aircraft accidents and incidents due to bird
strikes in the U.S. occurred between July and October. This period coincides with late
breeding season and fall migration (Dolbeer et al., 2016; Drey et al., 2014). According to
ICAO (2005), safety meetings are effective in disseminating accident prevention
information. During safety meetings pilots discuss safety strategies to mitigate identified
risks. Most importantly, safety meetings help increase the situational awareness of
aviators (FAA, 2016a; Koonce, 2003). Thus, it is plausible to conjecture that safety
meetings may have increased the history effect among the experimental group
participants. Similarly, the exposure of participants to the pretest could have increased the
testing effect among the experimental group participants.
There is a third possibility for the increase in the posttest scores of the
experimental group participants. At least three courses in the Purdue professional flight
program cover the theme “wildlife hazard to aviation”. For example, the “Aviation Safety
Problems” course, taught by the researcher in 2015 and 2016, dedicated a week to engage
students with this theme. It is important to note that no participants of this project was a
former “Aviation Safety Problems” student while the researcher taught this course.
However, pilots of the experimental group may have participated in classes, during the
current project, in which this theme was covered, biasing their posttest scores. It is
important to underscore that five and three participants of the control group and of the
experimental group, respectively, reported they had taken up to three hours of self-study
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addressing the bird-hazard topic. In addition, one participant of the control group reported
he/she had had a bird strike.
It is practically impossible to completely eliminate the risk of aircraft accidents
due to birds. Currently, there are no aircraft systems that can effectively deter birds from
entering the aircraft flightpath (NTSB, 2010b). Therefore, pilots play a vital role in the
accident prevention process, especially when flying outside the airport environment,
where actions by airport operators have almost no effect (Dolbeer et al., 2016). Relevant
operating procedures could be implemented by aviators. Most importantly, safety training
helps pilots enhance their knowledge and skills needed to identify bird-hazards, and
create and implement effective strategies to reduce safety risks. Regarding research
question two, qualitative data provided perspectives and offered a greater depth of
understanding of the quantitative data (Berg, 2007). In addition, triangulation tested the
quantitative data for consistency (Patton, 2015). The researcher acknowledges possible
limitations of this study, and discusses them in a later section of this chapter. However,
the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data supports the idea that a safety training
protocol focusing on the mitigation of bird hazards could assist Part141 GA pilots in
mitigating the risk of aircraft accidents due to birds.
The investigation of previous aircraft accidents due to birds indicated inadequate
ADM and SRM processes by GA pilots (CIAIAC, 2016; NTSB, 2009). The last research
question was an attempt to understand how 14 CFR Part 141 GA pilots manage to fly
safely, given the threat of aircraft accidents due to birds. The researcher used the
participants’ answers to the open-ended questions in the pretest, posttest, and especially
to the follow-up survey questionnaire to answer this question. A finding of concern was
that 14 CFR Part 141 GA pilots had not been provided adequate information about the
safety management of wildlife by aviators. Pilots of both groups clearly indicated that
they had been provided limited-to-no information on this theme during ground and flight
training. Further research is necessary to investigate the causal factors of this discrepancy
that could affect aviation safety.
Before the safety training, several participants indicated they would report a bird
strike to maintenance personnel. Yet, they demonstrated a sound understanding of the
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importance of reporting the presence of birds at and around aiports to the ATC tower as a
safety strategy to enhance aviation safety, as suggested by Eschenfelder and Hull (2006,
MacKinnon (2004), Mendonca (2016), and Nicholson and Reed (2011). Both actions are
vital for aviation safety. After the safety training, however, pilots of the experimental
group also indicated they would report bird strikes to the FAA (Dolbeer, 2006b; Dolbeer
et al., 2016; FAA, 2013). Participants of both groups indicated that they would reduce the
aircraft airspeed to mitigate the amount of damage and possible effect on flight (Dolbeer,
2006a, 2007; MacKinnon, 2004). However, only pilots of the experimental group
indicated they would reduce the flight time while flying in the bird-rich zone (Dolbeer;
2006a).
Research studies indicate that the risk of major aircraft accidents due to birds are
significantly higher during takeoff roll and initial climbout. One factor that could explain
the higher risk during these phases of flight is the kinetic energy, as demonstrated by
Avrenly and Dempsey (2014), Dolbeer (2006a, 2007), Eschenfelder (2005), and ICAO
(2012). The aircraft airspeed is the most important factor in the KE equation, and the only
one that could be controlled by the flight crews (Eschenfelder & Hull, 2006). Pilots of the
experimental group indicated a better understanding of this concept after the safety
training. Most importantly, they could consider KE during their ADM processes while
developing strategies to enhance aviation safety. For examples, two participants of the
control group cited the initial climbout as a phase-of-flight in which the risk of an
accident is higher due to bird ingestions. However, only one could adequately explain
his/her answer, as suggested by Dempsey and Avrenly (2014), and Dolbeer (2006a). This
finding could be another indication that, prior to the safety training delivered as a part of
this study, participating pilots were not well-suited to manage the risk of bird strikes.
Adequate flight planning is fundamental for aviation safety (FAA, 2016a). The
risk of bird strikes is an intrinsic component of aviation. Even though it is practically
impossible to completely mitigate the risk of accidents due to wildlife hazards, the
probability and/or severity of damaging strikes with a negative effect on flight can be
achieved through effective SRM. According to the FAA (2016a), pilots can mitigate the
built-in risks of a flight through efficient ADM practices. SRM is the heart of the ADM
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processes, and should be incorporated in all phases of flight, especially during the
preflight planning stage. The first step in the SRM process is the identification of hazards
that aviators will face in their operational environment (ICAO, 2013a).
Pilots cannot efficiently mitigate risks associated with concealed hazards. There
are a number of resources that should be used by pilots to identify bird hazards, including
the AHAS, AIM, AIP, the FAA Airport Facility Directory (NTSB, 2009), ATC and ATIS
(MacKinnon, 2004), NOTAMs (DOT, 2017), and the FAA wildlife hazard website
(FAA, 2016c). Responses from pilots of both groups indicated they were aware of some
of these resources. However, participants of both groups, even after the safety training
(experimental group), were not capable of citing the AIM, AIP, the FAA Airport Facility
Directory, and the FAA wildlife hazard website as important sources of wildlife hazard
data and information. One possible explanation for this issue could be the reduced flight
time and experience of the participants of the current study. Some participants were
probably not even aware of these sources of aeronautical information prior to the safety
training. Keller (2015) and Mendonca (2008) suggested that flight experience and the
qualification of pilots could influence the results of research studies addressing aviation
safety.
A Cessna 500 with two experienced pilots collided with one or more American
white pelicans, in the vicinity of PWA airport, in Oklahoma city, on March 04, 2008
(NTSB, 2009). The American white pelican has a wingspan of 96 to 114 inches and can
weigh up to 20 lbs. Considered one of the largest North American birds, American white
pelicans are common in Central Oklahoma from March to May. The strikes resulted in
loss of control of the airplane. The aircraft crashed and was destroyed by impact forces
and a post-crash fire, killing the two pilots and three passengers. The FAA airport
facilities directory contained, at the time of the mishap, a remark warning users of the
PWA airport regarding the presence of flocks of birds at, and around, the aerodrome.
Moreover, the AHAS indicated a medium-risk of bird strikes during that period of the
year. The strikes occurred at approximately 1,800 feet AGL, or in the bird-rich zone,
while the aircraft was flying at about 200 knots. The NTSB (2009) indicated that the KE
resulting from the strikes far exceeded the demonstrated kinetic energy of the airplane’s
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certification standards. Using this accident as a foundation, both the NTSB (2009) and
O’Callaghan (nd) suggested that pilots could reduce the aircraft airspeed until clearing
the bird-rich zone so as to reduce the severity of possible bird strikes. Pilots should be
aware that the aircraft minimum safe speeds for different aircraft weight and
configurations, and other operational factors (e.g., ATC clearances) should be factored
into this equation. Moreover, pilots should also know that multiple bird strikes with
different bird species, and/or simultaneous damage to different aircraft systems, may lead
to unpredictable results. Notwithstanding this, the use of bird-hazard data and
information, especially during the preflight planning phase, could help Part 141 GA pilots
devise precautionary operational strategies for mitigating the risk of bird strikes in the
bird-rich zone.
The researcher pursued other explanations that could explain the participants’
answers to the follow-up survey questionnaire. In addition to the safety meetings in
which they regularly participate, the researcher was informed of a bird strike that
occurred on October 02, 2017, involving a flight instructor and a student during a crosscountry flight. Even though no one was injured, the strike may have caused damage to
the aircraft. This incident was debated during that week, especially during the safety
meeting (A. Running, personal communication, October 11, 2017). As a reminder, the
follow-up survey questionnaire was sent out on October 06, 2017. It is highly possible
that this bird strike may have increased the awareness of pilots in both groups. Certainly,
bird-strike prevention strategies were covered during the safety meeting (e.g., reporting
of strikes using the U.S. NWSD) (A. Running, personal communication, October 11,
2017).

5.4

Conclusions

Aircraft accidents due to birds are a major safety concern worldwide (Dolbeer &
Barnes, 2017). Globally, more than 262 people were killed and 247 aircraft damaged
beyond repair as a consequence of wildlife strikes since 1988. From 1990 through 2015,
ninety-seven percent of the wildlife strikes in the U.S. involved birds. The estimated
annual costs of these events to the U.S. aviation industry was projected to be
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approximately 113 hours of aircraft downtime, and $227 million in direct and indirect
costs. Actual losses are at least twice as high, considering the underreport or incomplete
report of strikes (Dolbeer et al., 2016). During this period, 63% of the aircraft damaged
beyond repair due to wildlife strikes were small GA aircraft. Sixty-percent of the strikes
resulting in a destroyed aircraft occurred at GA airports. Integrated management
programs implemented by airport operators since 2000 have reduced the number of
damaging strikes. However, such actions have had little effect outside the airport
environment. A number of authors recommend pilots should proactively participate in the
safety management of wildlife hazard process (Avrenly & Dempsey; Dolbeer, 2006a;
Dolbeer et al., 2016; Eschenfelder, 2005; MacKinnon, 2004; Mendonca, 2016; Nicholson
& Reed, 2011). Effective mitigation of wildlife hazards to flight cannot occur without the
participation of pilots. The purpose of this study was to determine if a safety training
protocol could effectively enhance 14 CFR Part 141 GA pilots’ knowledge and skills to
reduce the risk of bird strikes to aviation.
The research attempted to identify:
1. If a correlation existed between the Part 141 GA pilots flight
experience, and their knowledge and skills to manage the risk of bird
strikes;
2. If the treatment was effective in enhancing the participants knowledge
and skills to reduce the risk of bird strikes; and
3. From the pilots perspective, how they managed to fly safely despite
the threat of aircraft accidents resulting from bird strikes.
Findings indicated that there was not a significant relationship between the
participants flight experience, measured in flight hours, and their knowledge and skills to
safely mitigate an inherent risk of aviation, bird hazards. It should be noted that
participants had an average of 145.06 flight hours, with a range from 15 to 345, and a
standard deviation of 110.86.
The safety training, delivered as an interactive workshop, did appear to
significantly improve the posttest scores of the experimental group, t(13) = -5.559, p <
0.05, with a large effect size, d = 2.89. The researcher also ran a Mann-Whitney test to
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determine if there were significant differences in scores between the pre-and posttest
scores of the control and experimental groups. Results were in agreement with the
previous parametric statistical tests, and indicated that the posttest scores for the
experimental group (mean rank = 11.50) were statistically significantly higher than the
control group (mean rank = 4.00), U = 56.00, z = 3.264, p < 0.05, r = 0.84. It should be
noted that nine participants in the control group completed the pretest, but only seven
took the posttest.
Finally, analysis of qualitative data helped illuminate the quantitative data
findings, as suggested by Patton (2015). A major finding of concern was the fact that
pilots had received little information about the safety management of bird hazards during
ground and flight training. Pilots of both groups indicated that this theme had been barely
addressed during their careers. The safety management of wildlife hazards to aviation and
the key elements of a sound safety culture are connected through safety training,
education, and communication (DeFusco et al., 2015). Research findings suggest that
most pilots were not aware of the U.S. NWSD, and that they were expected to report
wildlife strikes to the FAA (Reporting Culture). Several pilots could not demonstrate a
clear understanding of some characteristics of the bird hazards and risks associated with
their flight activities. For example, only the pilots of the experimental group, after the
safety training, demonstrated an adequate understanding of the KE and SRM concepts,
and how they relate to severity in case of a bird ingestion during takeoff roll and initial
climb-out (Informed Culture). When challenged with specific bird-hazard situations
addressing strategies to reduce the risk while flying in the bird-rich zone, some responses
from the control group participants were incomplete or inadequate (Flexible Culture).
When questioned about aeronautical resources that could be used to gather bird-hazard
data, most participants were not aware of the AIP, AIM, the FAA Airport Facility
Directory, and the FAA wildlife hazard (Learning Culture and Flexible Culture).

5.5

Limitations

The current study experienced a number of limitations. These factors ranged from
small sample size, to the validity of the questions used in the pretest, posttest, and follow-
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up survey questionnaire. The study was limited by having only approximately 296
possible participants in the population and an initial small sample of 17 participants. Two
pilots of the control group did not complete the posttest, and consequently the follow-up
survey questionnaire, further reducing the sample size. In the end, there were seven and
eight Part 141 GA pilots in the control and experimental groups, respectively. The
improper use of statistical tests can increase the likelihood of committing a Type I or
Type II error, and can increase the need for extra resources (Bridge & Savilowsky, 1999).
To limit the effect of a small sample size, and possible violations of assumptions of
parametric data, the current study employed nonparametric tests during the analysis of
quantitative data (Field, 2009; Privitera, 2015). The small sample size limited the
generalizability of the current findings. However, the results provide valuable
information to the researcher, Part 141 operators, to the aviation industry, the FAA,
aviation safety stakeholders, and other researchers.
Another possible limitation of this study was the validity and reliability of the
questions used during the pretest, posttest, and follow-up survey questionnaire. When a
new assessment instrument is developed, researchers should provide information about
the instrument’s reliability and validity following rigorous procedures (Polit & Beck,
2006). The researcher used the face validity procedures (Borg & Gall, 1989; DeVon et
al., 2007; Sartori, 2009) and the CVI method (DeVon et al., 2007; Polit and Beck, 2006;
Sullivan, 2011) to increase the validity and reliability of the measurement instrument.
Among the 25 MCQs used in the posttest, 21 were also used in the pretest. However, four
MCQs were worded slightly differently from the pretest (see Appendices H and I). It is
important to note that all MCQs were designed to measure the same construct, the
participants’ knowledge and skills to mitigate the risk of bird strikes. The researcher
acknowledges that these slight changes may have had an impact on the findings
(concurrent validity), as suggested by Ary et al. (2006), and/or caused instrumentation
effects, as suggested by Sekaran and Bougie (2013).
Despite possible limitations on the validity and/or reliability of this new
assessment tool, the researcher followed scientific processes to enhance its reliability and
validity. A Cronbach’s Alpha analysis indicated a coefficient of 0.603 (low internal
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reliability) and 0.823 (high internal reliability) for the pretest and posttest, respectively
(Field, 2009).
The desired participants profile included experienced pilots with different flight
experience, ranging from a few to more than 1000 flight hours. The researcher attempted
to recruit such pilots by allowing Part 141 GA aviators with different flight experiences,
flight certificates, and ratings to participate in the study. However, the participants’ flight
experienced ranged from 15 to 345 hours. The researcher supported the quantitative
findings of this study with a robust literature review, which included information from a
major GA aircraft accident due to birds. Additionally, the researcher used qualitative data
to illuminate the findings retrieved from the analysis of quantitative data.

5.6

Recommendations for Practice

The limitations of this study, in particular the small sample size, may constrain
the generalizability of the results. Nevertheless, the findings can still provide the
groundwork for the development and implementation of aviation stakeholders’ efforts to
reduce the risk of bird strikes. The Part 141 pilots’ answers to the open-ended questions
indicated possible flaws in their ground and flight training regarding the safety
management of birds by pilots. Based on this finding, and the supporting literature of
Dolbeer et al. (2016), FAA (2016a), ICAO (2013a, 2013b), and MacKinnon (2004), the
topic “safety management of wildlife hazards by pilots” should be incorporated into the
ground training of Part 141 GA pilots. In addition, flight instructors and students should
be encouraged to self-study this theme, including information derived from the analysis
of bird strikes in the U.S.; bird hazard data acquisition (e.g., AHAS, AIP); planning a
safer flight in regards to bird hazards; and pilots’ actions to mitigate the risk of bird
strikes, integrating KE and SRM concepts.
Certified Flight Instructors are the foundation of aviation safety, and play a
paramount role in the education and training processes of other pilots (FAA, 2016f).
Safety training can assist pilots in developing or enhancing their knowledge and skills to
identify the inherent hazards of flight activities, and to develop and implement SRM
strategies to mitigate the associated risks. Moreover, safety training should be tailored to
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the needs of those being trained (Manuele, 2013). During ground and flight training,
flight instructors should introduce safety management of bird hazards material.
Moreover, fictitious scenarios or even real strategies to mitigate the risk of bird strikes
while flying in the bird-rich zone could be incorporated during flight activities, when
operationally possible.
Information derived from the analysis of wildlife strike data is vital for the safety
management of wildlife hazards to aviation. It facilitates the understanding of the causes
of wildlife hazards, helps create and implement safety strategies, and assess the
effectiveness of interventions (ICAO, 2005). The reporting of wildlife strikes is not
mandatory in the U.S. (NTSB, 2009). The FAA (2013) provides guidance for pilots to
report strikes using the U.S. NWSD. Moreover, the Agency has implemented efforts in
order to encourage aviation professionals to report incidents due to wildlife (Dolbeer et
al., 2016). However, empirical data indicate that continued and improved efforts are
needed to increase the quantity and quality of wildlife strikes reported to the FAA
(Dolbeer, 2015; Dolbeer et al., 2016). Aviators have an inherent responsibility to report
all hazards in their work environment, including wildlife (Cleary & Dickey, 2010). Part
141 GA pilots should be instructed on when and how to report wildlife strikes to the
FAA, using the FAA guidelines (FAA, 2013). This will not only improve safety, but can
also help develop and maintain a robust safety culture within the organization.

5.7

Future Research Recommendations

Integrated research is vital for the safety management of wildlife hazards to
aviation. Little research has been done involving aviators in this theme. The results of this
study provided answers to the research questions. However, they also created additional
challenges that should be pursued in future research studies. The following are
recommendations to continue this path of investigation:
1. Poorly-developed assessment instruments can cause researchers to pursue
ineffective paths, resulting in the loss of resources (Douglas & Purzer, 2015). A
new study should be conducted in order to develop new questions to assess the
knowledge and skills of pilots to mitigate the risk of bird strikes. Moreover, new
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procedures could be adopted to increase the validity and reliability of the new
assessment instrument, as suggested by DeVellis (2003), DeVon et al. (2007), and
Guzey et al. (2014).
2. Results from the current study suggest that there was not a significant relationship
between flight experience, measured in flight hours, and the knowledge and skills
of Part 141 GA pilots to mitigate the risk of bird strikes. A future study should be
completed using a similar methodology, but including pilots with a greater range
of flight hours.
3. Analysis of quantitative and qualitative data suggests that the safety training,
delivered as an interactive workshop, was effective (Andrews, 1997; BrooksHarris & Stock-Ward, 1999) in enhancing the Part 141 GA pilots’ knowledge and
skills to reduce the risk of bird strikes. Future research studies could be conducted
with GA pilots with different flight qualifications, experiences, and backgrounds
(e.g., sport and corporate pilots), but using a similar framework.
4. The participants’ responses to the open-ended questions suggested they had
received little instruction and guidance during their ground and flight training
regarding the safety management of wildlife hazards. Clearly, further research
needs to be completed to gain additional understanding of this discrepancy.
5. Qualitative data elucidates the findings of quantitative data. Additionally, it adds
details and depth to information derived from the analysis of quantitative data
(Patton, 2015). Obtaining a larger amount of qualitative data prior to and after
collecting quantitative data could not only assist the researcher in understanding
the quantitative results, but also in identifying if the safety training was effective,
considering a qualitative standpoint.
6.

Increasing the sample size in future similar experiments will allow for enhanced
statistical analysis and increased power for the study; thereby providing a more
definitive conclusion.
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5.8

Final Thoughts

The aviation industry, the safest, fastest, and most far-reaching transportation
mode, is a vital contributor to the quality of life, health, and well-being of billions of
people worldwide. Globally, aviation supports 58 million direct and indirect jobs, and
contributes to US$ 2.4 trillion to the global gross domestic product (GDP) (ICAO, 2016).
In the U.S., the aviation industry strongly supports economic development and job
creation. Annually, the U.S. civil aviation system generates more than $1.6 triillion in
economic activities, supports approximately 10.6 million jobs, and accounts for five
percent of the U.S. GDP (FAA, 2017b). Some U.S. states are economically driven by
aviation. For example, civil aviation contributes to almost 20% of the Hawaiian GDP.
The U.S. GA industry supports 1.1 million jobs, and approximately $220 billion in total
economic output (GAMA, 2017).
Aviation is driven by economic activities. A thriving world and U.S. economies
provide the groundwork for the American aviation industry to grow in the medium and
long terms. According to ICAO (2016), globally, air traffic has doubled every five years
since 1977, and will continue to do so until 2030. In the U.S., commercial aviation will
experience an average annual growth of 1.9% in the next 20 years (FAA, 2017c). The
long term prospects for the GA industry are also optimistic. GA is forecast to incorporate
3,400 new aircraft, and increase the number of hours flown by 0.9 per year until 2037.
The analysis of wildlife strike data from 1990 through 2015 in the U.S indicate
that the rate of damaging strikes to GA aircraft has increased since 2000 (Dolbeer et al.,
2016). Several factors contribute to the growing threat of aircraft accidents due to bird
strikes, including increased air traffic, and expanding populations of large birds (Cleary
& Dolbeer, 2005; Dolbeer et al., 2016). The forecast growth for the U.S. aviation industry
and the ever-increasing risk of aircraft accidents due to wildlife strikes, require new
strategies and great effort in order to continuously improve aviation safety. Involving
pilots in this process is not an option anymore, it is a requirement.
Providing Part 141 GA pilots, through specific safety training, with the
knowledge and skills to mitigate the risk of bird strikes could:
1. Reduce the number of human fatalities and injuries due to bird strikes;
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2. Reduce direct and indirect costs associated with damaging strikes;
3. Increase the quality and quantity of wildlife strike reports by pilots; and
4. Support the sustainable growth of the U.S. aviation industry.
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APPENDIX A: FLIGHT CREW TRAINING GUIDANCE TO REDUCE THE RISK OF BIRD STRIKES

Phase of flight

Suggested Techniques
Review available information on the risk of bird strikes related to the entire flight a / b / c / d / e / f / g / h / i / r / w / y / z.
Consider strategies to reduce the risk (probability and/or severity of bird strikes) a. Examples include the use
of speeds and flaps settings that provide the best angle of climb speed during initial climb-out a / i / j, planning

Flight Planning

the flight to operate above bird-rich zone as much as possible during the entire flight (expedited climb / late
descent) a / i / c, and reducing airspeed and flight time while flying in the bird-rich zone a / c / w / x / y.
Obtain useful information from, among others: NOTAMs; the Aeronautical Information Manual; the
Aeronautical Information Publication, the FAA airport facilities directory, the FAA wildlife strikes resource
website; the U.S. Air Force AHAS; and previous scientific studies a / s / t / x.
Observe wildlife activity when approaching the aircraft a / h.
Be alert for signs of nesting birds in airframes and engines a.

Preflight Preparation

Be aware of information provided by the Air Traffic Control (ATC) in regards to wildlife activities a.
Discuss emergency procedures that are applicable in case of a bird strike during the review of aircraft
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emergencies a / ac.

Appendix A continued
Be alert and note wildlife reports by ATC and other operators a.
Report observed wildlife activity to ATC a / q.
Consider using another runway after assessing the risks of a bird strike a.
Taxi for takeoff

Consider delaying takeoff until the birds have dispersed a / q.
Heat the windshield, if possible, since heat may increase the windshield pliability and its ability to withstand a
bird strike a / ad.
Use the aircraft radar to enhance escape responses of certain species of birds k.
Use the aircraft external lights (e.g., landing lights) to enhance the detection of the aircraft by certain bird
species a / l / m / ac / ad / ae.
Check the runway for the presence of wildlife before commencing takeoff a.
Be prepared to wait airport personnel to clear wildlife a / q.
Use the aircraft external lights during takeoff a / e / m / n / ac / ad / ae.

Takeoff

Select engine ignition for takeoff to enhance engine flameout protection a.
Be prepared to mitigate the risk of a strike (e.g., rejected takeoff; engine failure after takeoff) a.
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Remember to reduce speed and flight time while flying in the bird-rich zone a / c / d.

Appendix A continued
Use speeds and flaps setting that provide the best angle of climb speed until clearing the bird-rich zone a / j.
Clear the bird-rich zone as rapidly as possible a / d / i / j / k / r.
Climb
Use the aircraft external lights until clearing the bird-rich zone a / e / m / n / ac / ad / ae.
Be prepared to mitigate an engine failure (probability is higher during the climb phase-of-flight) i
Listen to ATC to obtain up-to-date information on bird hazard a / h.
En-route
Plan descent and approach in order to minimize flight time and airspeed while in the bird-rich zone a / c / d.
Adjust descent (and consequently approach) in order to minimize flight time and airspeed while in the bird-rich
zone a / c / d / r
Descent

Descend with idle power and avoid low-altitude level flight if operationally possible r
Consider asking for an alternate runway in case bird activity has been reported in a specific runway a.
Use the aircraft external lights and maintain them on until the after-landing procedures a / m / n / ac / ad / ae .
Adjust approach in order to minimize flight time and airspeed while in the bird-rich zone a / c / d / s / x .

Approach

Minimize the airspeed to reduce the severity of potential bird strikes a / c / d / s / x.

after power is increased a / r .
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Consider a go-around if birds are encountered, but only if the go-around can be initiated without striking birds

Appendix A continued
Plan on additional landing distance because bird ingestions may disable thrust reversers a / j.
Landing

Consider avoiding using thrust-reversers (if possible) if suspicious of bird ingestions (to reduce damage to the
engine) a .
Maintain control of the aircraft a / h.
Reduce airspeed if the windshield has been penetrated a .
Consider the use of sunglasses or smoke goggles to protect the eyes from wind, debris, and precipitation a.
Refer to the appropriate aircraft operating manual (checklist) and/or pilot’s operating handbook and carry out

In case of a bird strike

the applicable procedures a.
Notify ATC a / h.
Consider landing at the most suitable airport a.
Assess damage and its effects on landing performance a.
Follow the FAA guidance while reporting the bird strike p.

Note1. Information provided here is based on well documented recommended practices, scientific studies, and FAA wildlife related documents, and it is not
meant to supersede any SOPs contained in approved aircraft operating manuals or pilot’s operating handbooks a / h.
Note 3. To date, there is no single on-board technology available specifically designed to reduce the risk of bird strikes u.
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Note 2. Currently, the bird-rich zone for air carriers and GA is below 3,500 AGL c / d.

Appendix A continued
Note 4. Report the presence of birds to ATC in any phase of flight so that ATC and other aircraft will have current information a / h / m / v.
Note 5. Report all wildlife strikes to the FAA. Provide as much information as possible (e.g. altitude; phase of flight)
Note 6. Submit bird remains for identification

o/s

j/o/p/r/s/v/w/x

.

.

Note 7. More research is needed to validate the use of the aircraft external lights and/or radar as strategies to reduce the risk of bird strikes. However, findings of
previous scientific studies showed that both techniques hold the potential to reduce the risk of strikes with certain species

a/k/l/m/n

Note 8. The kinetic energy equation indicates that the aircraft airspeed is more critical than the bird mass in regards to the severity in case of a bird strike c / j / y / aa
/ ab / ad

.

Note 9. In case of a bird encounter flight crews should pull up, consistent with good flying techniques, to attempt to pass over them b / j / k / aa. However, pilots
should also be aware that birds flying close to the ground (e.g., during the aircraft takeoff roll or close to touchdown) exhibit unpredictable maneuvers when
threatened aa.
Note 10. The safety training protocol of this study will not address procedures and techniques to be used by pilots in case of bird strikes. However, the reporting
of bird strikes by pilots will be covered.
Note 11. a(MacKinnon, 2004), b(DOT, 2016), c(Dolbeer, 2006a),, d(Dolbeer et al., 2016), e(Dolbeer & Barnes, 2017), f(FAA, 2009), g(Mendonca, 2008b),
h

(Mendonca, 2011), i(Avrenli & Dempsey, 2014), j(Eschenfelder & Hull, 2006), k(Eschenfelder & DeFusco, 2010), l(Sheridan et al., 2015), m(Doppler et al.,

2015), n(Blackwell et al., 2012), o(DeVault et al., 2013), p(FAA, 2013), q(Dolbeer, 2007), r(Nicholson & Reed, 2011), s(FAA, 2016c); t(NTSB, 2009); u(Blackwell
et al., 2012); v(FAA, 2016a); w(ICAO, 2012); x(ICAO, 2013a); y(Nicholson & Reed, 2011); z(CIAIAC, 2016); aa(Dolbeer, 2006b); ab(Eschenfelder, 2005); ac(FSF,
1989); ad(MacKinnon et al., 2003), ae(Dolbeer & Barnes, 2017).
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APPENDIX B: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL LETTER
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APPENDIX C: INVITATION (E-MAIL) LETTER

Email subject line: General aviation pilots needed for a research study
Dear Prospective Participant:
As part of the continuous process to attempt to reduce wildlife strike events occurring with aircraft,
and consequently improve aviation safety, a research project is being conducted by Purdue
researchers in the School of Aviation and Transportation Technology (SATT). The research
project is focused on safety management systems and aeronautical decision-making concepts, and
strategies to prevent aircraft accidents due to wildlife strikes, with the ultimate goal of improving
aviation safety. This study will involve participating in a safety training session addressing the
safety management of wildlife. After an assessment of the pilots’ demographics, participants will
be randomly-assigned to one of two groups: the treatment group and the control group. Both groups
will be asked to take a pretest in appropriate sessions. In approximately ten days after the pretest,
the treatment group will be provided a two-hour interactive workshop on safety management
systems (SMS) and aeronautical decision-making (ADM) concepts, and on the safety management
of wildlife hazards to aviation. Both groups will then be asked to complete a posttest. Both the
pretest and the posttest are made up of 25 multiple choice questions and three open-ended
questions covering SMS and ADM concepts. Each test will not take longer than 20 minutes to
complete. If needed, the researchers will deliver the pretest, the safety training (experimental
group), and/or the posttest in more than one session to facilitate your participation. In
approximately 12 days after the posttest, participants of both groups will be asked to complete a
short follow-up online survey questionnaire with 10 open-ended questions. The control group will
then be offered an opportunity for a training session on SMS and ADM concepts, and on the safety
management of wildlife hazards to aviation. Refreshments will be provided during the pretest,
safety training, and the posttest. Additionally, as a means to offset possible inconvenience due to
participation in this study, a $25 gift card will be provided to each pilot who completes the entire
study. Your identity will remain confidential, and your participation is completely voluntary. If
you choose, you may opt out of the study at any time, without any negative consequences.
You are eligible to participate in this study if you are at least 18 years old, are a flight student or
flight instructor in the Purdue University professional flight program or at Purdue Aviation, and
have flown in the last 6 months.
Thank you in advance for your attention and for devoting your time to support this project which,
with your experience and knowledge, will surely help to improve safety regarding wildlife hazards
to aviation.
If you have any questions, are interested in learning more, or would like to participate, please
contact Dr. Thomas Carney at 765-494-9954 (tcarney@purdue.edu), or Flavio Mendonca at 765476-1654 (fmendonc@purdue.edu).
Sincerely,
Dr. Thomas Carney, Principal Investigator
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APPENDIX D: PURDUE UNIVERSITY PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM
(CONTROL GROUP)

Exploiting Science: Enhancing the Safety Training of Pilots to Reduce the Risk of Bird
Strikes
Thomas Carney, Ph.D.
School of Aviation and Transportation Technology
Purdue University
Purpose of study: This experiment is part of a larger effort to mitigate the risk of wildlife strikes
to aviation. You are being asked to participate in this project because of your aviation knowledge
and experience. This study may be beneficial to the general aviation community by improving
the safety training of aviation professionals.
Specific procedures: You have been randomly-assigned to the control group of this study. You
will be asked to write down your name and Purdue e-mail in an attendance sheet where you will
receive a code, an odd number. You should use this code while answering the assessments
during this study. You will then be asked to complete the pretest, an assessment on the safety
management systems (SMS) and aeronautical decision-making (ADM) concepts, and on the
safety management of wildlife hazard to aviation, that also includes demographics questions. In
approximately 15 days, you will be asked to complete a posttest, an assessment on the safety
management systems (SMS) and aeronautical decision-making (ADM) concepts, and on the
safety management of wildlife hazards to aviation. In approximately 12 days after the posttest,
you will receive an e-mail asking you to complete a short online follow-up survey questionnaire
with ten open-ended questions. If needed, the researchers will deliver the posttest in more than
one session to facilitate your participation. You will NOT have to disclose any personally
identifying information in the pretest, posttest, and the short online follow-up survey
questionnaire.
Duration of participation: You will be asked to complete all of the experiences described. The
pretest and posttest will take you approximately 20 minutes each. The short online follow-up
survey questionnaire will take you no more than 20 minutes to complete. The entire study will
last approximately six weeks.
Risks: With regard to your safety, the risk is minimal: no more risk exists than the amount
encountered in everyday life. If you experience frustration or undue stress during any part of the
study, notify the researcher and the experiment will be stopped. In addition, please keep in mind
that your participation is completely voluntary and you can leave the experiment at any time
without consequence by informing the experimenter that you wish to stop participating in the
study. Breach of confidentiality is a risk; safeguards to minimize those risks can be found in the
confidentiality section.
Potential benefits: You may learn and/or enhance your aeronautical decision-making and safety
management abilities. You will be offered an extra-session on SMS and ADM concepts, and on
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wildlife hazard management after the data has been collected and analyzed so that you can
benefit from this study. Most importantly, the information obtained from this study may suggest
ways to improve the flight training of GA pilots and other aviation professionals. We hope that
the benefits to society will be a greater understanding of the safety management of wildlife
hazards.
Compensation: Refreshments will be offered during the pretest, interactive workshop, and
posttest. In addition, as a means to offset possible inconvenience due to participation in this
study participants will be given a $25 gift card upon completion of the pretest, posttest, and short
follow-up online survey questionnaire. If you decide to withdraw before completing the entire
study, you will receive a $5 gift card if you have taken the pretest, and a $10 gift card if you have
completed the pretest, and the posttest.
It is important to highlight that payments to non-resident aliens are subject to withholding and
reporting rules that require tax withholding at the time of payment. Non-resident aliens who
participate is this study may receive a lower rate because taxes will be deducted.
Confidentiality: Your confidentiality is of the highest concern to the researchers. Therefore, all
data collected from you will remain anonymous and confidential. Only the authorized
researchers will have access to identifying data. To prevent any link between your identifying
information and performance, all forms with your information will be kept in a separate file from
the data collected. Identifying information will not be used in the data analysis or in any
subsequent presentation or document. All data, including your Personal Identifying Information,
will be kept in a locked cabinet at the School of Aviation and Transportation Technology, and
destroyed six months after the conclusion of this study. Findings from this study may be
published and presented in a scientific journal or conference, but raw data will not be used in
future research. Additionally, any department at Purdue University responsible for regulatory
and research oversight may also review records from this project.
My rights in this study: Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may
choose not to participate or, if you agree to participate, you can withdraw your participation at
any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may
also decline to answer any question that makes you feel uncomfortable.
Questions about the study: For any questions regarding your rights as a research participant
and/or for research-related problems, you can contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Thomas
Carney, School of Aviation and Transportation Technology, Purdue University, at 765-494-9954
or tcarney@purdue.edu. You may also contact the Purdue University Human Research
Protection Program (HRPP), at (765) 494-5942, or via email at irb-questions@purdue.edu.
Documentation of informed consent: I have had the opportunity to read this consent form and
have the research study explained. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research
study, and my questions have been answered. I am prepared to participate in the research study
described above. I will be offered a copy of this consent form after I sign it.
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______________________________________
Participant’s signature

Date:___________

_____________________________________
Participant’s name
______________________________________
Researcher’s signature

Date:___________
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APPENDIX E: PURDUE UNIVERSITY PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM
(EXPERIMENTAL GROUP)

Exploiting Science: Enhancing the Safety Training of Pilots to Reduce the Risk of Bird
Strikes
Thomas Carney, Ph.D.
Flavio A. C. Mendonca, Ph.D. Candidate
School of Aviation and Transportation Technology
Purdue University

Purpose of study: This experiment is part of a larger effort to mitigate the risk of wildlife strikes
to aviation. You are being asked to participate in this project because of your aviation knowledge
and experience. This study may be beneficial to the general aviation community by improving
the safety training of aviation professionals.
Specific procedures: You have been randomly-assigned to the experimental group of this study.
You will be asked to write down your name and Purdue e-mail in an attendance sheet where you
will receive a code, an even number. You should use this code while answering the assessments
during this study. You will then be asked to complete the pretest, an assessment on the safety
management system (SMS) and aeronautical decision-making (ADM) concepts, and on the
safety management of wildlife hazards to aviation, that also includes demographics questions. In
approximately ten days later, you will participate in a two-hour interactive workshop addressing
SMS and ADM concepts, and the safety management of wildlife hazards. During this training,
there will be discussions addressing the aforementioned subjects. Then you will be asked to
complete a posttest, an assessment on the safety management systems (SMS) and aeronautical
decision-making (ADM) concepts, and on the safety management of wildlife hazards to aviation.
In approximately 12 days after the posttest, you will receive an e-mail asking you to complete a
short online follow-up survey questionnaire with ten open-ended questions. If needed, the
researchers will deliver the safety training in more than one session to facilitate your
participation. You will NOT have to disclose any personally identifying information in the
pretest, posttest, or the short online follow-up survey questionnaire.
Duration of participation: You will be asked to complete all of the experiences described. The
interactive workshop, which will be conducted in approximately ten days after the pretest, will
last approximately two hours. The pretest and posttest will take you approximately 20 minutes
each. The posttest will occur immediately after the interactive workshop. The short online
follow-up survey questionnaire, which will occur in approximately 12 days after the posttest,
will take you no more than 20 minutes to complete. The entire study will last approximately six
weeks.
Risks: With regard to your safety, the risk is minimal: no more risk exists than the amount
encountered in everyday life. If you experience frustration or undue stress during any part of the
study, notify the researcher and the experiment will be stopped. In addition, please keep in mind
that your participation is completely voluntary and you can leave the experiment at any time
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without consequence by informing the experimenter that you wish to stop participating in the
study. Breach of confidentiality is a risk; safeguards to minimize those risks can be found in the
confidentiality section.
Potential benefits: You may learn and/or enhance your aeronautical decision-making and safety
management abilities. Additionally, the information obtained from this study may suggest ways
to improve the flight training of GA pilots and other aviation professionals. The researchers hope
that the benefits to society will be a greater understanding of the safety management of wildlife
hazards.
Compensation: Refreshments will be offered during the pretest, interactive workshop (safety
training), and posttest. In addition, as a means to offset possible inconvenience due to
participation in this study, participants will be given a $25 gift card upon completion of the
pretest, safety training, posttest, and short follow-up online survey questionnaire. If you decide to
withdraw before completing the entire study, you will receive a $5 gift card if you have taken the
pretest, and a $10 gift card if you have completed the pretest, safety training, and the posttest.
It is important to highlight that payments to non-resident aliens are subject to withholding and
reporting rules that require tax withholding at the time of payment. Non-resident aliens who
participate is this study may receive a lower rate because taxes will be deducted.
Confidentiality: Your confidentiality is of the highest concern to the researchers. Therefore, all
data collected from you will remain anonymous and confidential. Only the authorized
researchers will have access to identifying data. To prevent any link between your identifying
information and performance, all forms with your information will be kept in a separate file from
the data collected. Identifying information will not be used in the data analysis or in any
subsequent presentation or document. All data, including your Personal Identifying Information,
will be kept in a locked cabinet at the School of Aviation and Transportation Technology, and
destroyed six months after the conclusion of this study. Findings from this study may be
published and presented in a scientific journal or conference, but raw data will not be used in
future research. Additionally, any department at Purdue University responsible for regulatory
and research oversight may also review records from this project.
My rights in this study: Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may
choose not to participate or, if you agree to participate, you can withdraw your participation at
any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may
also decline to answer any question that makes you feel uncomfortable.
Questions about the study: For any questions regarding your rights as a research participant
and/or for research-related problems, you can contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Thomas
Carney, School of Aviation and Transportation Technology, Purdue University, at 765-494-9954
or tcarney@purdue.edu. You may also contact the Purdue University Human Research
Protection Program (HRPP), at (765) 494-5942, or via email at irb-questions@purdue.edu.
Documentation of informed consent: I have had the opportunity to read this consent form and
have the research study explained. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research
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study, and my questions have been answered. I am prepared to participate in the research study
described above. I will be offered a copy of this consent form after I sign it.
______________________________________
Participant’s signature

Date:___________

_____________________________________
Participant’s name (printed)
______________________________________
Researcher’s signature

Date:___________
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APPENDIX F: PARTICIPANTS DEMOGRAPHICS ASSESSMENT

1. How many total flight hours have you logged?
a. 0-100
b. 101-200
c. 201-300
d. 301-400
e. 401-500
f. 501+
2. Please circle all ratings and certificates held.
a. Private
b. Instrument
c. Commercial single-engine
d. Commercial multi-engine
e. CFI
f. Other
3. In which training environment did you earn your pilot certificate(s) (select all that apply)?
a. Part 61
b. Part 141
c. Four-year Collegiate Aviation Program
d. Military
f. Other
4. Have you taken any academic course addressing the safety management of wildlife hazards?
a. Yes
b. No
4.1 In case you have, how many hours have you taken addressing this theme?
a. None.
b. 0.1-3 hours
c. 3.1-6 hours
d. 6.1-10 hours
d. More than 10 hours
5. How many hours of self-study have you had on the safety management of wildlife of wildlife
hazards?
a. None.
b. 0.1-3 hours
c. 3.1-6 hours
d. 6.1-10 hours
d. More than 10 hours
6. Have you had a wildlife strike before?
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a. Yes
b. No
If you have, how many?
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APPENDIX G: BANK OF QUESTIONS

TECHNICAL / OPERATIONAL:
1. The highest risk of an engine failure due to a bird strike is during the following phase of flight:
a. Final approach
b. Cruise
c. Landing
d. Initial climb-out
2. The majority of bird strikes involving general aviation aircraft occurs:
a. Above 1,000 AGL
b. Below 200 feet AGL
c. Below 3,500 feet AGL
d. Above 1,500 feet AGL
3. The risk of a bird strike is higher:
a. During the day
b. During the night
c. During dusk
d. During dawn
4. The likelihood of a damaging bird strike is higher:
a. Below 200 feet AGL
b. Above 500 feet AGL
c. Above 5,500 feet AGL
d. Below 500 feet AGL
5. During climb, pilots should clear bird-hazard risk areas by using airspeeds and flap
configurations that provide:
a. The best rate of climb (Vy)
b. The best angle of climb (Vx)
c. The takeoff safety speed (V2)
d. The aircraft design maneuvering speed (Va)
5.1. Why would you use that configuration?
6. When does the majority of bird strikes in the U.S. occur?
a. Between July and October
b. Between March and June
c. Between May and September
d. Between November and February
7. The degree of severity resulting from a bird strike is influenced by several factors, including:
a. The altitude of the aircraft and its airspeed
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b. The outside air temperature (OAT) and the aircraft configuration
c. The aircraft airspeed and the mass of the bird
d. The mass of the bird and the altitude of the aircraft
8. The probability of a bird strike, while flying in the bird-rich zone, is an inverse function of the
aircraft:
a. Airspeed
b. Rate of climb
c. Configuration
d. Angle of attack
9. Empirical evidence indicates that actions by pilots:
a. Can reduce the severity of a bird strike
b. Can reduce the probability of a bird strike
c. A and B are correct
d. Will most likely not mitigate the risk of a bird strike
10. If a pilot flying at 1,500 AGL sees a flock of birds at approximately the same altitude, which
action could they take to try to prevent a strike?
a. Pull up
b. Initiate a turn to either side
c. Dive the aircraft
d. Initiate a turn to either side and dive the aircraft
11. On short final, if birds are encountered, the recommended action to perform should be:
a. To execute a go-around
b. To maintain a low thrust setting and fly through the birds
c. To pull up, avoid the birds, and land
d. To dive the aircraft and fly underneath the birds
12. There is empirical evidence that the following aircraft systems may assist pilots in mitigating
the risk of bird strikes involving certain species of birds:
a. Aircraft external lights and transponder
b. Aircraft radar and external lights
c. Aircraft traffic collision avoiding system (TCAS) and external lights
d. Aircraft ground proximity warning systems (GPWS) and transponder
13. The risk of damage to the aircraft engine(s) due to bird ingestions is higher:
a. During takeoff roll and initial climb-out
b. During the approach and landing
c. During landing and takeoff roll
d. During cruise and descent
14. The bird-rich zone is defined as the airspace where most bird strikes occur. Which actions
could aviators take to mitigate the risk of bird strikes in regards to the bird-rich zone?
a. Reduce flight time and airspeed while flying in the bird-rich zone
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b. Increase the flight time and the airspeed while flying in the bird rich zone
c. Increase flight time but decrease airspeed while flying in the bird rich zone
d. Decrease flight time but increase airspeed while flying in the bird rich zone
15. Which factors should pilots consider while planning their flights to mitigate the risk of a bird
strike?
a. Birds tend to be more active during the day and dusk
b. Birds tend to be more active during dusk and dawn
c. Birds tend to be more active during dusk and night
d. Birds tend to be more active during dawn and day
16. The majority of bird strikes occurs:
a. In the airport environment
b. Outside the airport environment but still close to the airport
c. En-route
d. In published visual flight rules (VFR) routes
17. By reducing the aircraft airspeed while flying in the bird-rich zone, pilots will:
a. Reduce the probability of a bird strike
b. Reduce the severity of a bird strike
c. Increase the probability a bird strike
d. Increase the risk of an aircraft accident due to a bird strike
18. The following safety tool is based on several years of historical bird habitat, migration, and
breeding behavior data and provides a relative probability of bird strikes for a particular
geographical area:
a. The Bird Strike Committee USA Website
b. The FAA Wildlife Strike Resources System
c. The Avian Hazard Advisory System
d. The Wildlife Hazard Warning System
19. Based on empirical evidence, the risk of a bird strike decreases dramatically:
a. Below 1,000 feet AGL
b. Above 3,500 feet AGL
c. Above 500 feet AGL
d. Below 500 feet AGL
20. Empirical evidence indicates that the following action by pilots could help mitigate the risk
of bird strikes during takeoff:
a. Turn on the aircraft windshield heat
b. Turn on the aircraft transponder
c. Turn on the aircraft Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS)
d. Turn on the aircraft deicing system
21. During the approach, the use of the aircraft ___________ can enhance the bird-response
behavior to an approaching aircraft:
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a. Radar
b. External lights
c. Windshield heat
d. Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS)
22. If there is an altitude band where birds are anticipated, pilots should:
a. Climb through these altitudes as quickly as possible, using the manufacturer’s
recommended best rate of climb speed
b. Climb through these altitudes as quickly as possible, using the manufacturer’s
recommended best angle of climb speed
c. Climb through these altitudes as quickly as possible, using the manufacturer’s
recommended takeoff safety speed (V2)
d. Climb through these altitudes as quickly as possible, using the manufacturer’s
recommended aircraft design maneuvering speed
23. Aeronautical decision-making (ADM) is a systematic approach to the mental process used
by pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set of
circumstances. One of the ADM principles is that:
a. The ability to make good decisions is based upon direct experience
b. Certain hazards, such as wildlife, cannot be effectively mitigated by general aviation
pilots
c. As pilots continue to log accident-free flight hours, a corresponding increase of good
judgment should be assumed
d. Safety requires the use of appropriate and effective risk management in all stages
of the flight
24. The majority of bird strikes to aircraft occur:
a. On approach
b. During landing roll
c. En route
d. During takeoff run
25. The kinetic energy equation indicates that the _________ is more critical than the ________
in regards to the severity in case of a bird strike.
a. Bird mass / aircraft rate of descent
b. Bird mass / aircraft airspeed
c. Aircraft rate of descent / aircraft airspeed
d. Aircraft airspeed / bird mass
26. You are cleared by ATC to descend from 6,000 feet to 1,500 feet AGL and you are aware
that you will fly through an area where other pilots reported the presence of birds. Which actions
could you take to mitigate the risk of a bird strike, if operationally possible?
a. Increase your rate of descent and airspeed
b. Increase your rate of descent without increasing your airspeed
c. Reduce your rate of descent and airspeed
d. Reduce your rate of descent and airspeed
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27. Birds ______ feet will usually dive when they detect an approaching aircraft.
a. Above 100 feet AGL
b. Below 100 feet AGL
c. Above 500 feet AGL
d. Below 400 feet AGL
28. The risk of an engine failure due to bird ingestions is higher at _________ altitudes during
the ________ phase of flight.
a. Lower / approach
b. Lower / climb
c. Higher / climb
d. Higher / approach
29. A bird strike during _______ is significantly more likely to result in an engine failure than
during __________.
a. Descent / Approach
b. Approach / Climb
c. Climb / Descent
d. Landing / Descent
30. The probability of a bird ingestion with damage to the engine is higher during the following
phases of flight:
a. En-route and descent
b. Approach and landing roll
c. Descent and approach
d. Takeoff run and climb
31. The FAA encourages pilots to report wildlife strikes to aircraft. In which situation are pilots
expected to report a bird strike?
a. When observing the presence of birds at the taxiway
b. When the presence of birds on final approach prompts a missed-approach
c. When ATC relay information about the presence of birds in a specific location
d. When observing the presence of birds at the tarmac
32. The severity of a bird strike is a direct function of:
a. The aircraft rate of climb and mass of the bird
b. The aircraft angle of attack and airspeed
c. The aircraft airspeed and mass of the bird
d. The aircraft airspeed and rate of climb
33. You are the captain of a single-pilot jet aircraft. You are descending from 10,000 feet to
1,500 feet AGL. ATC and other aircraft reported birds at 5,500 feet AGL and below. Which
actions could you take to mitigate the risk of an accident due to birds if operationally possible?
a. Increase airspeed and rate of descent
b. Decrease airspeed and use idle-power
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c. Increase airspeed and use idle-power
d. Decrease airspeed and increase power
34. You are planning a cross-country flight that will most likely pass along a major U.S.
migratory flyway. Where can you obtain information about the migration patterns of birds as
well as a forecast of bird movements within a low level flight arena for the contiguous 48 U.S.?
a. The FAA Wildlife Hazard Management Website
b. The U.S. Department of Agriculture Website
c. The U.S. Bird Strike Committee Website
d. The U.S. Avian Hazard Advisory System Website
35. You are flying solo at 2,000 feet when you see a flock of birds at around the same altitude.
The recommended action you can take to mitigate bird strikes, if operationally possible, will be:
a. Pull up, consistent with good flying techniques to attempt to pass over them
b. Dive, consistent with good flying techniques to attempt to pass below them
c. Turn right or left, consistent with good flying techniques to attempt to avoid them
d. A combination of “B” and “C”
36. You are the captain of a Boeing 787. You are on final approach close to the runway at
Chicago O’Hare International Airport when you observe a flock of birds. You realize that your
aircraft will probably hit some birds. Which actions would you take to mitigate the risk of bird
strikes, if operationally possible? Why?
a. Initiate a go-around and attempt a second approach
b. Fly through the birds and land
c. Initiate a go-around and divert to another airport
d. Fly through the birds and then initiate a go-around
36.1 Can you explain why you would take that action?
37. You are planning a local flight for the next weekend. You will take some friends on a onehour ride, and will fly no farther than 30 miles away from KLAF. What can you do to reduce the
probability of bird strikes?
a. Fly above 1,000 feet AGL as much as possible
b. Fly below 3,500 feet AGL as much as possible
c. Fly above 4,500 feet AGL as much as possible
d. Fly below 2,500 feet AGL as much as possible
38. You are about to takeoff at an airport with reported bird activity. The most effective way for
you to reduce the probability of a bird strike after takeoff will be to:
a. Fly at the lowest airspeed possible
b. Minimize the rate of climb
c. Fly at the highest airspeed possible
d. Maximize the rate of climb
39. You have just taken off and are about to fly through a bird-rich zone. You should ________
the ________ to reduce the severity of a possible bird strike.
a. Decrease / rate of climb
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b. Decrease / airspeed
c. Increase / airspeed
d. Increase / rate of climb
40. You will most likely fly through an area where the presence of birds is expected. The
following factors could directly impact the amount of damage to the aircraft in case of a bird
strike:
a. Engine thrust and aircraft rate of descent
b. Aircraft rate of descent and airspeed
c. Engine thrust and aircraft airspeed
d. Aircraft airspeed and configuration
41. The degree of severity in case of a bird strike is influenced by a variety of factors, including:
1. Time of the day
2. Aircraft rate of descent
3. Bird mass
4. Number of birds involved
5. Point of impact on an aircraft
a. 1, 2, and 5
b. 2, 3, and 5
c. 1, 3, and 5
d. 3, 4, and 5
42. The majority of bird strikes in the U.S. occurs during the ___________ phase of flight.
a. Climb
b. Takeoff run
c. Landing roll
d. Approach
43. Bird strikes during _________ are substantially more hazardous with respect to engine
failure than those during _______ and __________.
1. Climb
2. Landing roll
3. Approach
4. Takeoff run
5. Descent
a. 4; 2 and 3
b. 2; 3 and 5
c. 2; 1 and 4
d. 5; 4 and 5
44. Which factors should you consider while planning your flight to mitigate the risk of bird
strikes?
a. Birds do not fly at night
b. Birds do not fly in poor visibility conditions (e.g., fog, rain)
c. Jet engine spinner markings repel birds
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d. Birds generally dive to avoid a conflicting aircraft
45. The FAA strongly encourages pilots to report bird strikes. In which situations are you
expected to report a strike?
1. The presence of birds at the airport environment was reported by air traffic control
2. Evidence of a strike was identified on the aircraft wing (without damage)
3. You had to abort the takeoff due to birds at the runway
4. You observed the presence of birds at the tarmac
a. 1, and 3
b. 2 and 3
c. 1 and 2
d. 3 and 4
46. If you are considering flying to an airport located along one of the major North American
flyways, you should look for information about birds migrating patterns and forecast. Where can
you find such information?
47. If operationally possible, what is the safest strategy pilots should adopt to mitigate the
probability and severity of a bird strike while flying in the bird-rich zone? Why?
48. If birds were encountered en-route, what actions, if operationally possible, would you take to
attempt to prevent a strike?
49. You landed at KLAF after a cross-country flight. Upon leaving the aircraft, you observe the
remains of birds on the leading edge of the right wing. What should you do? Why?
50. Which factor is more critical in case of a bird strike, the mass of the bird or the aircraft
airspeed? Why?
51. How often do you receive guidance and/or training about the safety management of wildlife
to aviation? If you have received, could you share your experiences?
52. Why should you report bird strikes? How can you report a bird strike??
53. In case of a bird strike, how can you ensure that the bird species is properly identified?
54. In which phases of flight is the risk of an aircraft accident due to bird ingestions the highest?
Could you explain why?
55. Why should you inform ATC about the presence of birds that you observe while you are
flying?
56. If a pilot is aware of the presence of birds in the takeoff path, which actions could be taken to
mitigate the risk of an aircraft accident?
57. What aeronautical resources could pilots use to gather information about the presence of
birds at and around airports?
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58. During the cruise phase of flight, how could pilots obtain up-to-date information about bird
hazards?
59. What actions could pilots take to enhance engine flameout protection when operating
turbine-powered aircraft in the presence of birds?
60. If you see a flock of birds close to Purdue University Airport (LAF), which actions could you
take to enhance aviation safety?
61. You are cleared by ATC to taxi to runway 10 (LAF). During the taxi you observe the
presence of birds at and near that runway. Which actions could you take, if any, to mitigate the
risk of a bird strike?
62. You are stabilized on final approach at Chicago O’Hare International Airport when you
encounter a flock of Canada geese. You feel that there is a high-probability of hitting some birds.
Which action would you take, if any, to mitigate the risk of an accident?
63. What is the most effective way for pilots to reduce the severity of a bird strike?
64. What are your recommendations, if any, for pilots to mitigate the risk of bird strikes?
65. From your perspective, how can pilots mitigate the risk of bird strikes?
66. What wildlife mitigation techniques and guidance have you been provided during your career
as a pilot? By whom?
67. What aspects of the safety management of wildlife / birds are you familiar with?
68. How is the safety management of wildlife / birds emphasized in during your flight activities
(e.g., ground training)? Could you explain?
69. How has information about the safety management of wildlife / birds been made available to
you?
70. What are your recommendations, if any, to enhance pilots’ knowledge and skills to mitigate
the risk of bird strikes?
71. What sources of information do you use for preflight and in-flight information regarding
wildlife hazards?
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APPENDIX H: PRETEST

Code:_________

Date:___________________

Administration Instructions:
Carefully read each question and the four listed alternative responses of the assessment. Assume
that you are involved in any phase of a flight (e.g., planning; climb-out; final approach). Based
on your experience and current knowledge, select the best choice and circle your answer. Please
answer the open-ended questions to the best of your knowledge.
1. The highest risk of an engine failure due to a bird strike is during the following phase of flight:
a. Final approach
b. Cruise
c. Landing
d. Initial climb-out
2. The majority of bird strikes involving general aviation aircraft occurs:
a. Above 1,000 AGL
b. Below 200 feet AGL
c. Below 3,500 feet AGL
d. Above 1,500 feet AGL
3. The likelihood of a damaging bird strike is higher:
a. Below 200 feet AGL
b. Above 500 feet AGL
c. Above 5,500 feet AGL
d. Below 500 feet AGL
4. The degree of severity resulting from a bird strike is influenced by several factors, including:
a. The altitude of the aircraft and its airspeed
b. The outside air temperature (OAT) and the aircraft configuration
c. The aircraft airspeed and the mass of the bird
d. The mass of the bird and the altitude of the aircraft
5. Empirical evidence indicates that actions by pilots:
a. Can reduce the severity of a bird strike
b. Can reduce the probability of a bird strike
c. A and B are correct
d. Will most likely not mitigate the risk of a bird strike
6. On short final, if birds are encountered, the recommended action to perform should be:
a. To execute a go-around
b. To maintain a low thrust setting and fly through the birds
c. To pull up, avoid the birds, and land
d. To dive the aircraft and fly underneath the birds
7. There is empirical evidence that the following aircraft systems may assist pilots in mitigating
the risk of bird strikes involving certain species of birds:
a. Aircraft external lights and transponder
b. Aircraft radar and external lights
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c. Aircraft traffic collision avoiding system (TCAS) and external lights
d. Aircraft ground proximity warning systems (GPWS) and transponder
8. The risk of damage to the aircraft engine(s) due to bird ingestions is higher:
a. During takeoff roll and initial climb-out
b. During the approach and landing
c. During landing and takeoff roll
d. During cruise and descent
9. The probability of a bird strike, while flying in the bird-rich zone, is an inverse function of the
aircraft:
a. Airspeed
b. Rate of climb
c. Configuration
d. Angle of attack
10. The bird-rich zone is defined as the airspace where most bird strikes occur. Which actions
could aviators take to mitigate the risk of bird strikes in regards to the bird-rich zone?
a. Reduce flight time and airspeed while flying in the bird-rich zone
b. Increase the flight time and the airspeed while flying in the bird rich zone
c. Increase flight time but decrease airspeed while flying in the bird rich zone
d. Decrease flight time but increase airspeed while flying in the bird rich zone
11. Empirical evidence indicates that the following action by pilots could help mitigate the risk
of bird strikes during takeoff:
a. Turn on the aircraft windshield heat
b. Turn on the aircraft transponder
c. Turn on the aircraft Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS)
d. Turn on the aircraft deicing system
12. During the approach, the use of the aircraft ___________ can enhance the bird-response
behavior to an approaching aircraft:
a. Radar
b. External lights
c. Windshield heat
d. Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS)
13. Aeronautical decision-making (ADM) is a systematic approach to the mental process used by
pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set of
circumstances. One of the ADM principles is that:
a. The ability to make good decisions is based upon direct experience
b. Certain hazards, such as wildlife, cannot be effectively mitigated by general aviation
pilots
c. As pilots continue to log accident-free flight hours, a corresponding increase of good
judgment should be assumed
d. Safety requires the use of appropriate and effective risk management in all stages
of the flight
14. The kinetic energy equation indicates that the _________ is more critical than the ________
in regards to the severity in case of a bird strike.
a. Bird mass / aircraft rate of descent
b. Bird mass / aircraft airspeed
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c. Aircraft rate of descent / aircraft airspeed
d. Aircraft airspeed / bird mass
15. By reducing the aircraft airspeed while flying in the bird-rich zone, pilots will:
a. Reduce the probability of a bird strike
b. Reduce the severity of a bird strike
c. Increase the probability a bird strike
d. Increase the risk of an aircraft accident due to a bird strike
16. You are cleared by ATC to descend from 6,000 feet to 1,500 feet AGL and you are aware
that you will fly through an area where other pilots reported the presence of birds. Which actions
could you take to mitigate the risk of a bird strike, if operationally possible?
a. Increase your rate of descent and airspeed
b. Increase your rate of descent without increasing your airspeed
c. Reduce your rate of descent and airspeed
d. Increase your airspeed without increasing your rate of descent
17. The risk of an engine failure due to bird ingestions is higher at _________ altitudes during
the ________ phase of flight.
a. Lower / approach
b. Lower / climb
c. Higher / climb
d. Higher / approach
18. The probability of a bird ingestion with damage to the engine is higher during the following
phases of flight:
a. En-route and descent
b. Approach and landing roll
c. Descent and approach
d. Takeoff run and climb
19. The risk of a bird strike is higher:
a. During the day
b. During the night
c. During dusk
d. During dawn
20. You are the captain of a single-pilot jet aircraft. You are descending from 10,000 feet to
1,500 feet AGL. ATC and other aircraft reported birds at 5,500 feet AGL and below. Which
actions could you take to mitigate the risk of an accident due to birds if operationally possible?
a. Increase airspeed and rate of descent
b. Decrease airspeed and use idle-power
c. Increase airspeed and use idle-power
d. Decrease airspeed and increase power
21. You are about to takeoff at an airport with reported bird activity. The most effective way for
you to reduce the probability of a bird strike after takeoff will be to:
a. Fly at the lowest airspeed possible
b. Minimize the rate of climb
c. Fly at the highest airspeed possible
d. Maximize the rate of climb
22. The degree of severity in case of a bird strike is influenced by a variety of factors, including:
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1. Time of the day
2. Aircraft rate of descent
3. Bird mass
4. Number of birds involved
5. Point of impact on an aircraft
a. 1, 2, and 5
b. 2, 3, and 5
c. 1, 3, and 5
d. 3, 4, and 5
23. You are planning a cross-country flight that will most likely pass along a major U.S.
migratory flyway. Where can you obtain information about the migration patterns of birds as
well as a forecast of bird movements within a low level flight arena for the contiguous 48 U.S.?
a. The FAA Wildlife Hazard Management Website
b. The U.S. Department of Agriculture Website
c. The U.S. Bird Strike Committee Website
d. The U.S. Avian Hazard Advisory System Website
24. You are flying solo at 2,000 feet when you see a flock of birds at around the same altitude.
The recommended action you can take to mitigate bird strikes, if operationally possible, will be:
a. Pull up, consistent with good flying techniques to attempt to pass over them
b. Dive, consistent with good flying techniques to attempt to pass below them
c. Turn right or left, consistent with good flying techniques to attempt to avoid them
d. A combination of “B” and “C”
25. You are planning a local flight for the next weekend. You will take some friends on a onehour ride, and will fly no farther than 30 miles away from KLAF. What can you do to reduce the
probability of bird strikes?
a. Fly above 1,000 feet AGL as much as possible
b. Fly below 3,500 feet AGL as much as possible
c. Fly above 4,500 feet AGL as much as possible
d. Fly below 2,500 feet AGL as much as possible
26. You landed at KLAF after a cross-country flight. Upon leaving the aircraft, you observe the
remains of birds on the leading edge of the right wing. What should you do? Why?
27. Why should you inform ATC about the presence of birds that you observe while you are
flying?
28. What wildlife mitigation techniques and guidance have you been provided during your career
as a pilot? By whom?
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APPENDIX I: POSTTEST

Code:_________

Date:___________________

Administration Instructions:
Carefully read each question and the four listed alternative responses of the assessment. Assume
that you are involved in any phase of a flight (e.g., planning; climb-out; final approach). Based
on your experience and current knowledge, select the BEST choice and circle your answer.
Please answer the open-ended questions to the best of your knowledge.
1. Birds ______ feet will usually dive when they detect an approaching aircraft.
a. Above 100 feet AGL
b. Below 100 feet AGL
c. Above 500 feet AGL
d. Below 400 feet AGL
2. You are cleared by ATC to descend from 6,000 feet to 1,500 feet AGL and you are aware that
you will fly through an area where other pilots reported the presence of birds. Which actions
could you take to mitigate the risk of a bird strike, if operationally possible?
a. Increase your rate of descent and airspeed
b. Increase your rate of descent without increasing your airspeed
c. Reduce your rate of descent and airspeed
d. Increase your airspeed without increasing your rate of descent
3. You are planning a local flight for the next weekend. You will take some friends on a onehour ride, and will fly no farther than 30 miles away from KLAF. What can you do to reduce the
probability of bird strikes?
a. Fly above 1,000 feet AGL as much as possible
b. Fly below 3,500 feet AGL as much as possible
c. Fly above 4,500 feet AGL as much as possible
d. Fly below 2,500 feet AGL as much as possible
4. The degree of severity resulting from a bird strike is influenced by several factors, including:
a. The altitude of the aircraft and its airspeed
b. The outside air temperature (OAT) and the aircraft configuration
c. The aircraft airspeed and the mass of the bird
d. The mass of the bird and the altitude of the aircraft
5. Bird strikes during _________ are substantially more hazardous with respect to engine failure
than those during _______ and __________.
1. Climb
2. Landing roll
3. Approach
4. Takeoff run
5. Descent
a. 4; 2 and 3
b. 2; 3 and 5
c. 2; 1 and 4
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d. 5; 4 and 5
6. On short final, if birds are encountered, the recommended action to perform should be:
a. To execute a go-around
b. To maintain a low thrust setting and fly through the birds
c. To pull up, avoid the birds, and land
d. To dive the aircraft and fly underneath the birds
7. The likelihood of a damaging bird strike is higher:
a. Below 200 feet AGL
b. Above 500 feet AGL
c. Above 5,500 feet AGL
d. Below 500 feet AGL
8. The risk of damage to the aircraft engine(s) due to bird ingestions is higher:
a. During takeoff roll and initial climb-out
b. During the approach and landing
c. During landing and takeoff roll
d. During cruise and descent
9. A bird strike during _______ is significantly more likely to result in an engine failure than
during __________.
a. Descent / Approach
b. Approach / Climb
c. Climb / Descent
d. Landing / Descent
10. The bird-rich zone is defined as the airspace where most bird strikes occur. Which actions
could aviators take to mitigate the risk of bird strikes in regards to the bird-rich zone?
a. Reduce flight time and airspeed while flying in the bird-rich zone
b. Increase the flight time and the airspeed while flying in the bird rich zone
c. Increase flight time but decrease airspeed while flying in the bird rich zone
d. Decrease flight time but increase airspeed while flying in the bird rich zone
11. Empirical evidence indicates that the following action by pilots could help mitigate the risk
of bird strikes during takeoff:
a. Turn on the aircraft windshield heat
b. Turn on the aircraft transponder
c. Turn on the aircraft Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS)
d. Turn on the aircraft deicing system
12. During the approach, the use of the aircraft ___________ can enhance the bird-response
behavior to an approaching aircraft:
a. Radar
b. External lights
c. Windshield heat
d. Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS)
13. Aeronautical decision-making (ADM) is a systematic approach to the mental process used by
pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set of
circumstances. One of the ADM principles is that:
a. The ability to make good decisions is based upon direct experience
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b. Certain hazards, such as wildlife, cannot be effectively mitigated by general aviation
pilots
c. As pilots continue to log accident-free flight hours, a corresponding increase of good
judgment should be assumed
d. Safety requires the use of appropriate and effective risk management in all stages
of the flight
14. The kinetic energy equation indicates that the _________ is more critical than the ________
in regards to the severity in case of a bird strike.
a. Bird mass / aircraft rate of descent
b. Bird mass / aircraft airspeed
c. Aircraft rate of descent / aircraft airspeed
d. Aircraft airspeed / bird mass
15. There is empirical evidence that the following aircraft systems may assist pilots in mitigating
the risk of bird strikes involving certain species of birds:
a. Aircraft external lights and transponder
b. Aircraft radar and external lights
c. Aircraft traffic collision avoiding system (TCAS) and external lights
d. Aircraft ground proximity warning systems (GPWS) and transponder
16. The majority of bird strikes involving general aviation aircraft occurs:
a. Above 1,000 AGL
b. Below 200 feet AGL
c. Below 3,500 feet AGL
d. Above 1,500 feet AGL
17. The risk of an engine failure due to bird ingestions is higher at _________ altitudes during
the ________ phase of flight.
a. Lower / approach
b. Lower / climb
c. Higher / climb
d. Higher / approach
18. The probability of a bird ingestion with damage to the engine is higher during the following
phases of flight:
a. En-route and descent
b. Approach and landing roll
c. Descent and approach
d. Takeoff run and climb
19. You will most likely fly through an area where the presence of birds is expected. The
following factors could directly impact the amount of damage to the aircraft in case of a bird
strike:
a. Engine thrust and aircraft rate of descent
b. Aircraft rate of descent and airspeed
c. Engine thrust and aircraft airspeed
d. Aircraft airspeed and configuration
20. You are the captain of a single-pilot jet aircraft. You are descending from 10,000 feet to
1,500 feet AGL. ATC and other aircraft reported birds at 5,500 feet AGL and below. Which
actions could you take to mitigate the risk of an accident due to birds if operationally possible?
a. Increase airspeed and rate of descent
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b. Decrease airspeed and use idle-power
c. Increase airspeed and use idle-power
d. Decrease airspeed and increase power
21. You are about to takeoff at an airport with reported bird activity. The most effective way for
you to reduce the probability of a bird strike after takeoff will be to:
a. Fly at the lowest airspeed possible
b. Minimize the rate of climb
c. Fly at the highest airspeed possible
d. Maximize the rate of climb
22. The degree of severity in case of a bird strike is influenced by a variety of factors, including:
1. Time of the day
2. Aircraft rate of descent
3. Bird mass
4. Number of birds involved
5. Point of impact on an aircraft
a. 1, 2, and 5
b. 2, 3, and 5
c. 1, 3, and 5
d. 3, 4, and 5
23. You are planning a cross-country flight that will most likely pass along a major U.S.
migratory flyway. Where can you obtain information about the migration patterns of birds as
well as a forecast of bird movements within a low-level flight arena for the contiguous 48 U.S.?
a. The FAA Wildlife Hazard Management Website
b. The U.S. Department of Agriculture Website
c. The U.S. Bird Strike Committee Website
d. The U.S. Avian Hazard Advisory System Website
24. You are flying solo at 2,000 feet when you see a flock of birds at around the same altitude.
The recommended action you can take to mitigate bird strikes, if operationally possible, will be:
a. Pull up, consistent with good flying techniques to attempt to pass over them
b. Dive, consistent with good flying techniques to attempt to pass below them
c. Turn right or left, consistent with good flying techniques to attempt to avoid them
d. A combination of “B” and “C”
25. By reducing the aircraft airspeed while flying in the bird-rich zone, pilots will:
a. Reduce the probability of a bird strike
b. Reduce the severity of a bird strike
c. Increase the probability a bird strike
d. Increase the risk of an aircraft accident due to a bird strike
26. If a pilot is aware of the presence of birds in the takeoff path, which actions could be taken to
mitigate the risk of an aircraft accident?
27. During the cruise phase of flight, how could pilots obtain up-to-date information about bird
hazards?
28. If you see a flock of birds close to Purdue University Airport (LAF), which actions could you
take to enhance aviation safety?
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APPENDIX J: QUESTIONS FOLLOW-UP SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

01. Which factor is more critical in case of a bird strike, the mass of the bird or the aircraft
airspeed? Why?
02. If operationally possible, what is the safest strategy pilots should adopt to mitigate the
probability and severity of a bird strike while flying in the bird-rich zone? Why?
03. Why should you report bird strikes? How can you report a bird strike??
04. In which phases of flight is the risk of an aircraft accident due to bird ingestions the highest?
Could you explain why?
05. What aeronautical resources could pilots use to gather information about the presence of
birds at and around airports?
06. You are cleared by ATC to taxi to runway 10 (LAF). During the taxi you observe the
presence of birds at and near that runway. Which actions could you take, if any, to mitigate the
risk of a bird strike?
07. What aspects of the safety management of wildlife / birds are you familiar with?
08. Why should you inform ATC about the presence of birds that you observe while you are
flying?
09. How is the safety management of wildlife / birds emphasized in during your flight activities
(e.g., ground training)?
10. What are your recommendations, if any, for pilots to mitigate the risk of bird strikes?
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APPENDIX K: ONLINE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE – COVER LETTER

Email subject line: Wildlife Hazard Management Study – Survey Questionnaire
Dear Purdue Pilots:
As part of the continuous process to attempt to reduce wildlife strike events, and consequently
improve aviation safety, a project is being conducted by Purdue researchers. The research project
is focused on safety management systems and aeronautical decision-making concepts, and
strategies to prevent aircraft accidents due to wildlife strikes, with the ultimate goal of improving
aviation safety. This short online survey questionnaire is the last step of this project. It should not
take you longer than 20 minutes to complete this assessment. Your identity will remain
completely anonymous and confidential, and your participation is completely voluntary. You
may stop participating at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise
entitled.
Use the link provided to assess the survey questionnaire. Please do not put your name on this
survey. Remember to use the code (number) you received during the pretest to identify yourself.
You have had a unique opportunity to be part of this study that has been conceived as a
pioneering scientific research. Uncountable safety benefits are expected as a final result for this
effort.
Thank you in advance for your attention and for devoting your time to support this project.
Considering your aviation experience and knowledge, you will surely help to improve safety
regarding wildlife hazard to aviation.
If you have any questions, are interested in learning more about this project, please contact Dr.
Thomas Carney at 765-494-9954, (tcarney@purdue.edu), or Flavio Mendonca at 765-4761654
(fmendonc@purdue.edu).
Sincerely,
Dr. Thomas Carney, Principal Investigator

182

APPENDIX L: SPSS OUTPUT RESEARCH QUESTION 1

Descriptive Statistics (Flight Hours)
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

FLIGHT HOURS CG

9

15

345

187.78

115.653

FLIGHT HOURS EG

8

15

246

96.75

88.087

17

15

345

144.94

110.797

FLIGHT HOURS
PARTICIPANTS
Valid N (listwise)

8

Descriptive Statistics (Pretest Scores) – Experimental and Control Groups
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

CG.PRETEST

9

32

88

56.00

15.748

EG.PRETEST

8

44

72

59.50

11.199

17

32

88

57.65

13.495

CG.POSTTEST

7

32

68

58.29

12.406

EG.POSTTEST

8

76

96

87.50

7.540

15

32

96

73.87

17.944

PRETEST

POSTTEST
Valid N (listwise)

7

Test for Linearity – Pearson Correlation Coefficient
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Test for Outliers – Pretest

Test for Normality – Pearson Correlation Coefficient
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Statistic

df

Shapiro-Wilk

Sig.

Statistic

df

Sig.

FLIGHT.HOURS

.192

17

.098

.901

17

.070

PRETEST.SCORES

.192

17

.098

.950

17

.450

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Pearson Correlation Coefficient Test
Flight Hours
Flight Hours

Pearson Correlation

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pretest Scores

Pretest Scores
.263
.309

17

17

Pearson Correlation

.263

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

.309

N

17

17
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Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient and Kendall's Tau-b (τb) Correlation Coefficient Tests
FLIGHT.HOURS PRETEST.SCORES
Kendall's tau_b

FLIGHT.HOURS

Correlation Coefficient

1.000

.257

.

.167

17

17

Correlation Coefficient

.257

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.167

.

17

17

1.000

.326

.

.202

17

17

Correlation Coefficient

.326

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.202

.

17

17

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
PRETEST.SCORES

N
Spearman's rho

FLIGHT.HOURS

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

PRETEST.SCORES

N
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APPENDIX M: SPSS OUTPUT RESEARCH QUESTION 2

Test for Normality (Pretest) – Independent T-Test
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
GROUP
PRETEST

Statistic

Df

Shapiro-Wilk

Sig.

Statistic

df

Sig.

CONTROL

.278

9

.044

.870

9

.122

EXPERIMENTAL

.276

8

.073

.844

8

.083

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Test of homogeneity of variances - Pretest (Levene’s Test)
Levene Statistic
PRETEST

df1

df2

Sig.

Based on Mean

.013

1

15

.912

Based on Median

.000

1

15

.988

.000

1

12.298

.988

.019

1

15

.893

Based on Median and with
adjusted df
Based on trimmed mean

Independent T-Test - Pretest (Descriptive Group Statistics)
PRETEST
PRETEST

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

CONTROL

9

56.00

15.748

5.249

EXPERIMENTAL

8

59.50

11.199

3.960

Independent Sample T-test (Pretest)
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Test for Normality (Posttest) – Independent T-Test
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
GROUP
SCORES

Statistic

Df

Shapiro-Wilk

Sig.

Statistic

df

Sig.

CONTROL

.284

7

.092

.768

7

.020

EXPERIMENTAL

.276

8

.072

.822

8

.049

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Test of homogeneity of variances - Posttest (Levene’s Test) – Independent T-Test
Levene Statistic
POSTTEST

Based on Mean
Based on Median
Based on Median and with
adjusted df
Based on trimmed mean

df1

df2

Sig.

2.039

1

13

.177

.982

1

13

.340

.982

1

7.272

.353

1.544

1

13

.236

Independent T-Test - Posttest (Descriptive Group Statistics)
POSTTEST
POSTTEST

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

CONTROL

7

58.29

12.406

4.689

EXPERIMENTAL

8

87.50

7.540

2.666

Independent Sample T-Test (Posttest)
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Mann-Whitney U Test- Pretest Scores
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Mann-Whitney U Test - Posttest Scores

Boxplot of Differences: Control Group - Paired T-test
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Test for Normality (Control Group) – Paired T-test
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Statistic
difference

df

.197

Shapiro-Wilk

Sig.
8

Statistic

.200*

df

.940

Sig.
8

.613

*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Paired Samples Statistics (Control Group)
Paired Samples Statistics
Mean
Pair 1

N

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

CG.PRETEST

60.00

7

14.606

5.521

CG.POSTTEST

58.29

7

12.406

4.689

Paired Samples T-test (Control Group)
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Boxplot of Differences: Experimental Group - Paired T-test

Test for Normality (Experimental Group) – Paired T-test
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Statistic
difference

df

.135

Shapiro-Wilk

Sig.
8

Statistic

.200*

df

.979

Sig.
8

.958

*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Paired Samples Statistics (Experimental Group)
Paired Samples Statistics
Mean
Pair 1

N

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

PRET.EG

59.50

8

11.199

3.960

POST.EG

87.50

8

7.540

2.666
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Paired Samples T-test (Experimental Group)

Related-Samples Sign Test - Median values and paired differences
(Control Group)
PRETEST.CG

POSTTEST.CG

DIFFERENCE

52.00

60.00

8.00

Related-Samples Sign Test (Control Group)
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Related-Samples Sign Test - Median values and paired differences
(Experimental Group)
PRETEST.EG

POSTEST.EG

DIFFERENCE

64.00

90.00

26.00

Related-Samples Sign Test (Experimental Group)

193
Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test (Experimental Group)
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VITA

Flavio A. C. Mendonca
Purdue University
Polytechnic Institute
School of Aviation and Transportation Technology (SATT)
1401 Aviation Drive, West Lafayette, Indiana, 47907-2015

EDUCATION
o Post-Doc Researcher
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, Start date - Spring 2018
o Ph.D. Degree in Technology
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, December 2017
o MBA Degree in Business Administration
Fluminense Federal University, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, December 2010

o Master of Science Degree in Aviation Safety
University of Central Missouri, Warrensburg, Missouri, June 2009

o Bachelor of Sciences Degree in Aviation Management
Force Academy, São Paulo, Brazil, December 1989

Brazilian Air

AVIATION COURSES
o Safety Management Systems (SMS)
Brazilian Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center, Brasilia, Brazil –
2013
o The Responsibility of the Federal Justice within the Aviation Safety System
Magistrate College, Recife, Brazil – 2011
o Aircraft Accident Investigation
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA – 2006
o A-320 Ground School
TAM Airlines Academy, São Paulo, Brazil – 2006
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o Aircraft Accident Prevention Expert; Human Factors in the Prevention and
Investigation Process; Problem Solving and Decision-Making Techniques; Witness
Interview Techniques in the Prevention and Investigation Process; Conceiving and
Steering and Aviation Accident Prevention Program
Institut Français de Sécurité Aerienne, Paris, France – 2004
o Flight Safety Officer
Institut Français de Sécurité Aerienne, Paris, France – 2004
o Civil Aviation Flight Inspector
Brazilian Civil Aviation Department, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil – 2003
o Flight Safety Officer
Brazilian Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center, Brasilia, Brazil –
1996
a

o Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
Brazilian Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center, Brasilia, Brazil –
1996

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Purdue University, School of Aviation and Transportation Technology (SATT)
Graduate Teaching Assistant
January 2015 – December 2017
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Participate in the Industry Advisory Board meeting
Serve as an active member of the Purdue Safety Committee
Teach undergraduate courses
Create and executed syllabi according to accreditation standards
Distribute grades while following FERPA regulations
Assist with department functions
Conceive, conduct, and write detailed research analyses for publication
Designed a Departmental Study Abroad Program – 2016
Assisted with SMS expertise during the course of the Purdue SATT SMS project 20152016

Brazilian Air Force Officer (January 1986-November 2014)
A. Brazilian Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center (CENIPA)
January 2001 - July 2007, and January 2011 - November 2014
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•

•

•

Coordinated the development and implementation of the Brazilian Air Force annual
aviation safety program
Planned and organized the aviation safety courses provided by CENIPA
Instructed during the aviation safety courses provided by CENIPA
Acted as the keynote speaker in aviation safety seminars and workshops in Brazil
Acted in the capacity of an accredited representative in three major aircraft accidents in
accordance with the ICAO provisions
Participated in more than 30 investigations of aircraft accidents and incidents involving
Brazilian Air Force and civil aircraft as an aircraft accident investigator
Acted in the capacity of Investigator in Charge (IIC) of several aircraft accidents and
serious incidents involving Part 121 and Part 135 operators and military aircraft. IIC is a
person charged, on the basis of his or her qualifications, with the responsibility for the
organization, conduct and control of an investigation (ICAO Annex 13).
o IIC of a serious incident involving an ATR 42-500 (2014)
o IIC of an accident involving MD-11 {U.S. Registered} (2013)
o IIC of a serious incident involving an ATR 72-500 (2013)
o IIC of an accident involving ATR 42-500 (2012)
o IIC of a serious incident involving a L410UVP-E20 (2011)
o IIC of an accident involving an ATR 72-212 (2011)
o IIC of an accident involving a Brazilian Air Force Neiva Regente (1999)
o IIC of an accident involving a Brazilian Air Force Learjet 35 (1996)
Liaised with the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Transportation Safety
Board, BOEING company, EMBRAER, the International Civil Aviation Organization,
the International Air Transport Association, and the Bureau d´Enquetês et d`Analyses in
aviation safety matters in the capacity of representative of the Brazilian Government
Conducted safety audits to determine the level of compliance with established standards,
and also to assess the effectiveness of aviation safety programs
Provided aviation safety expertise during the Brazilian National Airlines Association
(ABEAR) safety meetings. ABEAR is a trade organization representing the principle
Brazilian airlines. The association's purpose is to foster a regulatory and business
environment that ensures safety, security, and a sound Brazilian airline industry
Participated and delivered presentations during the Brazilian National Committee for
Aeronautical Accident Prevention (CNPAA) meetings. Additionally, worked together
and conducted special meetings and discussions with representatives from major national
airlines, the Air Traffic Controllers’ Union, Airlines and Pilots’ Union, as well as other
relevant entities. The CNPAA is the forum for the discussion of safety matters afflicting
the aviation industry in Brazil. In addition, the CNPAA provides the stage for the
development of specific safety programs and strategies to be implemented by the
Brazilian aviation industry, such as SMS, Risk Management Processes, FOQA,
Confidential Safety Reporting System, and Hazard Reporting Systems.
Planned and organized the second Brazilian International Wildlife Hazard Conference
that occurred simultaneously with the fourth Caribbean, Central America, and South
America (CARSAM) Committee of Wildlife Hazard Prevention meeting (Rio de Janeiro
– 2005)
o This safety conference had the support of the ICAO Lima South American (SAM)
Office;
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•

•

o Persons from approximately 30 countries, representing worldwide well-known
aviation organizations (e.g., North America Bird Strike Committee), attended the
conference.
Served as the chief of the following CENIPA’s divisions: Human Resources Training and
Development (2006-2007); Operational Documents (2011-2012); Military (2013); and
Administrative (2014):
o As the chief of the CENIPA’s Human Resources Training and Development
division, I planned and assisted in the delivering of the organization’s aviation
safety courses and workshops;
o As the chief of the CENIPA’s Operational Documents, I worked with the
organization’s librarians to think more strategically about technology, and to
introduce solutions to innovate, boost quality, and align services with the
priorities of CENIPA;
o As the chief of the CENIPA’s Military division, I supervised over 105 flight
safety officers within the Brazilian Air Force. In addition, I planned and
coordinated the efforts towards the development of the Brazilian Air Force annual
aviation safety program;
o As the chief of the CENIPA’s Administrative division, I planned recreation,
leisure, and sports activities that promoted social integration and inclusion of the
organization’s members and their families. My responsibilities as the chief of this
division also included planning and managing human and financial resources that
guaranteed stable and reliable processes that supported the CENIPA’s technical
divisions in their daily work.
Acted in the capacity of Flight Safety Officer during the Ágata VI Operation (2012). The
Ágata Operation is a Brazilian Armed Forces military effort with several purposes,
among them:
o To curb cross-border criminal activities such as smuggling and illegal resource
extraction;
o To boost cooperation between the Brazilian Armed Forces and civilian agencies;
and
o To help the Brazilian Armed Forces to grow accustomed to Brazil's established
military doctrine of joint force action, which involves multiple military service
branches operating in a coordinated manner to improve fighting capabilities.

B. Third Brazilian Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Regional Office
August 2009 - December 2009
a

•
•
•

Conducted, as the IIC, the investigation of three accidents involving general aviation
aircraft;
Planned and organized a regional aviation safety seminar; and
Lectured in safety courses, workshops, conferences, and seminars.

C. Brazilian Air Force Academy
January 1998 - December 2000
• Instructed flight training, flight simulator, and ground training;
• Acted in the capacity of the Brazilian Air Force Academy flight safety officer:
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o Developed, implemented, and assisted with improving aviation safety programs;
o Conducted the investigations of several safety occurrences, including aircraft
accidents and incidents;
o Conducted safety audits;
o Revamped the Brazilian Air Force Academy emergency response plan;
o Conducted safety presentations and briefings; and
o Assisted the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority Regional Office with the
investigation of safety occurrences as well as with educational and other safety
initiatives involving the general aviation community.

AVIATION EXPERIENCE
a

Certified Flight Instructor, CFII, MEI (Brazilian certificates)
•
•
•
•
•

Certificates and Ratings: Airline Transport Pilot with Learjet 30 and Embraer 110
Ratings; Certified Flight Instructor with Airplane Single-and Multiengine and Instrument
Ratings;
Pilot Examiner;
Flight Time: 3,500 hours;
Aircraft flown: Neiva T-25 Universal, EMBRAER 312 Tucano, EMBRAER 110
Bandeirante, Neiva U-42 Regente, Aeroboero AB-115; EMBRAER 810 Seneca, and
Learjet 35;
Conducted check rides on behalf of the former Brazilian Civil Aviation Department
(DAC), and then the Brazilian National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) (2003-2014).

ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE
a

Purdue University, Office of Diversity and Inclusion
Summer 2016
• Advised Purdue incoming students on aviation, STEM, and higher education;
• Conducted the Introduction to Aviation Technology courses;
• Led camp participants in College of Technology events;
• Presented university statistics and financial resource information; and
• Promoted conversations between Purdue incoming students and the SATT current students
and faculty members.

International Civil Aviation Organization Safety Management Panel (SMP)
December 2011 - November 2014
• Provided expertise related to aviation safety and the investigation of aircraft accidents and
incidents as an adviser to the Brazilian team during the development of the first edition of
ICAO Annex 19 – Safety Management:
o Participated in several meetings of the ICAO SMP Working Group 4 (WG4)
whose responsibilities included: to enhance provisions for the collection, analysis
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and protection of safety data and safety information; to collaborate with other
ICAO relevant groups of experts such as the Safety Information Protection Task
Force (SIP-TF), and any other groups of experts involved in related activities, as
necessary for the development of additional overarching provisions in ICAO
Annex 19 as well as Annex 13. Meetings of the WG4 occurred in different
countries (Canada; U.S.; Brazil; Switzerland; Spain);
o Submitted two working papers during the ICAO SMP special meeting (2012); and
o Planned and organized a meeting of the ICAO SMP WG4 in Brazil (2014).
Brazilian Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center
March 2003 - June 2007
• Acted in the capacity of the South America coordinator of the CARSAM Committee of
Wildlife Hazard Prevention:
o Planned, developed, and organized strategies designed to assist the Committee’s
member States in developing safety programs to mitigate the risk of wildlife strikes to
aviation;
o Provided technical guidance to some CARSAM countries in order to help them
develop and implement wildlife-strike hazard reporting systems.
• Acted in the capacity of coordinator of the Brazilian national wildlife hazard management
committee:
o Responsible for promoting, fostering, and coordinating research and the
implementation of actions towards the mitigation of wildlife risks in Brazil. Among
the members of the Brazilian Committee were: the Brazilian TAM, GOL, VARIG,
VARIGLOG, and Ocean Air Airlines; the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority;
INFRAERO (Brazilian Airports Government Authority {it used to manage 97% of
the air carrier airports in Brazil}); the Brazilian Institute of Environment and
Renewable Natural Resources; and Lider Air Taxi; and
o Planned workshops and safety symposiums that promoted the engagement of local
communities’ leaders and populations, and national and state agencies’ officials in
strategies and programs towards the safety management of wildlife to aviation.

LEADERSHIP AND HONORS
a

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Purdue Graduate School Excellence in Teaching Award [nomination] (2017);
Purdue Teaching Academy Graduate Teaching Award (2017);
Bilsland Dissertation Fellowship (2017);
University Aviation Association (UAA) Second Place Virtual Poster Winner (2017);
Purdue Teaching Academy Graduate Teaching Award (2016);
University Aviation Association (UAA) Third Place Virtual Poster Winner (2016);
Purdue Graduate Aviation Council President (August 2016 to present);
Brazilian Aeronautics Honor Medal (2014);
Brazilian Air Force Officer (1986-2014):
o Brazilian Air Force Academy ultralight club safety officer;
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

o Leader of military aircraft formation (Neiva T-25 Universal, EMBRAER 312 Tucano,
EMBRAER 110 Bandeirante, and Learjet 35);
o Commanded and influenced people, including civilians, by providing purpose,
direction, and motivation during my entire tenure in the Brazilian Air Force;
o IIC during the investigation of aircraft accidents and incidents, which frequently
involved Brazilian and international organizations (e.g., NTSB), and professionals
with different cultures and backgrounds;
o In the capacity of the South America coordinator of the CARSAM Committee of
Wildlife Hazard Prevention, assisted and provided guidance on the creation of
national wildlife hazard prevention committees by ICAO CARSAM region States;
Brazilian Navy Honor Award for Aviation Safety (2013);
Instructor of the CENIPA’s online safety courses (2011-2014);
During my tenure in the Air Force, I assisted Purdue’s graduate students while they were
developing their research projects during the multicultural teams’ operations course (20102014);
Santos-Dumont Brazilian Air Force Honor Medal (2011);
Brazilian Aeronautical Accident Investigation and Prevention System (SIPAER) honor
medal (2009);
Phi Beta Delta Honor Society for International Scholars Award (2009); and
William L. Vacek Outstanding Graduate Award (2008).

FUNDED PROJECT
a

Sponsor: Delta Airlines (2016-2017). 2017 Ergonomics Assessment Project. Co-Principal
Investigator. $134,675.

PUBLICATIONS & PRESENTATIONS
a

Reviewer
•

Conexão SIPAER: Aviation safety magazine (CENIPA) (2009 to present)

Peer-Reviewed Journal Publications
Mendonca, F., Keller, J.C., Wang, Y. (2017). Managing the risk: An analysis of bird strike
reporting at part 139 airports in Indiana (2001-20014). Journal of Airline and Airport
Management, 7(1), 43-64.
Mendonca, F. A. C., & Carney, T. Q. (2017). A safety management model for FAR 141
approved flight schools. Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering, 6(2), 33-49.
Peer Reviewed Presentations
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Mendonca, F. A. C., Huang, C., Carney, T. Q., & Johnson, M. E. (2017, September). Wildlife
strikes to aircraft: An analysis of wildlife-strike reporting at the three busiest
international commercial airports in Brazil (2011-2016). Paper presented at the 70th
University Aviation Association collegiate aviation conference, Riverside, CA.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2016, September). Battling the criminalization of aircraft accidents: A case
study. Paper presented at the University Aviation Association 69th Annual Education
Conference & Expo, Omaha, Nebraska.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2016, September). Exploiting science: Enhancing pilots’ safety training to
reduce the risk of bird strikes. Paper presented at the University Aviation Association
69th Annual Education Conference & Expo, Omaha, Nebraska.
Refereed Proceedings
Mendonca, F. A. C., Huang, C., Fanjoy, R. O., & Keller, J. (2017, May). A case study using the
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework. Proceedings of
the 2017 International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.
Huang, C., Johnson, M. E., Major, W., Mendonca, F. A. C., Anne, A., & Ropp, T. D. (2016,
August). Exploring the centralized safety management to mitigate the threats and risks of
aircraft maintenance. Paper presented at the International Conference on Technology
Management – ICTM 2016, Chicago, IL.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2016, August). Exploiting science: Enhancing pilots’ safety training to
reduce the risk of bird strikes. Paper presented at the 2016 Bird Strike Committee USA
Meeting, Chicago, IL.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2013, August). Anexo 19: Gerenciamento da segurança de voo [Annex 19:
Safety management]. Paper presented at the third Brazilian Flight Test and Research
Institute Safety Symposium, São José dos Campos, Brazil.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2011, September). Airlines pilots’ perceptions concerning recommended
practices that reduce the risk of bird strikes. Paper presented at the 11th meeting of the
Bird Strike North America Conference, Niagara Falls, Canada.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2008, August). The bird hazard report as a safety tool. Paper presented at
the Tenth Bird Strike Committee USA/Canada meeting, Orlando, FL.
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Select Conference Presentations
Mendonca, F. A. C., Carney, T. Q., & Huang, C. (2017, March). Enhancing the safety training of
aviators to mitigate the risk of bird strikes: A scientific approach. Poster presented at the
Purdue Road School Transportation Conference and Expo, West Lafayette, IN.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2014, April). A prevenção do acidente organizational. [Preventing
organizational accidents]. Paper presented at the second Brazilian Air Force Aviation
Safety Seminar, Salvador, Brazil.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2009, October). O risco da avifauna para a aviação militar [Wildlife
hazards to the military aviation]. Paper presented at the fourth Brazilian Navy Seminar on
Aviation Safety, São Pedro da Aldeia, Brazil.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2006, July). O gerenciamento do risco aviário no Brasil: Ações exitosas
[Wildlife hazard management in Brazil: Successful actions]. Paper presented at the fourth
Caribbean, Central America, and South America (CARSAM) committee meeting,
Panama, Panama.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2005, November). A prevenção do risco aviário no Brasil: Um estudo de
caso [Prevention of bird strikes in Brazil: A case study]. Paper presented at the second
Brazilian International Conference on Wildlife Hazard Management, Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2005, April). Managing the risk of wildlife strikes at airports: A safety
management systems approach. Paper presented at the ICAO Airport Safety Management
Systems for the ICAO NAM/CAR/SAM Regions, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2004, September). A prevençao do risco aviário no Brasil: O papel do
Centro de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos [Prevention of bird
strikes in Brazil: The role of the Brazilian Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and
Prevention Center]. Paper presented at the second Caribbean, Central America, and South
America (CARSAM) Committee Meeting, Lima, Peru.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2003, September). O Centro de Investigação e Prevençao de Acidentes
Aeronáuticos e a prevenção do risco aviário [The role of the Brazilian Aeronautical
Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center in regards to the prevention of wildlife
strikes]. Paper presented at the first Caribbean, Central America, and South America
(CARSAM) Committee Meeting, Santiago, Chile.
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Peer Reviewed and Technical Publications
Mendonca, F. A. C., & Fanjoy, R. O. (2017, September). Flight crew guide to the mitigation of
bird strikes to aircraft: A case study. Poster presented at the University Aviation
Association 70th Annual Collegiate Aviation Conference & Expo, Riverside, California.
Mendonca, F. A. C., & Allan, A. B. (2016, September). Integrating aircraft accident
investigation and career development theories and concepts. Poster presented at the
University Aviation Association 69th Annual Education Conference & Expo, Omaha,
Nebraska.
Mendonca, F. A. C., & Johnson, M. E. (2015, October). Integrating sustainability and the safety
management of wildlife in aviation. Poster presented at the University Aviation
Association Fall Education Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2014). A prevenção e a investigação do acidente organizational
[Preventing and investigating organizational accidents] (CENIPA’s textbook). Brasília,
Brazil: CENIPA.
Mendonça, F. A.C. (Feb, 2012a). The independence of the accident and incident investigation
organization from other State aviation organizations. Working paper presented at the 2nd
International Civil Aviation Organization Safety Management Panel – SMP Meeting.
Montreal, Canada.
Mendonca, F. A.C. (Feb, 2012b). Transferring Annex 13 (Chapter 8) to Annex 19: Probable
issues for consideration by the SMP. Working paper presented at the 2nd International
Civil Aviation Organization Safety Management Panel – SMP Meeting. Montreal,
Canada.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2011a). A ficha CENIPA 15 e as atividades de prevenção do risco aviário.
[The CENIPA 15 form and the prevention of aircraft accidents due to bird strikes].
Conexão SIPAER: Aviation safety magazine, 2(3).
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2011b). Cinzas vulcânicas e a segurança de voo [Volcanic ashes and
aviation safety]. Conexão SIPAER: Aviation safety magazine, 3(1).
Mendonca, F. A. C., & Maso, D. B. (2010). Consequências da criminalização de acidentes
aeronáuticos [The consequences of the criminalization of aircraft accidents]. Conexão
SIPAER: Aviation safety magazine, 1(2).
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Mendonca, F. A. C. (2010). O professional do SIPAER [The SIPAER professional]. Conexão
SIPAER: Aviation safety magazine, 1(3).
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2009). O gerenciamento do risco aviário em aeroportos [Bird hazard
management at airports]. Conexão SIPAER: Aviation safety magazine, 1(1).
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2008). SMS for bird hazard: Assessing airlines pilots’ perceptions
(Unpublished master’s thesis). University of Central Missouri, Warrensburg, MO.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2005). O gerenciamento do risco da fauna [Wildlife hazard management]:
(CENIPA’s textbook). Brasília, Brazil: CENIPA.
Education Sessions and Seminars, Guest Lectures/Speaking
•

Purdue University
Spring, 2017
o Guest lecture. Safety management of aviation. West Lafayette, Indiana.
Fall, 2016
o Guest lecture - ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices: Investigation of
aircraft accidents and incidents. West Lafayette, Indiana.
o Guest lecture - Aviation safety: Errors and violations. West Lafayette, Indiana.
o Aviation Graduate Council research seminar, guest lecture - Exploiting science:
Enhancing pilots’ safety training to reduce the risk of bird strikes
Summer, 2016
o Guest lecture - Aviation safety concepts. West Lafayette, Indiana.
Fall, 2015
o Guest lecture - Volcanic ashes and the safety of flights. West Lafayette, Indiana.
o Poster presentation - Integrating aircraft accident investigation and career
development theories and concepts. Next generation scholars’ research fair. West
Lafayette, Indiana.
Spring, 2015
o Guest lecture - Volcanic ashes and the safety of flights. West Lafayette, Indiana.
Spring, 2009
o Guest lecture - Criminalization of aircraft accidents. West Lafayette, Indiana.
o Guest lecture - SMS for bird hazard: Assessing airlines pilots’ perceptions. West
Lafayette, Indiana.

CONFERENCES AND SYMPOSIUMS PARTICIPATION
•

Brazilian 2nd Regional Aircraft Accident Investigation and Prevention Office. General
aviation aircraft accident prevention strategies. Salvador, Brazil, (June 2017)
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•
•
•
•
•

Transportation Research Board Webinar. Presenting report 145: Applying an SMS approach
to wildlife hazard management, (February 2017)
Royal Air Force International Air Safety Symposium. Sharing good practices, Royal Air
Force College Cranwell, Lincolnshire, UK (November 2012)
Especial meeting of the International Bird Strike Committee, Noordwijk, Netherlands (May
2007)
27th International Bird Strike Committee Conference, Athens, Greece (May 2005)
Flight Safety Foundation 55th annual International Air Safety Seminar (IASS). Keeping
safety a worldwide priority, Dublin, Ireland (November 2002)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
a

CENIPA
•

Aviation Safety
o Human Factors
o Crew Resource Management
o Safety Management Systems
o Aircraft Accident Investigation
o Developing an Aircraft Accident Prevention Program
o Runway Safety
o Wildlife Hazard Management
o The Prevention of FOD
o Hazardous Materials
o Safety Risk Management
o CFIT and ALAR
o ICAO Annex 13
o Managing Organizational Accidents
o Aviation Safety Tools
o Emergency Response Plan
Purdue University (Instructor)

•

Aviation Technology
o 481 Aviation Safety (3 credit hours)
o 381 Aviation Security (3 credit hours)
o 490 Aviation Project (3 credit hours)
o 223 Human Factors (3 credit hours)
Purdue University (Co-Teaching/Teaching Assistant)

•

Aviation Technology
o 327 Advanced Transport Flight Operations (3 credit hours)
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PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP
•
•
•

Sistema de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos [Brazilian Aeronautical
Accident Investigation and Prevention System] 1996 to present;
University Aviation Association, December 2016 to present;
Purdue School of Aviation and Transportation Technology, January 2015 to present.

COMMUNITY SERVICE
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Sharing your culture presentation at Rossville Consolidated School, Rossville (IN),
November 2017;
Assisted with the planning and organizing of the “Family Day”, Purdue Latino Cultural
Center, April 2017;
Presentation about Christmas in Brazil, First Community Church, Lafayette (IN), December
2016;
Sharing your culture presentation at Rossville Consolidated School, Rossville (IN),
November 2016;
Several activities at Klondike Elementary School, August 2015 to present;
Assisting international students to get acquainted with West Lafayette and the academic life,
June 2015 to present;
Lectures about aviation and Brazil to Purdue Village Preschool students, Spring 2015;
Interpreter Volunteer at the Western Missouri Medical Center, August 2007 to July 2009.

RESEARCH INTERESTS
•

a

Aircraft Accident Investigation, Aviation Security, Human Factors, Safety Management
Systems, and Safety Management of Wildlife

